

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THE MEETING GROUND OF SYNTAX AND PRAGMATICS[1]

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1. INTRODUCTION

Pragmatics, as Georgia Green has recently defined it, has to do with «the factors that influence a speaker's choice to say something the way she does, and the hearer's interpretation of what has been said, and what was meant by it» (1989: 159). There are obvious connections here with other disciplines: linguistics, psychology, philosophy, anthropology and artificial intelligence. What I want to do here is look at where pragmatics trades with formal syntax, particularly with the present-day variant of generative grammar, the theory of Government and Binding. To this end, I will discuss a number of recent proposals bearing on the trading relations of pragmatics and syntax.

A recent circular announcing the foundation of the International Pragmatics Association gives the following general description of the area: «today pragmatics is a large, loose and disorganised collection of research efforts.» This statement could create the impression that it is difficult to look upon pragmatics as a coherent discipline. However, there are now good textbooks available, such as Levinson (1983), and indication that as an academic discipline pragmatics has come of age. The attitude towards it held by linguists has generally been one of dismissal, however. If a particular phenomenon in a language is too ill-behaved or wayward to fit into existing

phonological, syntactic or semantic components of the grammar, then it must be pragmatic and can thus be dismissed or is simply not worth worrying about.

It would be a considerable gain in orderliness if we could manage to modularise pragmatics, either as a theory itself or with respect to (some of) its components. Can we ever expect that an independently motivated pragmatic theory (or perhaps theories) provides the simple generalisations that we also find in other components of the grammar? Is pragmatics a module? Leech (1983: 21) says that syntax and semantics are *rule-governed* but that pragmatics is *principle-controlled*. And Sperber and Wilson (1986) point out that pragmatics cannot be a module given the indeterminacy of the predictions and explanations it offers and the global knowledge it calls upon. If it is not a module itself, can it then perhaps be internally modular in the sense that there are conceptually distinct subcomponents that operate simultaneously to yield a single account of a given phenomenon, like the passive in GB theory? Some such interactions have also been proposed in pragmatics and the area of pragmatics has consequently been divided into various subfields like *conversational* pragmatics, *functionalist* pragmatics and even *psycholinguistic* pragmatics. I shall take pragmatics to be, as Stalnaker (1972: 383) defines it, the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed.

What are the central concerns of pragmatics? Deixis or indexicality is a central area in pragmatics: we would be dealing here with expressions whose meaning can best be viewed as a function of context to individual by assigning values to variables for speaker, hearer, time and place of utterance, style or register, etc. Tense / aspect markers and words such as *I, you, here, there, now, then,* are typical indexicals. Since these elements are subject to variable interpretations, the utterances of which they are a part cannot be interpreted merely in terms of their truth-conditional semantics. Pronouns will be one of the central topics in what follows, to see whether a fully pragmatic account of them can be proposed. One of the other central topics in pragmatics, to the extent that it is one of the aspects of pragmatics most frequently mentioned and discussed, is Grice's Cooperative Principle, on which a whole theory of inferencing or implicature was eventually built. Within this overarching principle Grice defined four maxims of conversation which he took to define all rational interchange. These maxims have been the subject of much study and have also been shown to be in need of improvement in that they are both too weak and too strong. This objection might be countered by assuming that Grice's principles are universal, but that their relative strength in a given context might vary across languages and cultures, i.e. that they have parameters of variation, just as has been proposed in syntax. Pragmatists have continually

been trying to hone the set of maxims down to a set of rules which are truly indispensable and which do not constitute submaxims of other members of that set. The most radical version of this endeavour is probably Sperber and Wilson's Principle of Relevance.

However all this will ultimately be resolved, it should be clear that it is principally the interface of pragmatic inference and grammar that constitutes the focus of interest for the linguist. Let me begin the discussion with a review of what has become known as the pro-drop parameter, which has been put forward as a candidate in which syntactic and pragmatic principles are intertwined.

2. THE PRO-DROP PARAMETER

In general, sentences are subject-predicate constructions. In tensed clauses, the subject NP shows agreement with the tensed verb. The subject NP is obligatory in tensed causes in languages like English and Dutch, and of the Romance languages, French, Italian and Spanish may have tensed sentences without an overt subject NP:

(1) Parliamo italiano.
«We speak Italian.»
Hemos trabajado todo el día.
«We have worked all day.»
*Speak Italian.
*Avons travaillé toute la journée.

Not realising the subject lexically in tensed clauses is called pro-drop. The expression of the subject in language is a central property, and is hence unlikely to be language-particular. It is fairly obvious that the explanation of this conspicuous difference between languages should be viewed as involving variation of a universal property. The first thing to do is to see whether variation in the lexicalisation of the subject position can be seen to be related to other properties of the language, so that pro-drop would be a consequence of the choice of a value for a parameter in Universal grammar (i.e. realisation of the subject as a lexical element). There are at least two sets of phenomena which have long been believed to be related to pro-drop: free inversion and long-distance extraction of the subject of embedded sentences. These facts are illustrated in (2) and (3):

(2) Gianni crede che è partito Mario.
«Gianni believes that is left Mario.»
Juan dijo que estaba agotado el libro.
«Juan said that was sold out the book.»
*John says that was sold out the book.
*Jean dit qu'est parti Pierre.

(3) Chi credi che verra a visitarci?
«Who believe-you that will come to visit here?»
¿Quién dijiste que salió temprano?
«Who did you say that left early?»
*Who do you think that left early?
*Qui a-t-il dit que va venir ce soir?

On the assumption that the normal place for the subject is pre-verbal, the subject position appears to be unfilled in three specific contexts in Italian and Spanish: in tensed sentences, in sentences in which the subject is post-verbal and in embedded sentences from which the subject has been removed by long-distance extraction. We may now start a search for a principle X in Universal Grammar that sees to it that some grammars contain the +X value of the parameter (say Italian and Spanish), while the others select the -X value of the parameter. The determination of the value of X has the presence or absence of the properties in (1)-(3) as a direct consequence.

In the matter of language acquisition the question is now how the language-learning child can determine the value of parameter X as it applies to their own language. This can only be done on the basis of positive evidence. An English child will not be offered the ungrammatical English sentences in (1)-(3). Now this is not in itself sufficient to determine that X must have the minus value, since the absence of tensed sentences with a non-lexical subject in English might be a coincidence. The child is never offered the ungrammatical sentences as negative evidence. The Spanish child, on the other hand, can immediately infer the positive value of X, since a Spanish sentence of the type in (1) will almost certainly be offered to the child as positive evidence, from which they may infer that the structures in (2) and (3) also belong to their language. The English child requires a markedness corollary; as long as there is no positive evidence pointing to the contrary, the child opts for the unmarked value of the parameter, i.e. -X. The Spanish child will eventually ascertain that Spanish is +X, selecting the marked value of the parameter.

This looks neat, but a note of caution should be sounded. Syntactically, the correlation of the occurrence of pre-verbal empty subjects with the possibility of the occurrence of post-verbal subjects in pro-drop languages is

a more complex phenomenon than appears at first sight. A more precise look at long-distance extraction in the Romance language reveals that what looks like long-distance extraction of a pre-verbal subject in effect takes place from the post-verbal subject position rather than from the pre-verbal. The facts of Italian *ne*- cliticisation are telling in this respect:

(4) a. Qui pensi che ha telefonato?
«Who think-you that has telephoned?»
b. Gianni *(ne) ha letti tre.
«Gianni of-them has read three.»
c. Due studenti sono arrivati.
«Two students are arrived.»
d. Sono arrivati due studenti.
«Are arrived two students.»
e. Due (*ne) sono arrivati.
«Two of-them are arrived.»
f. *(Ne) sono arrivati due.
«Of-them are arrived two.»
g. Quanti pensi che *(ne) sono caduti?
«How many think-you of-them are fallen?»

(5) a. *Wh [... [$_{CP}$ CHE [t... V...]]]]
Wh [... [$_{CP}$ CHE [...V t...]]]]

The argument goes as follows: (4a) shows once again that a finite embedded clause in Italian may occur without a subject. In (4a) the questioned subject of the embedded clause *qui* has been extracted across the lexical complementiser *che* and placed in sentence-initial position. Italian has a clitic element *ne* that is obligatory if an NP with a quantifying specifier, such as a numeral, occurs in object position without a lexical head noun. This is shown in (4b). If a quantified NP is used as the subject, the situation is slightly more complicated. Subjects are either pre-verbal or post-verbal, as shown in (4c) and (4d). If, however, the subject is a quantified NP with an empty head noun, *ne* is obligatorily present if the subject is post-verbal, and obligatorily absent when the subject is pre-verbal. This is shown in (4e) and (4f). The main verb in the embedded clause in (4g), *caduti,* is ergative, i.e. it has a derived subject at S-structure. At D-structure the NP headed by the quantifying determiner *quanti* occupies a post-verbal position as the internal argument of the verb.[2] The prediction is now that if extraction is from pre-verbal position, *ne* would have to be absent. If extraction is from post-verbal position, we would predict that *ne* would have to be present, and as (4g) shows, this is the case. So, extraction

cannot be from pre-verbal position. This implies that (5a) cannot be the structure of (4a) and (4g); rather (5b) must be the relevant structure.

All this shows that, at least as far as Italian is concerned, the relation of pro-drop to whether or not long-distance extraction of the subject is possible is no longer so clear. It has been suggested that we should instead try to establish a connection between the rich inflectional morphology of Italian and Spanish and the presence of pro-drop on the one hand, and the impoverished verbal morphology of English and the absence of pro-drop, on the other. There is an obvious correlation between the morphological richness of the verbal paradigm and the possibility of pro-drop. In the present tense finite paradigm of Italian and Spanish the features for person and number (the agreement features) are spelled out in the various verb forms, while English only realises a separate form on the 3rd person singular form: (io) *parlo*, (tu) *parli*, (lui) *parla*, (noi) *parliamo*, (voi) *parlate*, (loro) *parlano*, *vs.* I *speak*, you *speak*, he *speaks*, we *speak*, you *speak*, they *speak*. English needs a spelled-out agreement relation between the subject and tensed inflection. The interpretation of the pronominal features for person, number and gender in Italian does not require an overt subject. The verbal inflection suffices for this purpose. The dependency in English can be captured by taking INFLection in English to be insufficiently specified for the relevant features and requiring as it were a lexical antecedent for the appearance of the appropriate inflectional features. INFL would thus be anaphoric in English, requiring a lexical antecedent (an overt subject) for its identification. In Italian, INFL is fully specified itself for pronominal features, and can hence be said to be pronominal, not requiring a lexical pronominal to identify it. In this way the pro-drop parameter can be reduced to a difference in the binding requirements of INFL: if a finite INFL is anaphoric, it requires a lexical subject to bind it; if INFL is pronominal, a lexical subject is optional.

The nature of the pro-drop parameter has now been sufficiently illustrated, and I will turn to what has been taken to be the contribution of pragmatics to this parameter. The question is: what role is played by pragmatic information in the fixing of the parameter, as opposed to structural information, such as the relative strength of INFL? Hyams (1986) has proposed that in their acquisition of English children start out from the unmarked setting of the parameter and assume from the start that English is pro-drop, and hence have to learn on the basis of positive evidence that it is not. What is this evidence? The evidence is structural in the first instance: English, for instance, has expletive subjects such as *it* and *there*, but Hyams argues that the evidence is also partly pragmatic, specifically in that English exploits what Chomsky refers to as the «Avoid Pronoun» Principle. The effect of this principle is shown in (6):

(6) a. John would much prefer eating alone.
b. John would much prefer his eating alone.

(6a) is preferred to (6b) if *his* is to be construed as coreferential with *John*. Chomsky (1981: 227) described the Avoid Pronoun principle as one of those principles that «interact with grammar but do not strictly speaking constitute part of a distinct language faculty, or, at least, are specific realizations in the language faculty of more general principles . . . .» For Hyams the Avoid Pronoun Principle is a «universal pragmatic principle» and she claims that it operates in the fixing of the pro-drop parameter. I quote her argument in (7):

(7) (by hypothesis the child) operates under the Avoid Pronoun Principle, and hence, expects that subject pronouns will be avoided except where required for contrast, emphasis, etc. In English contrastive or emphatic elements are generally stressed. Once the child learns this, any subject pronoun which is unstressed might be construed as infelicitous . . . the child could then deduce that if the referential pronoun is not needed for pragmatic reasons, it must be necessary for grammatical reasons, i. e. a null pronominal is impossible, and hence, AGR is not PRO. (Hyams 1986: 94)

English is not pro-drop on this account. Naturally the question remains as to whether it can really be maintained that a so-called pragmatic principle like the Avoid Pronoun Principle can be said to be involved in the pro-drop parameter. A pragmatic principle of this kind would constrain the production and consequent interpretation of an utterance whose syntactic structure must have been noticed by he child first in order for the pragmatic principle to find a domain of application. This implies that the Avoid Pronoun Principle would have to be grammaticalised across languages, i.e. it would have to be a cross-linguistic fact that languages contain functionally useless elements, and there does not seem to be prima facie evidence for this claim. Our conclusion would therefore have to be that an appeal to pragmatic factors in the fixing of what is evidently a syntactic parameter is unwarranted. The development of the grammar would appear to be independent of interaction with pragmatics, as far as this case is concerned.

Let us now look at other areas where interaction of syntax and pragmatics has been hinted at. There have been attempts to take the imperative subject restriction out of the syntactic component and place it squarely in pragmatics. Is that purely a matter of pragmatics? While it is true that the 2nd person pronoun is conventionally associated with the addressee, this is not an absolute fact.[3] In the case that speaker and hearer fall together in one individual, as is the

case when I look at myself in the mirror at seven o'clock in the morning, I still can only say *Shave yourself*, and never *Shave myself*. Note that the ungrammatical variant cannot be ruled out on pragmatic grounds, because the addressee is present in the discourse. The sensible thing to say here is that the agent in an imperative sentence, whether or not overtly represented, must somehow not just denote the addressee, but count as 2nd person. This restriction is clearly pragmatically motivated but has become conventionalised as a fact in the grammar of English. In other words, pragmatics may have motivated the syntactic fact, but this fact must be incorporated in the grammar.

A third area in which a pragmatically influenced process has been conventionalised is anaphora. Anaphoric expressions are expressions whose interpretations are determined by some other element. As such this dependency has been investigaged thoroughly in the study of meaning in natural language over the last twenty years. I assume that a pronoun gets its value in sentence semantics, which I take to be a specification of the truth conditions of that sentence. Pragmatics then provides an account of how sentences are used in utterances to convey information in context, and so pragmatics accounts for everything else there is in the sentence, apart from its truth-conditional content. This is aptly summarised in Gazdar's (1979) famous dictum in (8):

(8) A: What's that new Pizza House like?
B: All the cooks are Italian
C: Let's go there then

(Kempson 1988: 140)

B takes A's question to be a question not about the place, but about the food. B's answer is not about food at all; it mentions a nationality, which is acceptable to A as information about food, however. There is thus a lot of indirect information that is being handled below the surface of the conversation and that is never explicitly expressed. Kempson notes that this indirect information handles such premises as provided in (10):

(10) If you ask a question about a house that serves food, you ask about the food served there.
People who cook a dish associated with their country of origin cook it well.
Pizza is an Italian dish.

According to Grice the Cooperative Principle comes into play to determine the additional information (the *implicatures)* which might be deduced by the

hearer from an utterance beyond its truth-conditional content, on the assumption, as Grice notes, that speakers do not say what is false, irrelevant, too much or too little. Indirect information is conveyed when these maxims seem to be flouted so that additional assumptions have to be made by the hearer in order to understand the speaker as uttering something meaningful, relevant and truthful. And a lot of work since Grice formulated his pragmatic framework has been devoted to arguing that a wide range of phenomena which had previously been thought to be part of the linguistic meaning of an expression could be better explained as conversational implicatures and not as the proposition directly expressed by the sentence.

I noted above that pronouns and anaphoric expressions in general are subject to variable interpretations, so that utterances of which they are a part transcent truth-conditional semantics. I want to discuss these facts in greater detail now, to show eventually that it is incorrect to maintain that pragmatics is totally divorced from the grammar of the utterance. It will turn out that in this area the principles of grammar interact with the principles of pragmatics to determine propositional content, and this is a position which is not easy to reconcile with existing positions, where truth-conditional semantics belongs to the grammar and where pragmatics is an unconnected component. Let us look at the anaphoric pronominals first.

Government-Binding theory, like any formal theory of grammar, should account for the following facts concerning pronominals:

- pronominal coreference can be established across an in principle unlimited distance:

(11) John$_i$ said that Pete had suggested that Charles had heard that . . . my photograph of him$_i$ had come out very well.

- at the same time, a minimum distance is also a prerequisite:

(12) John$_i$ saw him$_i$ in the mirror.

In Government-Binding theory, pronominal coreference is therefore constrained to an indication of the conditions under which pronominal coreference is *not* allowed: in (12) the grammar merely says that the pronoun *him* may refer to any male human being that is not called *John*. Under what conditions are pronouns licensed?

a. The pronoun is not coindexed with any NP in the sentence.
b. The pronoun is coindexed with an NP, but this NP is outside the binding category of the pronoun.

c. The pronoun is coindexed with an NP inside the binding category of the pronoun, but the NP does not c-command the NP.

Illustrations of these facts can be found in (13)-(15):

(13) a. He$_i$ came in.
b. John$_i$ said he$_i$ came in.
(14) My parents$_i$ knew [$_{CP}$ that I respected them$_i$]
(15) [[John$_i$]'s father] often beats him$_i$

Two constituents enter into a binding relationship if they are coindexed and if α c-commands β. We define the binding category as follows:

(16) XP (a maximal projection) is a binding category for α if XP is the minimal XP that
a. contains α
b. contains an opacity factor, where subject and [+finite] count as opacity factors

The examples given in (13)-(15) indicate that a pronominal must not bound, i.e. is free, in its binding category. This requirement is one of the binding principles of the Binding Theory, and is generally known as principle B; it is presented in (17):

(17) Principle B of the Binding Theory:
A pronominal is free in its binding category.

The free nature of the pronominal is clearly illustrated in (13). (14) shows that the binding category is the embedded CP, and that the pronominal is free inside that CP, while (15) indicates that the binding category, i.e. the node dominating the clause, contains both the coindexed NP and the pronominal, but the coindexed NP does not c-command the pronominal.

The important thing here is not so much the formulation of Principle B of the Binding Theory but rather the fact that it is essential to treat the class of pronouns as *unitary*. However, if we take the truth-theoretic properties of pronouns as basic, we can no longer regard the class as unitary. As Kempson (1988) has noted, there are at least five different types of pronoun if we base ourselves on their truth-theoretic content:

(18) *Referential pronouns*
She is very handsome.
Charles$_i$ thinks that everybody suspects that he$_i$ is very clever.

(19) *Coreferential pronouns*
Charles$_i$ thinks that he$_i$ is very clever.
After her$_i$ usual second sleeping pill, Mary$_i$ fell asleep.
(20) *Bound-variable pronouns*
Every farmer$_i$ worries that he$_i$ produces too much milk [he = each one of the farmers].
(21) *E-type pronouns*
Most people that buy a new car treat it well [it = the new car that each of the people in question have bought].
(22) *Lazy pronouns*
My grandfather put his paycheck under the bed, but anyone with any sense puts it in the bank [it = their paycheck].

Referential pronouns refer directly to a non-linguistic entity in the discourse. Pronouns are coreferential when their reference to a non-linguistic entity is in virtue of their coreference with some linguistic expression elsewhere in the discourse (the antecedent). Bound-variable pronouns do not refer to a fixed entity at all but may pick out various individuals in virtue of their dependence on some quantifying expression in the sentence. E-type pronouns are neither bound-variable pronouns nor pronouns whose value is fixed by coreference, while finally, lazy pronouns are not identical in truth-theoretic content to their antecedent, but appear rather to be modelled on the linguistic form of that antecedent.

When we view this array of data we cannot but arrive at the conclusion that an English pronoun is in principle ambiguous, a set of discrete lexical items. There have been attempts to reduce this kind of ambiguity, but any analysis of the meaning of pronouns in terms of their truth-theoretic content (referential, bound-variable, E-type or lazy) cannot give a unitary explanation of pronominal anaphora. As has been noted by Kempson and others, this ambiguity is not restricted to pronominals. It is also found in definite NPs, NPs which have the article *the*. Consider the following examples, some of which I borrowed from Kempson (1988):

(23) The man in the corner coughed. (referential)
(24) John stepped into the room and the poor bugger was crying. (coreferential)
(25) Of every house in the area that was inspected, it was later reported that the house was suffering from subsidence problems. (bound-variable)
(26) Everyone who acquired a copy later discovered that the copy was not quite like the original. (E-type)

(27) John walked into the kitchen.
The windows were dirty. (bridging cross-reference)

(27) is slightly different form (23)-(26). In (27) the use of *the*, the marker of definiteness, does not mark coreference with a preceding NP, but rather a link of association with some preceding expression, a link based on our world-knowledge and established via the addition of background knowledge. The problem that raises its head here is whether we should incorporate the entire range of our encyclopedic knowledge in the representation of lexical structure. This is not something that can be discussed here, but our conclusion must be that the phenomenon of definiteness of NPs does not seem to be amenable to a unitary treatment and is therefore ambiguous, probably across languages.

Arguments about systematic meaning relationships between sentences lead us to the same paradoxical conclusion. Consider (28) and (29):

(28) Joan went to the performance of *Carmen*.
(29) There was a performance of *Carmen*.

These sentences are related by what has been called *presupposition*. It arises with definite NPs, which presuppose the existence of the object referred to by the definite NP, and with factive verbs like *regret* which presuppose the truth of their complement.

(30) Joan regrets that Philip is married.
(31) Philip is married.

The relation between these pairs is clearly brought about by *the* of the definite NP «the performance of *Carmen*» and the verb *regret*. If meaning relations between sentences are the concern of the semantic component of the grammar, the grammar itself should be able to characterise presupposition relations between sentences. There is a problem here, however, since it appears that such a (recursive) characterisation is sensitive to the context in which the presupposing sentence is contained; sometimes the presupposition is preserved under embedding, sometimes it is not. This is the well-known presupposition projection problem.

(32) If Bill stayed at home, Joan went to the performance of *Carmen*.
(33) If Bill has staged a performance of *Carmen*, Joan went to the performance of *Carmen*.

(32) takes the truth of (29) for granted, which (33) does not. Compare also the following sentences:

(34) If Bill is in love with Sue, then she regrets that Philip is married.
(35) If Philip is married, then Sue regrets that Philip is married.

Again (34) presupposes (31), which (35) does not. These odd differences in the constancy of presupposition relations arise as a result of the interaction between the lexical items *the* and *regret* on the one hand and the connective *if* on the other hand. Sentence embedding is a rule of grammar, of syntax, and thus the kind of relatedness between sentences that we have observed has to be sensitive to information contained in the grammar. But not just that: it can be shown that relatedness between sentences, which requires them to have access to syntactic information, in addition needs to have access to real-world knowledge of the type manipulated in bridging cross-reference. Gazdar (1979) has provided the following pair of sentences:

(36) If the President invites George Wallace's wife to the White House, he'll regret having invited a black militant to the White House.
(37) If the President invites Angela Davis to the White House, he'll regret having invited a black militant to the White House.

(36) is an utterance about the wife of a racist politician in the state of Alabama in the early seventies. (37) is about the black American militant Angela Davis in the same period. But can the black militant in the main cause of (36) be presumed to be Mrs Wallace? If we have a sense of history, we would consider it most unlikely, and we would consequently not take the black militant in (36) to be Mrs Wallace. But we have seen that the factive verb *regret* presupposes the truth of its complement, i.e. it will be taken for granted by the speaker of (36) that the President *has* invited a black militant to the White House. However, a speaker who knows that the name Angela Davis refers to this well-known militant would certainly not be taking for granted the truth of the President having invited a black militant to the White House. Note that there is nothing in one's knowledge of language, i.e. in the processing of the linguistic structures provided, that distinguishes between (36) and (37); it is the knowledge of the people described that the speaker is trading on.

Pronominal reference and presupposition projection thus turn out to be two areas where a unitary account cannot be given exclusively by the rules of grammar but needs to be supplemented by rules of the pragmatic component. A further problem area is quantifier-variable binding. Anaphoric expressions,

whether they are pronouns or definite NPs, are subject to a syntactic restriction, i.e. they can only occur in a particular syntactic configuration. We have already seen that pronouns are either construed as bound variables or as referential. Bound-variable pronouns are dependent on an antecedent for their value while referential pronouns are not dependent on an antecedent but take their reference directly from some entity in the discourse situation. If a pronoun is a variable it is dependent on some operator, such as for example a quantifier, under c-command, i.e. the quantifier should be higher in the tree than the anaphoric pronoun:

(38) Every soprano thinks that she will lose her voice.
(39) She thinks that every soprano will lose her voice.

In (38) the quantifier *every*, which is part of the quantified NP *every actress*, has proper scope over the variable *she* since it c-commands the pronoun. In (39) *she* cannot be a variable since it is not bound by a c-commanding operator. We have seen in (25) that a definite NP can also be anaphorically dependent on a quantifying expression. This dependency is also subject to c-command:[4]

(40) Every computer in that batch needed the disc drive to be replaced.
(41) The disc drive needed every computer in that batch to be replaced.

(40) can be interpreted as the disc drive of each individual computer being faulty and in need of replacement, so that the referent of *the disc drive* ranges over the same set as that of *every computer*, where the coreferentiality would be based on bridging cross-reference properties accessed by the definite NP *the disc drive*. But (41) cannot be so interpreted: there is just one disc drive involved here. (40) thus allows a bound-variable reading in which the disc drive is each computer's disc drive. This dependency between *the disc drive* and *the computer* is not construed under identity but by the additional premise that computers have disc drives. This additional premise is a pragmatic phenomenon. So quantifier-variable dependencies, which are to be syntactically characterised as falling under some definition of c-command, need to be made sensitive to pragmatic premises necessary to establish bridging cross-reference. A similar side-issue arises here: are we to include all of our encyclopedic knowledge in our lexical specifications, if we wish to give a unitary, grammatical, account of these phenomena, or should we accept that quantifier-variable dependencies cannot be handled entirely in the province of the grammar? My own preference, as should be clear by now, is for the latter of these alternatives.

Three areas have now been isolated where a unitary account of the phenomena —pronoun ambiguity, systematic meaning relationships and syntactic restrictions on interpretation— inescapably leads to the conclusion that the needs to be more than rules of grammar or principles of grammar to arrive at full utterance interpretation.

When put in this way, the question involves, among many other things, a decision as to what precisely can be called a grammar. Could we perhaps devise a modular theory of the linguistic system that includes a pragmatic component? We might, for example, maintain that linguistically relevant information is present at various levels in the grammar: structural information as encoded in the syntax, lexical-semantic information, wich is encoded principally in the lexicon and in the computational rules of the LF component, and pragmatic information, the one «component» functioning either as the input for the other, or working in tandem with the other "components". If we adopt this tack, we will be forced to admit at a certain point that pragmatic information particular to a lexical item is part of the definition of that lexical item. I am reluctant to include encyclopedic information in the specification of lexical items.

In the final part of this paper I would like to put forward some speculations on the relationship between language and thought. What does it mean to have knowledge of language? Chomsky, in *Knowledge of Language* (1986: 10), views knowledge of language, or the language faculty, as «one 'module' of the mind.» It is quite customary in contemporary cognitive science to embrace the notion of modularity. Notice that we should first define whether we want our theory to be *externally* modular, i.e. when it operates only on a specific domain of information and has principles of operation that do not reach outside that domain, or *internally* modular, i.e. when it is analysable into distinct, but interacting subsystems. Government and Binding theory is internally modular in that Chomsky looks upon it as having two subsystems; a rule component, comprising the lexicon, the syntax, PF and LF, and a principles component, comprising bounding theory, Θ-theory, binding theory, government theory, case theory and control theory. A theory that views the language faculty as a processing system, i.e. an input-output system that acts on external stimuli and converts these into a representation of grammatical (and possibly logical) form has been devised by Fodor in *The Modularity of Mind* (1983). Note that modularity, either of the external or of the internal kind, is simply an instance of what Pylyshyn has dubbed

(42) «a central goal of explanatory theories» namely «to factor out a set of phenomena, a problem, or system into the most general and perspicuous components, principles or subsystems» (1980: 121).

Whether one views the grammar as externally modular or internally modular, the fact remains that the output of the grammar seriously undermines any possibility to represent the content of what is licensed by the grammar. This has been the main thrust of the argument; the evidence provided by the ambiguity of pronouns and the interaction between syntactic constraints and pragmatic processes undeniably points to underdetermination. To overcome this underdetermination, the output specification of the grammar must be enriched to determine the intended interpretation of a sentence in its context. It has recently been suggested that such an enrichment can be provided by the principle of relevance.[5]

Sperber and Wilson (1986) also claim that a grammar is an input system in the sense of Fodor, providing a mapping (or translation) from a characterization of the sequence heard, so a phonological representation of an expression of natural language onto a logical configuration, an expression in the language of inference required by the central cognitive mechanism (the language of thought). Fodor's view holds that we process the information presented by the world around us by the construction of mental representations, the language of thought, and the claim is that cognitive processes such as inference—inference strategies take the hearer from the speaker's utterance to the speaker's communicative intention— can be characterised syntactically. As we have seen above, for example in the case of the bridging cross-reference examples, the grammar does not provide enough of the necessary clues, i.e. it underdetermines the representation of the content attributable to the string determined by the grammar. In the case of the real-semantic ambiguity of pronouns, the underdeterminacy tenet could be implemented as follows: the grammar only makes available a categorization of the class of elements and an indication of the requisite locality, while the interpretation is provided by pragmatic processes. Sperber and Wilson propose in their book that there is just one principle to enrich the output specification of the grammar: the principle of relevance:

(43) *The Principle of Relevance:* every utterance conveys the assumption that the speaker believes their choice of words is such as to make immediately accessible to the hearer (i.e. with the least processing effort possible) an interpretation which gives rise to the intended inferential (or other cognitive) effect.

Thus, the choice of representation to assign a value to the pronominal is controlled by the principle of relevance, i.e. with the least effort for the maximum effect, in conjunction with a locality requirement intrinsic to

pronominals: Principle B of the Binding Theory. All anaphoric uses of pronominals depend on the assumption that the value to be assigned to the pronoun is a *cognitive* representation which is retrievable with least processing costs for the effects intended. The grammar provides but an incomplete conceptual basis of interpretation of an utterance, not the interpretation itself. Consider here once again the examples in (6):

(6) a. John would much prefer eating alone.
b. John would much prefer his eating alone.

Relevance theory can deal with these examples virtually automatically: minimize processing costs and maximize the contextual implications of the sentence. On this account (6b) would simply contain more words than (6a) and would therefore be more complex (by the presence of *his).* It would follow naturally from a relevance account of these examples that *his* conveys information that is not recoverable from the empty category, i.e. the non-lexical subject of *eating alone,* specifically that the antecedent of *his* is not *John* but some other person present in the discourse.

Sperber and Wilson hold that the interpretation of an utterance invariably involves establishing both its explicit and its implicit content, that is, establishing what proposition the utterance has actually expressed (i.e. establishing its logical form), and accessing the content (= a set of extra propositions), all additional information being available to the hearer at minimal processing cost. If it is the case that anaphor-antecedent relationships are established pragmatically (on the assumption that both pronominal and definite NP anaphor-antecedent relations constitute a unitary and pragmatic phenomenon), rather than syntactically, the additional information available to the hearer must be accessible too, and at low cost at that.

The sentence in (44), which illustrates again the phenomenon of bridging cross-reference, also brings out what «additional information» amounts to:

(44) I walked into the cathedral. The stained-glass windows were spectacular.

All anaphoric expressions pragmatically guarantee that an antecedent is available from the discourse. If no antecedent is explicitly provided, neither by the discourse nor by the visual scene, it is assumed that the context provides it as additional information. In (44) no mention is made of windows in the first sentence. However, the fact that the speaker uses the definite NP *the stained glass windows* in the second sentence in (44) is taken as a guarantee that such a representation is accessible in the discourse. Now, the hearer only has the

words *cathedral* and *window* available. The concept *window* entails as part of its information that windows are for looking out of rooms, halls, houses, cathedrals, etc., and a cathedral is a kind of room, so the hearer would assume as part of the additional information that the cathedral would have windows. The fact that a definite article is used in *the stained glass windows* indicates that the hearer does make use of this additional premise. Explicit content just as much as implicit content has been used in this identification process.

Now, we have seen in (40) that bridging cross-reference can interact with quantifier-variable binding:

(40) Every computer in that batch needed the disc drive to be replaced.

What this sentence means is that for every computer - disc drive pair the disc drive needed to be replaced in the computer. The quantifier *every* in *every computer* has to bind the new variable introduced by the additional information contained in *the disc drive*, i.e. that computers have disc drives. What is this variable? Suppose that quantifying NPs have a variable assigned as part of the argument structure in logical form, that is in the semantic representation of the sentence. This variable is accessible only in the c-command domain of the associated quantifier:

(45) $[_{IP}$ every computer$_i$ $[_{IP}$ t_i INFL $[$VP V $[_{CP}$ $[_{IP}$ the disc drive$_i$ . . .

The use of the definite article in the NP *the disc drive* introduces the additional premise that computers make use of disc drives. The quantifier *every* thus also binds the variable associated with the (data frame) of this definite NP.

Our discussion so far has turned on the distinction between properties that are intrinsic to language itself and properties that belong to the general cognitive mechanism. In our discussion we have taken semantics to be such properties of interpretation that are rule-governed and invariant from context to context. On this account, pragmatics makes use of whatever input the grammar provides in the process of utterance interpretation.

NOTES

1. This is a lightly edited version of a lecture presented at the «Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana» of the University of Zaragoza, Spain, in May 1990. I am grateful to Carmen Olivares Rivera for inviting me and to Jane Mallinson for discussions on the topic. My visit was made possible by the Commission of the European Communities ERASMUS.

2. There is a vast literature on the treatment of ergativity in Generative Grammar. For a representative specimen, see Burzio (1986).

3. For a recent treatment of the English imperative in the perspective of Government-Binding theory, see Beukema and Coopmans (1989), in which a more sophisticated discussion of the possibilities for the subject in imperative constructions is provided.

4. The examples in (40) and (41) were provided in a lecture given by Ruth Kempson at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands, on February 1, 1990. (41) is either gibberish or it has a non-real-world interpretation for most speakers of English that I have consulted. However, it is meant to illustrate in the first place that definite NPs showing bridging cross reference are also subject to c-command of an appropriate quantifier. The interpretation of (41) as crucially involving only one disc-drive is probably also bound up with a different meaning of *needed*.

5. See Kempson (1988) for more details on pronominal anaphora in a Relevance framework. For the original statement of the Principle of Relevance see Sperber and Wilson (1986).

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LENGUAJE Y DISCRIMINACIÓN GENÉRICA EN LIBROS DE TEXTO DE INGLÉS

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1. INTRODUCCIÓN

Nuestro trabajo se ha centrado en el lenguaje verbal e icónico utilizado en los libros de texto de inglés de diversos niveles educativos. Está demostrado que el lenguaje juega un importante papel en la organización de la conciencia humana al posibilitar la acción consciente y dirigir los propios actos, estando asimismo muy relacionado el desarrollo cognitivo con el desarrollo lingüístico y con la interacción social y didáctica. El lenguaje se convierte en un medio preferente en la construcción del autoconcepto (el esquema conceptual y afectivo de una persona) a través de los mensajes del medio y de las otras personas. La imagen de una persona se forma, de este modo, a través de un proceso de interiorización de esos mensajes.

El carácter interactivo que el lenguaje cumple en el ámbito educativo es fundamental considerarlo tanto como conducta verbal explícita como espacio de relación interpersonal. Espacio o clima relacional en el que intervienen componentes lingüísticos, prelingüísticos (actitudes, vestimenta, presencia...) y paralingüísticos con los que se manifiestan esos componentes (expresiones de afecto o desprecio, formas impositivas o no impositivas...) (Zabalza 1986).

Este clima en el aula es, por tanto, un factor de primordial importancia en el desarrollo de las y los escolares en el plano intelectual, afectivo, de autoconcepto, de relación con las demás personas y el medio... Corresponde, en gran parte, al profesor o profesora tener muy en cuenta estos aspectos que tanto pueden influir en la formación de sus escolares.

El lenguaje transmitido a través de los textos y los materiales escolares es un reflejo de la realidad exterior, al generar conceptos y principios sobre ella y la relación que se establece con dicha realidad por parte del alumnado. Se puede decir, en consecuencia, que el lenguaje de esos materiales no sólo es susceptible de ampliar sino también de restringir el acceso a la experiencia de las personas. En ese sentido, los libros de texto y otros materiales pueden ampliar las expectativas de los niños y por el contrario recortar las de las niñas, sobre todo si tenemos en cuenta el valor de la letra impresa y de las imágenes.

Si bien es cierto que los textos actuales han ido superando estereotipos muy marcados, considerados ya como claramente discriminatorios, tampoco reflejan el complejo dinamismo de nuestra sociedad, en la que las mujeres han ido superando algunas barreras. Transmiten, por el contrario, un modelo genérico diferente para cada sexo que minusvalora y restringe los valores y expectativas de niñas y mujeres.

Dada esta situación de tratamiento diferenciado a ambos sexos, podemos concluir que una verdadera escuela coeducativa está aún por conseguir, puesto que el modelo educativo imperante es el androcéntrico. De ahí deducimos la necesidad de avanzar hacia una escuela verdaderamente coeducativa, más allá de la mera asistencia mixta. Nuestro objetivo al analizar estos textos ha sido proporcionar datos y valoraciones que permitan avanzar hacia ese nuevo tipo de escuela.

Por nuestra parte, hemos iniciado un proceso que puede aportar algunas ideas para otras experiencias al involucrar a nuestros propios estudiantes de la Escuela de Profesorado de Guadalajara en este análisis de textos, en nuestras clases de inglés. Trabajo que de manera práctica les ha permitido comprender la dimensión real de los modelos genéricos discriminatorios en la escuela, a la par que han realizado una investigación en torno al análisis de textos escolares. Nuestro trabajo, por tanto, ha sido en colaboración con nuestros estudiantes a lo largo del curso 1989-90; trabajo que ha continuado en el curso 1990-91 y que con toda probabilidad dará otros frutos futuros en este campo.

2. OBJETIVO DEL ESTUDIO

El objetivo de este estudio era investigar hasta qué punto los libros de texto de inglés ofrecían un enfoque discriminatorio para niñas o para niños. Las lenguas extranjeras son el vehículo de comunicación entre personas de diferentes culturas, por lo que se prestan a dar visiones diferentes sobre otra realidad sociocultural y desarrollar valores de comprensión de las diferencias entre las personas. Nuestro objetivo no lo hemos visto al margen de la formación inicial del profesorado, sino como una parte necesariamente integrante de la misma, tanto en el terreno de los valores como en la formación en el área de Filología Inglesa.

Al analizar los libros de texto se pretendía analizar la imagen de la mujer en relación a la del hombre. Sin planteamientos apriorísticos de lo que en ellos íbamos a encontrar, se buscaba cuáles eran las características que los textos asignaban a cada sexo; es decir, cuáles eran los modelos o roles genéricos que se atribuían a cada uno de los sexos y se ofrecían a los escolares a través de los libros de texto.

La elección del método de análisis no era fácil, dadas las escasas aportaciones sobre esta cuestión en nuestro país y la disparidad de libros de texto para ser analizados, textos dirigidos tanto al alumnado de la primera como de la segunda etapa de EGB, enseñanza secundaria y a adultos. El método que nos ayudó a superar esta dificultad y unificar el análisis nos lo proporcionó el trabajo dirigido por Nuria Garreta y Pilar Careaga (1987), dedicado a los libros de lenguaje y ciencias sociales,[1] y cuya unidad de análisis es el personaje humano que aparece tanto en los textos y ejercicios como en las ilustraciones de los libros analizados.

El procedimiento seguido para el análisis ha sido descriptivo, por medio de un vaciado y un recuento numérico de aparición de todos los personajes humanos. Los datos extraídos han sido clasificados según criterios de sexo, edad, ocupación y ámbito de la misma, así como la adjetivación. Finalmente, hemos intentado establecer relaciones entre los datos cuantitativos de las diferentes variables analizadas de tal modo que nos puedan aportar aspectos del comportamiento que se está transmitiendo en la escuela.

Nuestro trabajo aporta, a pesar de sus limitaciones, datos para seguir reflexionando sobre aquellos aspectos que siguen marcando una educación diferenciada para niñas y niños en la escuela, como un primer paso en la evaluación de los materiales escolares de que disponemos y en la elaboración de otros nuevos, superadores de las discriminaciones aquí detectadas.

3. LOS MODELOS GENÉRICOS

Antes de introducirnos en el análisis de los libros de texto de las diferentes áreas es necesario definir conceptualmente lo que entendemos por modelos genéricos. Son un conjunto de normas, comportamientos y actitudes que la sociedad asigna a cada uno de los sexos, de tal modo que las personas se llegan a identificar como individuos con la figura socialmente aceptada de hombre o mujer.

La escuela es el ámbito privilegiado al que la sociedad le confiere la transmisión de un plan cultural por medio de un currículum explícito, al que se le suman unas interacciones sociales y didácticas y un currículum oculto que posibilitan un amplio aprendizaje de esos modelos para las alumnas y los alumnos. Como ya conocemos por las aportaciones de la psicología interaccionista, la personalidad y la autoestima se forman en un contexto social dado en el que juegan un importante papel la opinión y las expectativas que los demás hacen llegar a cada persona sobre sí misma. Estos modelos que se transmiten también en la escuela como parte de ese contexto social, ya sea consciente o inconscientemente, son parte integrante del currículum escolar.

En consecuencia, el ambiente y el clima relacional de la clase, las opiniones y expectativas del profesorado respecto a sus alumnas y alumnos, la participación y las relaciones entre ellos y ellas, las relaciones de poder en la clase... así como los materiales escolares, especialmente los libros de texto, son elementos que marcan el proceso de enseñanza y aprendizaje y posibilitan la consolidación o el debilitamiento de los modelos genéricos discriminatorios.

4. LENGUAJE Y CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA PERSONALIDAD

Consideramos necesario profundizar en el lenguaje como código de comunicación humana y como elemento de construcción de la personalidad antes de entrar en el análisis de los libros de texto.

El lenguaje, en su definición más general, es un sistema de signos que sirve para establecer la comunicación entre los seres humanos. Podemos decir que se produce comunicación en cuanto dos o más personas convienen en utilizar unos determinados signos para transmitirse una idea. De ahí que haya varios tipos de lenguaje basados en la diversa naturaleza de los signos: olfativo, táctil, visual, hablado, la música, el código matemático, la gestualidad...

De entre todos los diferentes lenguajes posibles el lenguaje hablado y el escrito son los códigos más privilegiados de comunicación humana. Códigos

que suelen acompañarse del lenguaje visual o de la gestualidad, y que se han convertido en el medio más eficaz para comunicar ideas, experiencias, sentimientos y opiniones. El lenguaje, por tanto, puede ser considerado como uno de los procesos superiores de la mente humana, que tienen en común el ser históricos e irreversibles; en consecuencia, no es aséptico ideológicamente y lleva una carga marcada por los sectores dominantes de la sociedad.

La comunicación es la función primaria del lenguaje, permitiendo la emisión y recepción de informaciones así como la influencia sobre otras personas con las que se interactúa, produciéndose una mutua regulación y orientación de la actividad. Esta naturaleza social e interaccionista del lenguaje implica, por una parte, ser producto y expresión de una cultura, y por otra adquirirse a través de la comunicación y el diálogo con los demás. Es decir, el lenguaje permite no sólo la comunicación sino también el acceso al conocimiento de la realidad en sus diversas manifestaciones. Comunicación y representación aparecen de este modo conjuntamente como funciones de la lengua (Siguán 1987: 136-59).

La función comunicativa o interpersonal no es, sin embargo, la única que podemos atribuir al lenguaje. Nos encontramos con un uso interiorizado y no comunicativo del lenguaje, que acaba convirtiéndose en instrumento del pensamiento (Vigotski 1984: 114), en gran parte pensamiento verbal, y por otra parte sigue unido a la actividad sobre la que el sujeto ejerce su control verbal (Siguán 1987). El lenguaje interior nos permite, en definitiva, comunicarnos con nosotros mismos y dirigir nuestra actividad.

En consecuencia, podemos ver algunos aspectos de interés en relación a la transmisión y mantenimiento de los modelos genéricos discriminatorios:

1. El lenguaje adquiere una gran importancia, como el medio más eficaz de transmitir ideas y opiniones a través de la interacción social y didáctica, al reflejar la realidad y la experiencia bajo la perspectiva de los sectores sociales que han tenido suficiente influencia para irlo conformando. En lo que respecta a la transmisión de una visión del mundo androcéntrica, el lenguaje sirve para transmitir esa visión, organizando y estructurando la conciencia humana de acuerdo con los modelos genéricos que se desea que sean asumidos por mujeres y hombres. El lenguaje como código de interpretación de la realidad no sólo posibilita ampliar la experiencia de las personas, sino que también restringe el acceso a la misma.

En nuestro caso, el uso de términos y expresiones marcadas por el género masculino, la diferente aparición de hombres y mujeres, sus diferentes ocupaciones y trabajos, así como sus diversas adjetivaciones, comunican y representan una realidad que recorta el mundo de la mujer y lo subordina al del hombre, condicionando, por tanto, la conciencia de niñas y mujeres.

2. Otra función del lenguaje es la intrapsíquica. El lenguaje interiorizado es, por una parte, pensamiento verbal, y por otra está también unido a la actividad de las personas. Esta función permite asumir mentalmente el modelo genérico que se le adjudica socialmente a cada persona y al mismo tiempo «construir» su esquema conceptual y afectivo (autoconcepto) a través de los mensajes que le llegan del medio y de otras personas. Es a partir de ese autoconcepto como cada cual genera modos de actuación y relación con las demás personas y con la realidad exterior. La imagen que de sí misma se forma cada persona se constituye a través de un proceso de interiorización de esos mensajes. Margaret Mead se refería de este modo a la construcción del autoconcepto:

> La persona es algo que tiene desarrollo. No está presente inicialmente, en el nacimiento, sino que surge en el proceso de la experiencia y de las actividades sociales. Se desarrolla en el individuo dado, de resultas de sus relaciones con ese proceso como un todo y con los otros individuos que se encuentran dentro de ese proceso. (Cit. por Zabalza 1986: 16)

3. El lenguaje y los modelos genéricos transmitidos por la escuela en su conjunto generan, en consecuencia, pensamiento y modos de pensar sobre la realidad y la relación que se establece con ella. La interacción entre la escuela (el profesorado, el currículum, la organización y los medios escolares) y el alumnado condicionan no sólo el desarrollo intelectual sino también un desarrollo genérico diferenciado de niñas y niños, cumpliéndose de este modo la denominada profecía de la autorrealización (Delamont 1985). Como veíamos en la introducción, en la escuela hay que tener en cuenta la doble perspectiva del lenguaje, como conducta verbal explícita y como espacio de relación interpersonal, a la hora de afrontar la desigualdad en las oportunidades que se ofrecen a las niñas, en comparación con las que se ofrecen a los niños.

Para poder analizar y contextualizar los resultados obtenidos de los libros de texto se hace necesario profundizar en el género gramatical en inglés, como categoría gramatical arbitraria que denota la relación entre el mundo real y la lengua como sistema de signos.

5. CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE EL GÉNERO GRAMATICAL EN INGLÉS

Si partimos de la consideración del lenguaje como un hecho cultural y social determinado históricamente que refleja la realidad, las lenguas están condicionadas por la concepción del mundo y la ideología de quienes tienen la posición social hegemónica. De ahí que el género sea, por una parte, un recurso gramatical que cumple una función clasificatoria y sintáctica y, por otra, el reflejo de unas determinadas posiciones ideológicas dominantes.

Mientras que en las lenguas románicas el género es un recurso importante que se realiza por medio de la concordancia, en inglés existen pocas distinciones por medio del género gramatical, y cuando éstas aparecen se establece una relación directa entre sexo y género. De este modo nos encontramos con nombres de género no-marcado morfológicamente, como *brother / sister, boy / girl, man / woman, father / mother...* (Algunos de estos pares de palabras de parentesco tienen términos genéricos duales: *child* tanto para *boy / girl* y *son / daughter*, por ejemplo).

Al contrario que en castellano y otras lenguas románicas, generalmente en inglés no se añaden sufijos especiales para marcar los distintos géneros, ni los determinantes lo denotan, aunque se marca el género por medio de los adjetivos posesivos y pronombres de tercera persona. Existe, sin embargo, una serie de nombres personales con género marcado morfológicamente, como *duke / duchess, writer / writress, hero / heroine, host / hostess...*

Hay, además, un amplio número de nombres personales de género dual como *doctor, partner, friend, teacher, person, student...* a los que en ocasiones es necesario añadirles la referencia genérica: *boyfriend / girlfriend, male student / female student...* En cambio, en función de la consideración social femenina o masculina de la actividad, hay nombres duales en origen que anteponen *male* (hombre) o *female / woman* (mujer): *a male nurse* (enfermero) frente a *nurse* (enfermera), *a woman engineer* (ingeniera) frente a *engineer* (ingeniero).

Comparando las características de la lengua inglesa con otras lenguas románicas (francés, español) respecto al género, podemos decír que el inglés tiene una base lingüística mucho menos marcada por el predominio del género gramatical masculino. Sin embargo, al ser la lengua un vehículo de transmisión cultural e ideológica, los libros de texto y otros materiales escolares siguen reproduciendo los modelos y prejuicios discriminatorios, como seguidamente iremos viendo.

6. MUESTRA DE LIBROS DE TEXTO ANALIZADOS

Como ya hemos visto anteriormente, la unidad de análisis de los libros de texto de inglés es el personaje humano que aparece en ilustraciones y texto, clasificándolo según variables de sexo y edad, actividad y localización de la

misma, y profesión u ocupación. El procedimiento seguido ha sido descriptivo por medio de un vaciado y de un recuento numérico de aparición de personajes.

Se ha analizado un 50% de las unidades o lecciones de cada uno de los 26 libros de texto, escogiendo las unidades pares o las impares, en lo que se refiere a ilustraciones, texto y ejercicios. Los libros de texto se han agrupado en dos bloques: por una parte, los textos dirigidos a escolares hasta 8º de EGB, y por otra los dirigidos a estudiantes de Secundaria y a adultos. Recogemos el título, la editorial, y el origen español (Esp.) o británico (Brit.) de los autores.

Vemos necesario resaltar que nuestro objetivo no es otro que analizar diversos textos (escogidos según criterios de actualidad y disponibilidad de los mismos) como elementos que forman parte de un orden pedagógico que trasciende las características y voluntad personales de los autores de los mismos y de las y los profesores que los utilizan. Precisamente para despersonalizar el análisis que presentamos, hemos optado por referirnos a los textos por medio de un número que se les ha asignado.

La muestra de textos de EGB se presenta en el siguiente cuadro:

Muestra de textos de Inglés
E.G.B.

Nº y título	Editorial	Autores
1. *Road to English: Ciclo medio*	S.M.	Esp.
2. *Now for English: Course and Activity Book*	Nelson	Brit.
3. *Supersam 6º*	Longman	Brit. / Esp.
4. *Trio.*	Heinemann - Brit. Council.	Brit.
5. *Road to English 6º*	S.M.	Esp.
6. *Project English 6º*	O.U.P.	Brit.
7. *Project English 7º*	O.U.P.	Brit.
8. *Our Friends on Holiday 7º*	Onda	Esp.
9. *Supersam 7º*	Longman	Brit. / Esp.
10. *Viking 7º*	S.G.E.L.	Esp.
11. *Let's Visit Our Friends*	Onda	Esp.

Se han analizado, por tanto, once libros de texto dirigidos a los diversos niveles de Enseñanza General Básica, predominando los diseñados para el Ciclo Superior (6º, 7º y 8º cursos).

La muestra de libros de texto dirigidos a enseñanza secundaria y de adultos es la siguiente:

Muestra de textos de inglés de secundaria

Título	Editorial	Autores
1. *Encounters Part B*	Heinemann	Brit.
2. *Springboard 2*	O.U.P.	Brit.
3. *Streamline English Destinations*	O.U.P.	Brit.
4. *Score 1*	Alhambra	Esp.
5. *Score 2*	Alhambra	Esp.
6. *Cambridge English Course 2*	C.U.P.	Brit.
7. *Reading Tasks*	Longman	Esp.
8. *Headway*	O.U.P.	Brit.
9. *New Cambridge English Course 1*	C.U.P.	Brit.
10. *Streamline English Connections*	O.U.P.	Brit.
11. *Mode 1*	Collins	Brit.
12. *English in Perspective*	O.U.P.	Brit.
13. *Success at First Certificate*	O.U.P.	Brit.
14. *Connect 1*	Macmillan	Brit.
15. *Approaches*	C.U.P.	Brit.

Se han analizado, por tanto, quince textos especialmente dirigidos a Enseñanza Secundaria y para adultos.

7. CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LOS PERSONAJES EN LAS ILUSTRACIONES DE LOS TEXTOS DE INGLÉS

Realizado el recuento numérico de aparición de personajes en las ilustraciones de los textos de EGB analizados, hemos obtenido los resultados reflejados en el siguiente cuadro.

Ilustraciones
Textos de EGB

Texto nº	Personajes femeninos				Personajes masculinos				Total	
	Niña	Joven	Mujer	Anciª	Niño	Joven	Hombre	Anciº	Femº	Mascº
1	111	2	24	1	127	21	23	3	138	174
%	35,5	0,6	7,6	0,3	40,7	6,7	7,3	0,9	**44,2**	**55,7**
2	210	-	27	-	232	-	106	-	237	338
%	36,5	-	4,6	-	40,3	-	18,4	-	**41,2**	**58,7**
3	184	-	33	-	207	-	185	18	217	410
%	29,3	-	5,2	-	33	-	29,5	2,8	**34,6**	**65,3**
4	143	18	54	10	263	17	84	2	225	366
%	24,1	3	9,1	1,6	44,5	2,8	14,2	0,3	**38**	**61,9**
5	26	42	22	10	68	6	53	9	100	136
%	11	17,7	9,3	4,2	28,8	2,5	22,4	3,8	**42,3**	**57,6**
6	57	9	27	-	74	9	25	6	93	114
%	27,5	4,3	13	-	35,7	4,3	12	2,8	**44,9**	**55**
7	11	56	56	3	23	54	156	5	126	238
%	3	15,3	15,3	0,8	6,3	14,8	42,8	1,3	**34,6**	**65,3**
8	123	10	30	2	146	10	57	7	165	220
%	31,9	2,5	7,7	0,5	37,9	2,5	14,8	1,8	**42,8**	**57,1**
9	54	55	12	1	53	81	49	2	122	185
%	17,7	18	3,9	0,3	17,3	25,5	15,4	0,6	**40**	**60**
10	15	15	40	2	34	30	70	-	72	134
%	7,2	7,2	19,4	0,9	16,5	14,5	33,9	-	**34,9**	**65**
11	8	141	25	7	30	177	78	7	181	292
%	1,6	29,8	5,2	1,4	6,3	37,4	16,4	1,4	**38,2**	**61,7**
Total	942	348	350	36	1275	405	886	59	1676	2607
%	21,9	8,1	8,1	0,8	29,3	9,4	20,6	1,3	**39,1**	**60,8**

El análisis de las ilustraciones en los libros de inglés de EGB nos permite resaltar algunos aspectos:

1º. De un total de 4.283 personajes aparecidos en las ilustraciones, un 39,1 % son femeninos y un 60,8 masculinos. Hay que tener en cuenta que tanto los libros de autores y editoriales británicos como españoles dan resultados negativos respecto a la aparición de personajes femeninos.

2º. Si comparamos la aparición de niñas y niños, vemos que estos últimos aparecen en un 29,3 % de ilustraciones, mientras las niñas lo hacen en un 21,9 %. Aunque la diferencia en la media no es muy elevada, nos encontramos con una gran desigualdad en los textos 4 y 5; no hay, sin embargo, ningún texto en el que la presencia de niñas sea superor a la de niños (en el texto 9 los niños aparecen unas décimas más que las niñas). Es interesante observar cómo en dos textos (1 y 6) aunque los protagonistas son tanto un niño como una niña, siguen prevaleciendo los personajes infantiles masculinos.

3º. La presencia de los jóvenes (9,4 %) es algo superior a la de las jóvenes (8,1 %). Es significativa la escasa aparición de personajes jóvenes en el conjunto de textos analizados, a pesar de que la mayor parte de ellos van dirigidos a escolares mayores de once años. Aparece un número igual de mujeres adultas que de mujeres jóvenes, aunque los hombres aparecen en un 20,6 % de ilustraciones. El texto 5 destaca por su aparición de chicas jóvenes muy superior al de chicos jóvenes.

4º. Las mujeres aparecen en un 8,1 % de las ilustraciones; los hombres en un 20,6 %. Unicamente en dos textos (1 y 6) está equiparada la aparición; por el contrario, en un buen número de ellos destaca una menor aparición de mujeres.

5º. Ancianas y ancianos apenas tienen presencia en las ilustraciones (0,8% y 1,3%, respectivamente) aunque en nuestra sociedad hay un creciente número de jubilados y una importante presencia de abuelas y abuelos en las familias.

6º. Comparando la aparición de personajes femeninos y masculinos, podemos concluir que se ofrece a niñas y niños un mundo androcéntrico en su conjunto, con una mayor aparición de niños que de niñas y prácticamente igual de éstas que de hombres. Las mujeres, en cambio, y a pesar de su papel social, aparecen mucho menos que hombres y niñas.

8. CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LOS PERSONAJES EN LAS ILUSTRACIONES DE LOS TEXTOS DE SECUNDARIA'

Hemos obtenido los resultados siguientes:

Ilustraciones Textos de Secundaria

Texto nº	Personajes femeninos				Personajes masculinos				Total	
	Niña	Joven	Mujer	Ancª	Niño	Joven	Hombre	Ancº	Femº	Mascº
1	-	51	27	7	-	22	102	13	85	137
%	-	22,9	12,1	3,1	-	10	45,9	5,8	**38,2**	**61,7**
2	4	20	9	9	9	42	18	3	42	72
%	3,5	7,5	7,8	7,8	7,8	36,8	15,7	2,6	**36,8**	**63,1**
3	1	1	27	6	1	6	53	-	35	60
%	1	1	28,4	6,3	1	6,3	55,7	-	**36,8**	**63,1**
4	23	104	20	-	18	134	46	7	147	205
%	6,5	29,5	5,6	-	5,1	38	13	1,9	**41,7**	**58,2**
5	8	19	14	1	14	32	27	1	42	74
%	6,8	16,3	12	0,8	12	27,5	23,2	0,8	**36,2**	**63,7**
6	9	40	82	5	19	41	114	4	136	178
%	2,8	12,7	26,1	1,5	6	13	36,3	1,2	**43,3**	**56,6**
7	1	1	8	-	1	2	9	1	10	13
%	4,3	4,3	34,8	-	4,3	8,6	39,1	4,3	**43,5**	**56,5**
8	2	3	32	2	1	26	58	-	39	85
%	1,6	2,4	28,5	1,6	0,8	20,9	47,7	-	**31,4**	**68,5**

9	5	32	30	2	6	39	47	3	69	95
%	3	19,5	18,2	1,2	3,6	23,7	28,6	1,8	**42**	**57,9**
10	4	10	127	5	11	14	264	8	146	297
%	0,9	2,2	28,6	1,1	2,4	3,1	59,5	1,8	**32,9**	**67**
11	1	41	12	1	-	47	16	-	55	63
%	0,8	34,7	10,1	0,8	-	39,8	13,5	-	**46,6**	**53,4**
12	5	6	72	6	12	27	128	6	89	173
%	1,9	2,2	27,4	2,2	4,5	10,3	48,8	2,2	**33,9**	**57,9**
13	-	13	31	-	-	9	53	2	44	64
%	-	12	28,7	-	-	8,3	49	1,9	**40,7**	**59,2**
14	4	26	12	6	4	29	13	4	48	50
%	4	26,5	12,2	6,1	4	29,5	13,2	4	**48,9**	**51**
15	-	7	43	3	-	15	58	-	53	73
%	-	5,5	34,1	2,3	-	11,9	46	-	**42**	**57,9**
Total	67	374	546	53	96	485	1006	52	**1040**	**1639**
%	2,5	13,9	20,3	1,9	3,5	18,5	37,5	1,9	**38,8**	**61,1**

A partir de los datos ofrecidos en el cuadro anterior de las ilustraciones de los quince libros analizados podemos deducir algunos aspectos:

1º. Se han contabilizado 2.679 personajes, de los que un 38,8 % son femeninos y un 61,1 % masculinos. Hay que hacer notar que los textos de editoriales o autores españoles (4, 5 y 7) no se destacan con respecto a la media de presencia de personajes; sí destacan, sin embargo, por estar por debajo de la media los textos 8, 10 y 12, editados por británicos.

2º. La aparición de niñas (2,5%) y niños (3,5 %) es muy reducida, ya que estos textos van dirigidos a estudiantes de Secundaria.

3º. Las jóvenes aparecen en un 13,9% de las ilustraciones y los jóvenes en un 18,1 %, lo que da a estos últimos una mayor presencia relativa. Unicamente en el texto 1 hay una considerable presencia de chicas jóvenes (22,9 %) frente a un 10% de chicos.

4º. Las mujeres con un 20,3 % y los hombres con un 37,5 % aparecen en casi el 60 % de las ilustraciones, mostrando a los jóvenes estudiantes el modelo adulto en el que el hombre casi dobla a la mujer en presencia.

5º. Las ancianas y los ancianos prácticamente no aparecen (1, 9 %), como ya vimos también en los libros de EGB.

9. ÁMBITO DE LAS ACTIVIDADES DE LOS PERSONAJES EN LAS ILUSTRACIONES

En las ilustraciones se han contabilizado los personajes que aparecen así como el ámbito de las actividades que realizan. En los textos de EGB hemos obtenido los siguientes datos de ocho textos (los números 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 y 11) agrupados en torno a tres ámbitos principales:

	calle	*trabajo*	*casa*	*total*
Personajes fems.	484 38;9 %	91 24,9 %	122 41,6 %	697 36,6 %
Personajes masc.	760 61 %	274 75 %	171 58,3 %	1205 63,3 %

Se ha hecho un recuento de 1902 actividades, de las que un 36,6 % corresponden a personajes femeninos y un 63,3 % a personajes masculinos. Lo primero que se infiere de estos datos es la menor participación de mujeres y niñas en actividades, así como en una menor gama de ellas. La calle y sobre todo el trabajo se representan como ámbitos principalmente masculinos. Por lo que se refiere a la casa, hay que especificar que en el texto nº 3 sólo aparecen personajes masculinos en casa en las unidades analizadas; hay que decir, sin embargo, que su presencia en la casa no está relacionada con actividades domésticas, excepto en muy contadas ocasiones.

Los textos de Secundaria nos han proporcionado los siguientes datos (textos 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12 y 14):

	calle	*trabajo*	*casa*	*total*
Personajes fems.	164 34,7 %	64 35,7 %	111 54,9 %	339 39,7 %
Personajes mascs.	308 65,2 %	115 64,2 %	91 45%	514 60,2 %

Se han contabilizado 853 actividades, de las que el 39,7 % corresponden a personajes femeninos y el 60,2 % a personajes masculinos. La participación femenina en actividades de calle y trabajo está por debajo de la aparición de personajes en las ilustraciones (38,8 %); sin embargo, en la casa aparecen muy por encima de esa presencia general. En conjunto, el modelo transmitido por la presencia masculina y femenina en activiades está más marcado aún que en los textos de EGB por los roles tradicionalmente adjudicados a cada sexo.

Las profesiones y ocupaciones se verán conjuntamente con las ofrecidas en el texto y los ejercicios posteriormente.

10. ANALISIS DEL TEXTO

Al analizar el texto y los ejercicios de los libros se ha pretendido contabilizar la presencia de personajes femeninos y masculinos a través de los nombres comunes referidos a personas y los pronombres personales de tercera persona singular. Las ocupaciones y la utilización de nombres propios las presentaremos posteriormente.

Se ha hecho un recuento de los pronombres personales, nombres comunes de personas marcados por el género masculino o femenino, y nombres de género dual. Los datos obtenidos en textos de EGB son los siguientes:

Texto
Nombres comunes y pronombres personales
E.G.B.

Texto nº	Pers. fems.		Pers. mascs.		Duales		Total
1	24	30 %	56	70 %			80
2	21	47,7 %	23	52,2 %			44
3	8	17,7 %	35	77,7 %			43
4	77	26 %	77	26 %	142	47,9 %	296
5	91	53,5 %	79	46,4 %			170
6	105	46,6 %	120	53,3 %			225
7	56	19,1 %	116	39,5 %	121	41,2 %	293
8	49	14,7 %	119	35,7 %	165	49,5 %	333
9	42	51,8 %	39	48,1 %			81
10	7	7,8 %	82	92,1 %			89
11	47	30,1 %	109	69,8 %			156
Total	527	**29,1 %**	855	**47,2 %**	428	**23,6 %**	1810

A partir de estos datos referidos a 1810 personajes nos encontramos con una mayor presencia de personajes masculinos (47,2 %) respecto a los femeninos (29,1 %), siendo sólo un 23,6 % los nombres comunes o pronombres personales no marcados morfológica o contextualmente. Un par de textos de EGB (3 y 10) destacan por la escasa aparición de personajes femeninos. Unicamente un texto (nº 9) tiene una mayor aparición de referencias a personajes femeninos. Destacan, por otra parte, tres textos (4, 7 y 8) por un mayor porcentaje de términos duales no marcados. Hay que tener en cuenta que todos los libros utilizan el inglés como lenguaje instrumental, por lo que se favorece el uso de nombres comunes duales: *friend, partner, teacher...*

Los textos de Secundaria nos aportan los siguientes datos:

Texto Secundaria
Nombres comunes y pronombres personales
Secundaria

Texto nº	Pers. fems.		Pers. mascs.		Duales		Total
1	87	21,8 %	143	35,9 %	168	42,2 %	398
2	29	13 %	57	25,6 %	136	61,2 %	222
3	151	32,6 %	208	45 %	103	22,2 %	462
4	229	36,2 %	248	39,3 %	154	24,4 %	631
5	110	19,3 %	189	33,2 %	270	47,4 %	569
6	155	26,2 %	248	41,9 %	188	31,8 %	591
7	93	46,5 %	86	43 %	21	10,5 %	200
8	165	38,4 %	146	34 %	118	27,5 %	429
9	17	37,7 %	17	37,7 %	11	24,4 %	45
10	308	24,2 %	721	56,6 %	243	19,1 %	1272
11	203	24,8 %	235	28,7 %	379	46,3 %	817
12	117	34,8 %	219	65,1 %			336
13	770	52 %	697	47,1 %	11	0,7 %	1478
14	44	18,8 %	85	38,2 %	93	41,8 %	222
15	29	9,4 %	51	16,6 %	226	73,8 %	306
Total	2507	31,4 %	3350	41,9 %	2121	26,5 %	7978

En estos textos de Secundaria se han contabilizado 7.978 nombres comunes y pronombres personales, de los que el 31,4 % corresponden a personajes femeninos, el 41,9 % a masculinos, y el 26,5 % son términos duales no marcados. Los textos 7, 8 y 13 destacan por una mayor referencia a personajes femeninos, mientras que el texto 10 presenta una fuerte presencia de referencias a personajes masculinos.

11. APARICIÓN DE NOMBRES PROPIOS PERSONALES

La aparición de nombres propios tiene una gran importancia dada la referencia específica que hacen a personas de uno u otro sexo. Los datos obtenidos se exponen en el siguiente cuadro resumen de textos de EGB y Secundaria

Aparición de nombres propios personales

	Femeninos	*Masculinos*	*Total*
EGB	1323	1797	3120
%	**42,4 %**	**57, 5 %**	
Secundaria	1136	1689	2825
%	**40,2 %**	**59,7 %**	

Los resultados de aparición de nombres propios nos proporcionan nuevamente una presencia bastante más importante de personajes masculinos que de femeninos, aunque suponen una pequeña reducción de la diferencia encontrada en las ilustraciones.

12. OFICIOS Y OCUPACIONES

Los oficios y ocupaciones adjudicados a los personajes son muy significativos de los roles que tradicionalmente se atribuyen a las personas en razón de su sexo. Los trabajos de mujeres son, en general, los socialmente considerados como femeninos presentando además un abanico muy cerrado de posibilidades profesionales. Las propuestas que se hacen a los hombres son las tradicionalmente aceptadas como masculinas y, por otro lado, son muy variadas. Nos hemos encontrado con la siguiente oferta cualitativa de empleos para cada uno de los sexos así como la que tiene carácter dual:

Oficios y ocupaciones

	Femeninos	*Masculinos*	*Dual*	*Total*
EGB	53	142	11	206
	25,7 %	**68,9 %**	**5,3 %**	
Secundaria	114	210	102	426
	26,7 %	**49,2 %**	**23,9 %**	

En los libros de texto de EGB se presenta una oferta de 53 profesiones para las mujeres, lo que representa el 25,7 % de los trabajos aparecidos, mientras que a los hombres se les ofrecen 142, representando el 68,9 %; los trabajos sin adscripción (duales) representan sólo el 5,3 %. Hay que resaltar que los textos 4 y 7 destacan por la excesiva diferencia entre la oferta cuantitativa femenina y masculina; sin embargo, los textos 2 (ilustraciones), 5 y 6 ofrecen una oferta cuantitativa mayor para las mujeres. En concreto, en el texto 10 se ofrece el siguiente abanico de profesiones en las unidades analizadas:

Profesiones (texto 10 EGB)

«Femeninas»	«Masculinas»
Maestra, estudiante, ama de casa, dependienta.	Mecánico, policía, maestro, estudiante, cámara, ciclista, locutor, dependiente, maletero, vendedor, médico, cantante, pianista, conductor, camarero, cocinero.

Los textos de Secundaria (excepto el 3 y el 14) ofrecen 114 trabajos potenciales para mujeres, lo que supone un 26,7% (dos puntos por encima de la oferta en EGB), 210 trabajos para hombres, lo que supone un 49,2 % (veinte puntos por debajo de la oferta en EGB), y 102 empleos duales. Destaca el texto nº 8 por la diferente oferta cuantitativa de aparición de las diversas profesiones: 17 para mujeres y 61 para hombres.

13. ADJETIVACIÓN DE LOS PERSONAJES

La adjetivación atribuida a los personajes es bastante amplia en casi todos los textos analizados. Se han contabilizado los adjetivos cualitativos aplicados a los personajes femeninos y masculinos, sin tener en cuenta otras formas lingüísticas de atribución (comparaciones, perífrasis, oraciones...). Las adjetivaciones aplicadas a ambos sexos no se han tenido en cuenta a la hora de resumir los resultados. A pesar de lo relativo que supone sacar algunas conclusiones a partir de cualidades atribuidas a personajes determinados, estableceremos comparaciones entre la adjetivación a los colectivos de personajes femeninos y masculinos. En total se han vaciado 9 textos de EGB y 14 de Secundaria (no se han analizado los textos 2 y 3 de EGB y 14 de Secundaria).

El primer aspecto a destacar es la gran diferencia cuantitativa entre adjetivaciones a personajes femeninos y masculinos. Veamos diversos porcentajes de adjetivación:

Adjetivación de personajes

Texto	*Femeninos*	*Masculinos*
EGB 1	31,2 %	68,7 %
4	28,1 %	71, 8 %
8	41,9 %	58 %
9	40,9 %	59 %
11	31,2 %	68,7 %
Sec. 1	22,7 %	77,2 %
13	47 %	52, 9 %

Si bien es claro que en algunos textos no se percibe una discriminación cualitativa, tenemos de todos modos otros que marcan un modelo diferente para las personas de un sexo y del otro. De ahí que nos encontremos no sólo con una destacada diferencia numérica de adjetivaciones aplicadas a cada sexo, sino además con un enfoque diferente de cualificación, que visto en su conjunto podemos definir como androcéntrico y discriminatorio para niñas y mujeres. Veamos, a modo de ejemplo, un listado de adjetivaciones de varios textos para posteriormente sacar algunas conclusiones.

	Personajes femeninos	*Personajes masculinos*
EGB 8	Beautiful, nice, pretty, intelligent, thin, little.	Strong, ugly, funny, handsome, stupid, silly, nice, intelligent, clever, famous, young, courageous.

	9	Enferma, pequeña, joven.	Agradable, enfermo, sediento, inteligente, pequeño, feliz, afortunado, alto.
SEC	10	Ill, disappointed, coquette, young, old, weak, slow (walking), careful (typing), long (hair), beautiful, terrified, grey (eyes), bad (driving), rich, worried, furious, black (hair), nervous, attractive (personality), frightened.	Great, fair (hair), good, disappointed, busy, rich, nervous, strong, old, short (hair), handsome, fast (walking), careless, hard (worker), ill, tall, angry, happy, best, selfish, rude, stupid.
	13	Old, lovely, young, sweet, surprised, beautiful, worried, angry	Attractive, young, dangerous, fake, hard, strong, embarrassed, ugly, handsome,

Nos encontramos un buen número de adjetivaciones del sexo femenino referidas al aspecto físico (belleza, pequeñez, debilidad...), al carácter más o menos descontrolado (asustada, decepcionada, preocupada, nerviosa, sorprendida, enfadada...) a sus malas habilidades (mala conductora, de andar lento), o a sus habilidades «típicamente» femeninas (mecanógrafa cuidadosa). En algún caso también llega a reconocerse su inteligencia.

El sexo masculino también se ve calificado respecto al aspecto físico, aunque resaltando además su fuerza, altura, andar rápido... o incluso su fealdad. Respecto al carácter y personalidad aparecen calificados los personajes masculinos como descuidados, rudos, egoístas, valientes, falsos, o incluso estúpidos. Son, eso sí, famosos, inteligentes, están ocupados o son los mejores jugadores. Características estas últimas que se oponen semánticamente al campo de las adjudicadas a las mujeres y niñas.

Podemos concluir respecto a esos aspectos que es a través de la calificación como se proyectan hacia las personas los modelos genéricos y se va moldeando la personalidad de cada cual.

14. CONCLUSIONES

Teniendo en cuenta los diversos aspectos del análisis de los 26 libros de texto de inglés de EGB y Secundaria, se pueden deducir algunas conclusiones.

1. A pesar de ciertos avances producidos, los libros de texto siguen transmitiendo modelos y valores genéricos diferenciados para niñas y niños en el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje. Se presenta, en líneas generales, un modelo discriminatorio y sexista para las niñas y las mujeres en la sociedad actual, así como un modelo androcéntrico para niños y hombres. Los textos se convierten, por tanto y con la salvedad de ser parte de un orden socio-pedagógico más allá de la voluntad de sus autores, en un elemento de mantenimiento de la discriminación de las personas en función de su sexo, sin servir de medio para una interpretación crítica y superadora de la realidad.

2. En las ilustraciones y en los textos se sigue relegando a los personajes femeninos respecto a los masculinos. Las actividades y trabajos siguen siendo los tradicionalmente asignados tanto a un sexo como al otro, significando una restricción de las expectativas de las niñas y las mujeres y, por el contrario, una amplitud potencial para los niños y hombres.

3. Los profesores debemos ser conscientes del material escolar que utilizamos para poder, al menos, contrarrestar los aspectos negativos en el terreno de los valores y la discriminación, exigiendo a la par mejores elementos educativos.

NOTA

1. Anteriormente habíamos realizado un análisis de textos de Francés e Inglés: Cerezal y Jiménez 1990)

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IRONY AND AMBIGUITY IN THE NARRATOR OF *A LETTER TO THREE WIVES*

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Current narratological theory distinguishes between external and character-bound narrators. The external narrator is not a character in the fabula, whereas the character-bound narrator narrates from inside it.[1] In both cases, this agent, defined as the one that utters the linguistic signs, is seen by some narratologists as the producer of narration, the activity that, in the case of a novel, transforms the story into a narrative text. Other agents have been recognized as subjects of the narrative text above and below the narrator, like the implied author, the enunciator, the focalizor or the characters themselves, but the narrator seems to keep a prominent part in any narratological scheme. In the novel, the reason for this prominence is clear as any linguistic utterance presupposes an agent that utters it. Thus, unlike the implied author or the focalizor, for example, the narrator is an explicit agent who never disappears from the text.[2]

In film the situation is rather different. There are agents who utter linguistic signs, but narration consists of much more than what is expressed in words. A similar agent to the narrator in a novel exists in some films, like the character who starts narrating events of the past and whose voice is eventually replaced by a visual flashback, the traditionally called voice-over narrator, or the intertitles of silent films and some sound films. These narrators, however, do not appear in all films and, when they do, their activity is limited to relatively short sections.

A film is a narrative, like a novel, and therefore the activity of narration is taking place, but, as Edward Branigan says, «we cannot ask for a biological person; instead we must seek a symbolic activity —the activity of narration (1984: 40). To say that the narrator is the agent that carries out this activity is, in David Bordwell's words, «indulging in an anthropomorphic fiction» because «in watching films, we are seldom aware of being told something by an entity resembling a human being» (1985: 62). Unfortunately both authors fall immediately after to the temptation of identifying this symbolic activity with the narrator, which Bordwell defines as «a construct of the spectator» and «a product of specific organizational principles, historical factors, and viewers' mental sets» (1985: 62). We prefer to restrict the use of the term «narrator» to the agent that, in some films, actively narrates *in linguistic signs*. Film narration involves other textual elements, which we could roughly group in four codes: mise en scene, cinematography, editing and non-linguistic sounds, or, from a more narrative standpoint, at least two other modes of narration: representation, focalization. None of these can, in any way, be attributed to the narrator.

The problem, in the end, is not just one of terminology, but of a narrative theory which is based primarily on novels. The terms narration and narrative seem to define accurately the activity and the final result of any rendering of a story, regardless of the medium. However, they are directly related to the linguistic signs which textualise stories in a novel. Their application to the same concepts in other media is smooth enough. It seems obvious that most films are narratives which «tell» a story through an activity of narration, like novels. The crucial word here is *tell*, because, while it describes precisely what happens in a novel, it only works metaphorically in a film (or, for that matter, in a play). Stories are not exacly *told* in these narratives: they are presented, dramatized, visualized, etc., but not told. The consequence is that the term *narration*, which defines something concrete in a novel, with an agent that performs it, the *narrator*, refers only to an abstract activity in film and one without a clearly identifiable agent. Therefore, only those agents that explicitly and recognizably narrate can be called *narrators*, while the term *narration* can still be kept to refer to the overall activity of textualization of a story, although it is an activity carried out in film in a more complex and composite way than in novels.

Consequently, the narrator or narrators in a film are those agents that tell stories in linguistic signs. All characters, as long as they speak, are potential and actual narrators, but our analysis must concentrate only on those agents who contribute actively, as narrators, to the presentation of the fabula.

Narrators can be in film, like in other narratives, external or character-bound. We have already mentioned the most frequent examples of both

categories in classical films. In other cases, we may have more complex narrators, whose status changes throughout the film. A striking example is the external narrator in *The Magnificent Ambersons* (1942). This voice-over narrator has no remarkable characteristics as such, apart from the voice, which the spectator clearly recognizes as that of the film's director, until a point in which one of the characters seems to hear his voice from inside the fabula and replies to it. This frame breaking, a usual enough narrative strategy in modern narrative texts, casts a momentary doubt over the apparent omniscience of the narrator, but is not pursued in the rest of the film. However, at the end, once the fabula has finished, the same voice-over narrator introduces to us the most important members of the cast and crew in the making of the film. Finally, over a shot of a microphone, we hear: «I wrote the film and directed it. My name is Orson Welles.» This is the first time the narrator uses the first-person pronoun. The external narrator has become a fictional character whose name (and voice) is that of the film director.

The crucial fact here, from a narrative standpoint, is that the status of the narrator has changed, together with the structure of the text. What we had all along was not an external narrator, as we thought, but a second-level character narrator, telling a story from within another story. In Genette's terms this narrator would not be heterodiegetic but homodiegetic and extradiegetic with respect to the second-level fabula. Framing this level, and including the narrator as an agent belonging to it (together with other agents, like actors and crew members) there is another level.

The final function of this strategy is ironic: the limits between reality and fiction are not clear, as what we understand by reality can be fictionalized at any point. Omniscience, as traditionally represented by the powerful external narrator, is also a fraud.[3] From the moment the external narrator becomes a character in another fabula, the illusion of omniscience is disclosed as just another narrative device.

The Magnificent Ambersons is a classic example of the modern mistrust in the transparency of narration, a basic characteristic of the classical text. There are, of course, other films in the history of cinema in which this mistrust is also felt and becomes a part of the overall sense of the narrative. We propose to analyse here the role of another narrator whose ambiguous position as such is sustained throughout the film. We are referring to Addie Ross in Mankiewicz's *A Letter to Three Wives* (1948).

Structurally, this film consists of a present time, which covers the first and last sections of the story, plus short intervals between the flashbacks, and three flashbacks (not in chronological order) which correspond to the memories

of the three main characters: Deborah, Rita and Laura Mae. If we were to analyse the three flashbacks without the present-day sections, the film would be, unlike *The Magnificent Ambersons*, a striking example of the classical mode of narration, with a camera which, with very few exceptions, tends to self-effacing, and a story which seems to be narrating itself. This initial adherence to the classical code makes, as we shall see, its subversion of it the more powerful.

The strategy of a story told in successive flashbacks ascribed to different characters appears in at least another two (later) films by Mankiewicz: *All about Eve* (1950) and *The Barefoot Contessa* (1954). There is, however, a very important difference between *A Letter* and these two films. In the latter, we get primarily the story of one character —Eve Harrington, María del Monte— told by those around them (or, occasionally, themselves) in flashbacks. As a result, we finally get an accurate portrayal of the heroine, through the grouping together of contrastive versions, or, at least, her story told from different perspectives. In *A Letter*, the story does not revolve around one single character, but around the three of them, each flashback expressing the story of their personal relationships with other people in the town, more specifically with their husbands and, indirectly, with Addie Ross.

There is one more difference. In *All about Eve* and *The Barefoot Contessa* there is one present-time event (an award-giving ceremony and a funeral) from which the different characters present start remembering. On each occasion, the flashback starts with voice-over narration by the character who is remembering and then, through cuts or dissolves, we are visually transferred to the point in the past that the memory refers to.

In *A Letter*, however, the three returns to the past (Debbie's, Rita's, Laura Mae's) start with the characters thinking in the present about a time in the past which concerns some crisis or climactic moment in their relationship with their husbands: Debbie's arrival in the town (which is given no name, although it plays an important part in the fabula), Rita's dinner party for her employers and Laura Mae's problematic seduction of Porter. There are dissolves as a strategy of transition from present to past, but these dissolves are not accompanied by the voice-over commentary of the character who is remembering. In the first two flashbacks, we get the offscreen voices of two other characters: the voice of the girl who is reading the fairy tale in Debbie's, and Debbie's voice in Rita's. In Laura Mae's, these voices from the present are replaced by the tinkle of a leaking sink, which fuses visually with a similar one in the past (there is an almost perfect graphic match and an almost imperceptible dissolve, which make it difficult to pinpoint the exact moment at which, diegetically, the story has changed from present to past).

These voices and noise (the first two offscreen, the third one onscreen) have the clear function of precipitating the memory, in the same way as Proust's madeleine and tea. Immediately before the flashback, there is also, on each occasion, a dialogue —between Deborah and Laura Mae in the first case, between Rita and Debbie in the second, and between Laura Mae and Rita in the third— which also plays an important part as the cause of each flashback.

There is more in two of these flashbacks. In Deborah and Laura Mae's transitions (first and third), we also get the voice over of the narrator, Addie Ross. In the first one, she repeats , «Is it Brad? is it Brad? is it Brad?» (referring to the question that torments Debbie's mind, namely, whether her husband is the one that has gone away with Addie). In the last one, she says: «Maybe you haven't got everything you wanted after all.» Gradually, her voice acquires a metallic quality and gets fused into the sound of the water hitting the bottom of the bucket. In both cases, this voice over is external, that is, it is not heard (or imagined, or remembered) or indeed uttered by the characters who are remembering, and who are the subjects of the flashbacks. The importance of these remarks of Addie Ross's in the origin of such large sections of the film, as well as the general status of the narrator, make us wonder to what extent Debbie and Laura Mae (and indeed Rita, although Addie's voice cannot be heard in her flashback) are the only agents, or even the main ones, in the production of their memories. In general, it is the role played by this voice-over narrator that marks the originality of the film. It is also through this device that *A Letter* separates itself most blatantly from classical cinema.

Addie's voice-over commentary does not appear at all during the flashbacks. Her presence as narrator is limited to the beginning and end of the film (especially the beginning) and, as we have seen, very briefly, to two of the transitions. The ambiguity with which this agent is invested starts in the opening scene. At first it seems a normal enough opening commentary in which the narrator gives us a description of the place where she lives. It is clear that she is a character-narrator, as she places herself, by means of the possessives (*my* town, etc.) in the space of the fabula. Strictly narrative commentary seems to start when she concentrates on the first couple: Brad and Debbie. By the time her voice over stops we still do not know who the narrator exactly is, or whether she is a main character or a «witness» narrator, who observes the events of the fabula from the inside but does not play any relevant part in the action. Her ironic tone, held throughout the intervention, does point at some important relationship with Brad and Debbie when she refers to them as «my very, very dear friends.» Nothing conclusive, however, stems from this sustained irony. We do know that the images that accompany her voice and the scene that

follows at Debbie's house do not constitute a flashback with respect to the time of narration. Unlike many films which start with voice-over character-bound narration, the time of narration is here the present. That is, narration and what is narrated occur simultaneously. This, which will be confirmed by subsequent interventions, gives a high degree of omniscience to a narrator: in spite of being part of the fabula, she is capable of seeing what is happening in different parts of the town.

It is usual for a classical film to adopt an omniscience in the visual presentation of the fabula which contradicts the necessarily restricted scope of the character narrator with whose commentary they start. *Rebecca* (1940), for example, starts with a character narrator who refers to a dream she had the previous night (simultaneously we can see images from the dream) and then, very briefly, to the time in the past when the fabula starts. The rest of the film is devoted to this flashback and, although the character's focalization predominates over all the other character's, several events are shown at which she was not present or in which we have more information than her. What has happened here is that when the character's narration stops her story is taken up by an external focalizor that, while generally following her progress through the fabula, enjoys an omniscience which she cannot have. In fact, the viewer soon forgets that s/he is watching a flashback and takes the narrator's intervention simply as a way of introducing us to the fabula.

Even in films in which the character narrator reappears several times throughout the film, and our understanding of the text is heavily influenced by his/her commentary, like *Double Indemnity* (1944) or *Sunset Boulevard* (1950), the dissociation between character narrator and external focalizor is still present, even though the more voice-over narration expresses the subjectivity of a character, the more focalization corresponds to her/him. The fact remains that, apart from the famous exceptions of *The Lady in the Lake* (1946) and the first part of *Dark Passage* (1944), we always see more than any of the characters, This is a fact of the classical code which we accept from our viewing competence and do not interpret as inconsistent.

The situation in *A Letter* is different because the tension does not exist between narrator and focalizor, or between voice-over and image, but within the narrator. Addie Ross shows features of an external and a character-bound narrator. Her position is ambiguous in the sense that the position of the narrator in *The Magnificent Ambersons* is ambiguous. But although she is closer to this narrator than to any of the other ones mentioned above, the difference is also clear: whereas the narrator in *Ambersons* is initially external and then becomes internalized, Addie seems to be both things at the same time.

As the film develops, more specifically, when the three friends receive the letter from Addie, we realize that there was more to the opening scene than we thought. The images of the railway station that we interpreted as descriptive contained some relevant narrative information which we were then not prepared to process: if we bear in mind that the time of narration is the present, the images that open the film are also present. Although they are used to describe the town, they are showing the town on the particular Saturday morning when the story (not the fabula) starts. More specifically, the train leaving is probably the one in which Addie leaves the town for good, apparently with one of the husbands of the other three. The subtlety of this shot illustrates another characteristic of this character narrator: to her ambiguity as a narrator we have to add her elusiveness as a character. If we accept the interpretation given here of the first shot, this is the closest we get to Addie's physical presence in the film's present time. Although we hear her commentary, we never actually get to see Addie.

Throughout the film her presence as a character is constantly felt. In the present-time scenes, the other characters talk about her even before they receive her letter. The letter, which she as a narrator reads to us as the three women (and the spectators) are reading it, places her, as a character, at the centre of the events in the rest of the fabula. The flashbacks include her relationship with each of the three husbands from their wives' viewpoint, since the three of them are more or less openly afraid that it is their husband Addie has left with. Debbie finds out, as soon as she arrives in the town (in the past), that everybody thought that Brad and Addie would have got married one day. Rita realizes she has forgotten George's birthday when he receives a rare record from Addie (which will later on be broken by Rita's uncultured employer). Porter has a portrait of Addie in his house when Laura Mae is trying to get him to marry her, and uses Addie as an example of the class that Laura Mae has not got. The three wives think that there are enough reasons for their husbands to have been the chosen ones.

In spite of her centrality in the fabula Addie never actually appears onscreen. The closest we come to seeing her, apart from the scene mentioned above, is in the two pictures that Brad and Porter have in their houses (but the pictures are both times framed from the back), and on another two occasions: in Debbie's flashback, at the party, Addie is talking to Brad in the garden, but, as Debbie looks, she is covered by a shrub (like in the train scene, she is onscreen but hidden from our view). In Laura Mae's section she is in the restaurant where Porter takes his wife on their first date. At one point, Porter looks offscreen but the expected eyeline match does not occur. Shot B, that of the object of the gaze, is missing. The high degree of artificiality in these two

unusual eyeline matches points to the fact that the film is curiously avoiding the physical presence or the character (much in the same way as male characters are avoided in *The Women*, 1939) and playing with her presence / absence. By the time Laura Mae looks at the photograph of Addie in Porter's house (the last of the scenes referred to in the manipulated order of the story), we already have the strong feeling that we will never get to see her or her picture.

One thematic implication of this textual strategy is that, although her presence and personality are constantly felt, her limited reality for the spectator makes her more a symbol than the actual origin of the three wives' predicaments. The evils of this small-town society, as illustrated in the lives of the three women, are within the society itself and only need the external agent to bring them into the open. Addie has more than one feature in common, at fabula level if not textually, with Horner in *The Country Wife*.

At the same time, however, the film is artificially separating the narrator (whose presence becomes intrusive at times) from the character (whose absence is ensured by textual tricks). To the tension existing within the part of the narrator we can now add the one between narrator and character, although both correspond to the same figure.

The second outstanding characteristic of this narrator is, as has been mentioned before, her irony. At the beginning, as Debbie and Rita are driving along, shortly before they find out about her secret, Addie introduces herself to the spectator for the first time. She adds: «Addie Ross, the person they always end up talking about.» Her words are perfectly timed. The next words are Debbie's: «I wonder whether she knows how much we do talk about her.» We may be expecting Rita's reply but, instead, we get a reply from Addie: «I know, but it doesn't matter; what matters is what *I* know and you don't... yet.» This character-narrator has the unusual power to hear what the other characters say, even though she is not present. The point is, of course, that she *is* present, not in flesh and blood but as a narrative device. She has all the characteristics of an external narrator but she belongs to the fabula. She can see or hear without being heard or seen. When she left on the train, in the first shot of the film, she seems to have left not so much for another town as for another narrative level. Her invisibility is so remarkable that even when, in the past, the other characters could see her, the spectators could not. More than with the narrators of any other film, her strongest connections are with the Shakespearean fairies Puck and Ariel, who, like the director of a performance on the stage, play at will with their puppet-like actors. Rita, Debbie and Laura Mae seem at times little more than puppets in her hands. In this scene, she teases them, without them being at all aware, into saying what she wants them to say.

Her function in the transitions may appear more clearly now. With her intrusions, she provokes the memories of the three women, and whether she or they are the origin of the successive visualizations remains unclear. Her intervention in both Debbie and Laura Mae's flashbacks supports this approach clearly. In the last one, the immediate cause of the memory is the noise produced by the leaking sink. But, as Addie's voice becomes gradually integrated into the sound pattern of the tinkle, it becomes difficult to differentiate between the two. The film has mixed both sounds into one. The same happens, in a slightly different form, in the first flashback. Addie's voice whispering «Is it Brad?» without Debbie being aware of it because they are at different fictional levels becomes mixed with the obsessive sound of an engine which may be the exaggerated but realistic sound of the boat moving in the water, or the imagined one of a train leaving, in Debbie's mind.

In other words, Addie the «spirit» narrator has become visible by turning into the object that originates the flashback. Her voice does not appear in the second transition but, instead, we see the smoke from a cigarette which the camera follows and frames in the centre immediately before the dissolve. For all we know, this may be Addie rendered visible again.

We said before that the internal narrator of a film is usually replaced by an external focalizor when the image takes over the narration in a retroversion. Therefore it is perfectly acceptable by the viewer that the character who originates the flashback may not be present at some point of the visualized section of the past. It is significant, however, that this happens in the last two retroversions of the film. In Rita's, we go back to the kitchen of her house where only Sadie, her maid and Laura Mae's mother's friend, is present. Shortly after, Rita comes in. In Laura Mae's, the return is also to her kitchen, where her mother and Sadie are playing cards. Laura Mae does not come onscreen until a few minutes after.

What we are suggesting is that, at least in these two cases, the external focalizor that replaces the character's memories in the past sections has, from the beginning, more connections with Addie than with the two women whose memories they are meant to represent. Addie has provoked the returns to the past at the level of the fabula by sending the letter and setting them to think. But, from the point of view of narration, she is also responsible for the production of the retroversions of the other three. She has made them remember, as a character and as a narrator, even though they are unaware of the latter.

The film finishes as Debbie leaves the table where all her friends are sitting and Porter and Laura Mae stand up and start dancing. An unexpected movement of the camera frames one of the glasses on the table which tumbles

and shatters. Addie's voice over says musically: «Hei-ho, goodnight everybody.» This final trick, of which we do not know whether the other characters become aware or not, because they have been left offscreen, emphasises her lingering presence in their lives after she has gone, as a reminder of their imperfections and the selfishness in their relationships. For the spectator, this is the final sign of the inexplicability of her status: a narrator who has the impunity to break a glass, an object of the fabula, cannot be accounted for in a fiction in which we expect the different narrative levels to be neatly separated. By this time, though, we are sufficiently aware of her very special powers as a composite figure of external and character-bound narrator, and we could not expect anything less from her.

Irony, ambiguity, elusiveness, fairy-tale impunity are then the characteristics of this unusual figure, Addie Ross. We have tried to describe her role in the film and to analyse it from a narrative standpoint. We have suggested the connections and also the narrative inconsistencies that appear between fabula, story and text throughout her performance. However, some questions remain unanswered. What does it all mean? How does her unique status contribute to our understanding of the film? We do not think that the ambiguity of her role allows us to give a definite answer to these questions. Ambiguity remains a key word. However, the points that our analysis has elicited do encourage us to try and probe a little further into the film, by suggesting one further connection between the development of the fabula and the narrative device.

Among the principles of narration which govern a narrative film, David Bordwell (1985) includes two kinds of strategies: *self-consciousness* and *communicativeness*.[4] He defines self-consciousness as the extent to which the narration displays recognition that it is addressing an audience (1985: 58). We could also define it as the extent to which the film is aware of itself as a narrative construct. A significant degree of self-consciousness has often been recognized as a characteristic of the modern film. In this sense, it is the opposite of classical *transparency*. In *A Letter*, it is the narrator that separates the text from the classical code. A classical film is a closed system in which everything ends up falling neatly into place. Indeed, much of the pleasure that we get from these films consists in witnessing the process by which all loose ends gradually disappear. Addie Ross does not fall neatly into any category. She is not completely a character nor an external narrator. To say she acts like the fairies in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* may shed some light into her relationship with the other characters, but it does not solve the inconsistency inherent to her narrative position. Puck and the other fairies *are* characters, which just happen

to have the power to be invisible and to influence the behaviour of mortals, but only metaphorically can they be associated with agents external to the fabula.

Addie is a mechanism of the narration to expose a narrative convention. She shows, in her inconsistency and her impunity at blurring limits between levels, the limitations and arbitrariness of the role of the traditional narrator. She is not a complete character or a consistent narrator because there is no reason why she should be. She can certainly be described as a joke on the spectator because she is a joke on the expectations created on us by the classical code. We said before that if it were not for this element, the film would be a fair example of a classical text. She spoils our fun by destroying our «willing suspension of disbelief» and calling our attention to the absurdity of her position. To this extent, *A Letter* is a self-conscious film and more cruelly so because it has all the ingredients to become self-effaced but it blatantly wastes them.

Communicativeness refers, according to Bordwell, to the willingness of the narration to communicate all the information available to it to the spectator (1985: 59). *A Letter* is communicative in most respects but it remains mysterious about the big question of the fabula: which one of the three husbands did Addie run away with? This is information that is obviously available to the narration but which is consciously concealed from us. Addie makes all sorts of uncalled for comments and manipulates us and the other characters at will. She knows who the unfaithful husband is and yet she ironically keeps it a secret from us.

The secret is apparently disclosed at the end of the film. Debbie comes back home and Brad is not there. She, the other two women and the audience, believe that Brad is our man. Just before the glass is shattered, however, Porter confesses that he was the one who left with Addie and later changed his mind. The explanation is credible enough as Brad had said at the beginning that he might not finish his business in another town in time to return in the evening. On the other hand, Porter's final decision accounts for the renewed happiness in his relationship with Laura Mae.

There is no clear reason why we should not believe his words. Yet, there is something contradictory in his attitude and in the understanding that the other characters seem to share with him. We feel that he may be trying to make Debbie happy for one more night before she discovers the truth in the morning. The phrasing of the dialogues is careful enough so as not to break the ambiguity. When Porter says that he wants to spare Debbie the suffering of one night, he might mean that she will not suffer again after the night or that she will. Rita says: «She would have known in the morning, anyway.» But we still do not know for sure what it is she will find out. In the end, the fabula remains

open and it is left to us to interpret the clues and decide one way or the other. Or, since the narration chooses not to say, we may dismiss the solution of the problem as irrelevant. The point would be not whose husband it was but that Addie had threatened (in more than one way) the precarious relationship that the three women had with their husbands and has, at the same time, helped them in their learning process, bringing about a final reconciliation.

If we take the role of the narrator, at the level of the text, and the secret, at the level of the fabula, to be the two most important driving forces of the narration, we must also agree that both of them remain inconclusive in the end. The film's lack of communicativeness runs parallel to its self-consciousness. The inexplicable narrative mechanism and the unexplained fabula resolution work together to provide a deeper insight into the world of the film. The joke that the narration plays on us, through the role of the narrator, is not just a joke. It is, in the end, a metaphor of the outcome of the fabula. Without leaving the comic world in which the film is firmly rooted, a world of self-preservation of the human species through love, tolerance and adaptability, the easy solution is denied us because the real world does not offer easy solutions, just like, in the film's reflexive approach to fiction and narration, the neatly ordered, closed text is not possible any more.

NOTES

1. We use here Mieke Bal's terminology and concepts (1985). Genette (1972) refers to the same concepts with the terms heterodiegetic and homodiegetic narrator, introducing also the autodiegetic narrator, who is a homodiegetic narrator that happens to be, at the same time, the protagonist of the fabula. These are more accurate divisions than the traditional ones between first-person and third-person narrator, since a narrator always narrates in first person.

2. It is true that, starting from Emile Benveniste (1966, 1974), another critical trend tends to approach the narrator, or the subjects of a narrative in general, as the products rather than the producers of narration. See in this respect Jesús González Requena (1987).

3. This same idea, which pervades the whole of Orson Welles's filmic career, is the central issue fo his last film, *F for Fake* (1972).

4. Bordwell borrows here from Meir Sternberg's categories (1978). There is one more category, *knowledge*, which Bordwell takes from Sternberg.

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AUTHORIAL INTENTION IN LITERARY HERMENEUTICS: ON TWO AMERICAN THEORIES

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1. INTENTION AND INTENTIONALITY

It will be convenient, before we broach the issue of intention in the theory of literature, to contextualize the concept of intention. In the phenomenological tradition inaugurated by Brentano, intention is a specific manifestation, among others, of the more general phenomenon of Intentionality.[1] Intentionality is a relationship between a cognitive representation and a state of affairs, in which the cognitive representation can be said to be «about» the state of affairs. Intentional states include perception, belief, desire, memory, and intention, among others. Contemporary philosophical schools differ on the status of Intentionality. For some thinkers (Ryle, Skinner, Quine), it is a concept which has no place in a rigorous theory of knowledge; for others, there is no understanding human activity without it. Let me side with the latter without further explanation, and say that the differences within this second current, e.g. between John R. Searle's mentalism and Daniel C. Dennett's «intentional stance,» are largely irrelevant for the purposes of this work. As a rule, I will adopt Searle's idiom, according to which meanings are actual representations in the brain, although I think that Searle's theory could benefit from a greater degree of self-consciousness about its own heuristic status. This methodological choice has the advantage of

setting in a larger frame the theory of speech acts, which I think is an important meeting ground for hermeneutics, linguistics, philosophy and literary theory.

For instance, both speech acts and Intentional states in general can be represented as a modalized propositional content.[2] My assertion «John loves Sally» (a speech act) can be paraphrased metalinguistically as «I assert that John loves Sally.» Similarly, my belief that John loves Sally (an Intentional state) can be paraphrased as «I believe that John loves Sally.» This paraphrase can be said to be Intentional, too. We must distinguish the *original Intentionality* of Intentional states themselves from the *derived Intentionality* of their semiotic representation (cf. Searle 1983a: 21). The Intentionality of a mental belief is original; that of language or literature is derived. Meaning is the relationship between primary and derived Intentionality, between an Intentional state and its semiotic representation. As we shall see, this definition allows for a variety of types of meaning.

Intention-with-a-lowercase-i is a kind of Intentionality. Therefore, my intention to love Sally, which itself is non-linguistic, can be represented linguistically and rather trivially as «I intend to love Sally.» Searle sees some Intentional states as more central, simple or primordial than others. These basic Intentional states, such as perception or belief, can be a component part of several other more complex or secondary[3] Intentional phenomena. Searle hesitates about the status of intention in this respect. First, he presents intention as an elaborate instance of such secondary Intentionality, and isolates in it the components of belief and desire («Bel» and «Des» in his notation):

> If I intend to do *A* , I must believe it is possible for me to do *A* and I must in some sense want to do *A* . But we get only a very partial analysis of intention from the following:
>
> Intend (I do *A*) —> Bel (<> I do *A*) & Des (I do *A*)
>
> The extra element derives from the special causal role of intention in producing our behavior. . . . (1983a: 34)

But immediately afterwards he reverses the priorities, and speaks of desire as an evolved or bleached-out intention (1983a, 36). Fortunately we do not have to solve this problem. What is more relevant to our purposes here is that intention-with-a-small-i is defined by Searle in its ordinary sense, preceding action as the aim before the shot. This is *prior intention*. There is another kind of intentionality: *intention in the action*. Even in those instances of human agency where there is not a distinct prior intention, we want to characterize the action as intentional-with-a-lowercase-i. In such cases, Searle argues, «the intention in action just is

the Intentional content of the action; the action and the intention are inseparable . . .» (1983a: 84). Intention in action does not have to be present in the subject's consciousness: «Sometimes one performs intentional actions without our conscious experience of doing so» (1983a: 91). This is often the case in complex actions which demand a variety of minor, instrumental actions. I may consciously intend to drive to work, though not necessarily to turn on the starter. This would still be an intentional action. In turning on the starter, I might set off a booby trap installed by some terrorist —this would count as an unintentional action. However, not every unforeseen consequence of our basic actions is adequately described as non-intentional; for instance, on my way home I might suddenly become the only European born on the first of June 1961 who happens to looking at a shop window. If we bracket away the privileged virtual observer of this circumstance, it does not even count as an action. In Searle's words, «we count an action as unintentional under those aspects which, though not intended, are, so to speak, within the field of possibility of the intentional actions of the agent as seen from our point of view» (1983a: 102). Or, from another perspective, «an unintentional action is an intentional action, whether successful or not, which has aspects which were not intended in it» (1983a: 108).

When we speak of the intentionality of a literary work, we do not mean simply *prior intentionality*, but neither are we referring simply to the Intentional nature of the work insofar as it is a semiotic phenomenon. We mean *intention in the action* , but in a sense which remains to be further elaborated, one which is specific to the structure of language.

The Intentionality of language is derived. This means that, even in the simplest of speech acts, there is a double layer of Intentionality: the Intentional state expressed, and the intention with which the utterance is made. Moreover, intention (and not only Intentionality) is inherent to semiotic phenomena. According to Searle, «the mind imposes Intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically Intentional by intentionally conferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological state upon the external physical activity» (1983a: 27). In the case of language, the intentional association between signifier and signified soon becomes automatic, an unconscious intention in the act. Searle defines Intentional causation as that causation in which one element is an Intentional state and the other is its condition of satisfaction or part of its conditions of satisfaction. (1983a: 122). The peculiarity of the Intentional causation of semiotic communication is that an Intentional state is the condition of satisfaction of the Intentional state that causes it. The (highly conventionalized) Intentional causality of a red light is satisfied only if it causes in the motorist a belief that he is required to stop. Therefore, the intention inherent in the red light

is not properly speaking to produce the effect of stopping the motorist, but to communicate to the motorist that he must stop. As Searle has noted, it is a mistake to assume that «the intentions that matter for meaning are the intentions to produce *effects* on audiences» (1983a: 161).

Complex Intentional systems are thus constituted by superposing different orders of Intentionality. With the example of the red light, we are in our third layer of Intentionality: the original Intentional state of the sender of a message, the intention intrinsic to the constitution of the sign, and the intention to communicate a meaning through that sign. In the case of language, the issue becomes considerably more complicated, as we shall see later: language is so conventionalized that our communicative intention is directed at the performance of speech acts. For the moment, it is sufficient to say that intentions are inherent to the structure of language, and not merely to the psychological phenomena which precede or attend its use. The use and meaning of language (even of a term such as «intentional fallacy») rests on a series of practices, specific choices and purposes, which have become conventional to the extent of being taken for granted.

2. THE INTENTIONAL FALLACY FALLACY

Authorial intention is a central concept in the classical theory of hermeneutics developed in the Romantic age. The classical accounts by Schleiermacher (1805-33, rpt. 1986) and Boeckh (1877) conceive interpretation as the reconstruction of the author's original conception. Emilio Betti voices their contemporary heritage best: «interpretation becomes a collaboration that the addressee extends to the author of the statement, inasmuch as he is called upon to reawaken in his own mind the idea conceived and expressed by the mind of the author» (1988: 32). Interpretation includes the reconstruction of the author's intentions. However, it is not restricted to the reconstruction of the conscious intent or the communicative interest of the author: «Even a 'manifestation' devoid of such interest and a behavior not in itself directed toward making a thought recognizable to others may be the object of interpretation» (1988: 33). Unintentional, implicit or symptomatic meanings resulting from such manifestations can be the object of hermeneutics.

This conception has long been challenged, often in a misguided way, by non-intentionalist theories of literary meaning. The modern discussion of the role of authorial intention in the activity of the critic is usually taken to start with the aestheticist reaction against romantic individualism, which was an essentially

intentionalist current. This reaction is linked to literary modernism and can be seen taking shape in various forms during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. It is seen, for instance, in the work of Roger Fry, who once said, «I'm certain that the only meanings that are worth anything in a work of art, are those that the artist himself knows nothing about»[4] or in T. S. Eliot's strictures against «interpretation» (Eliot 1957). The debate has assumed different shapes, such as a contention between «historicist» and «critical» theories of interpretation, or between advocates and opponents of psychoanalysis, Marxism, structuralism or deconstruction —doctrines which challenge the traditional concept of individual intention. In America the most influential anti-intentionalist ideas came from a «critical» movement who opposed positivist scholarship —the New Criticism.

The best known and most influential theoretical statement of the anti-intentionalist school is W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley's article «The Intentional Fallacy» (1946; rpt. 1967).[5] The authors summarized their position in the statement that «the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art» (1967: 3). There has been considerable debate as to what was the precise scope of this critical axiom or doctrine, as well as its legitimacy. Other critics have found that it is just as easy to hold that «the design of the author is both available *and* desirable.»[6] The extreme intentionalist position will have to be qualified, too. The meaning of a poem is not always the meaning the poet intended it to have; the poet is not always in control of everything which is at work in the poem (Redpath 1976: 17), and he is definitely not in control of an anti-intentionalist interpreter.

Let us note first that Wimsatt and Beardsley take «intention» to mean first of all *prior intention*, the original intention of the author, previous to the actual composition of the work, or the personal intention of the author in those cases where it is different from any intention which may be inferred from the work itself.[7] Sources of information as to the author's intention which are external to the work itself are not relevant for the judgement of the work. Rejection of intention is meant as a rejection of psychologism, in favour of intrinsic criticism— of criticism based on the analysis of the text itself. Anti-intentionalism presents itself therefore as a favouring of public conventions over private ones.

This is not the main sense in which I hold authorial intention to be decisive to the critical enterprise. Alastair Fowler has noted that «intention means different things at different stages of composition.»[8] It also means different things from the point of view of the author at work and the from the point of view of the interpreter. «Intention» understood as a working project of the author's is not a

concern of the interpreter, except insofar as it may have some bearing on the intention assumed to be present in the work. This first kind of intention may nevertheless be a concern of the critic. Wimsatt and Beardsley's article is mainly concerned with «intention» seen from the author's pole, with intention «extrinsic» to the work. The response of intentionalist critics to «The Intentional Fallacy» has been to show that intention is, to use Wimsatt's own terms, *intrinsic* to the literary work, that the public sharability of language is not separable from a concept of intention, a circumstance which is neglected by anti-intentionalist critics. In short, writing literature involves an *intention in the action* which is part of the communicative structure of the work. Intention is not merely something which precedes the work or exists apart from it; neither does intentionalism consist in a blind submission to any meaning an author may claim for his work. It is a requirement to see the work in the right context.[10] For Gadamer, too, the opposition between intentional meaning and unintended meaning is too simplistic, unsatisfactory (1988: 58). An extended speech act theory (Pratt 1977; Harris 1988) can help us conceive of an intentionalism which is not narrowly and exclusively psychological.

As for Wimsatt and Beardsley's denunciation of psychologism, it remains a mystery how Wimsatt and Beardsley ever expected a historical psychic intention to be a threat at all for criticism if they believe that it is never available (cf. Peckham 156). It is also significant that Wimsatt and Beardsley assume that an unfulfilled intention is not recognizable without recourse to external evidence.[11] Any of a range common phenomena, such as bad verse which tries hard to be good, can serve as an example that this is not the case.

Let us note, too, that Wimsatt and Beardsley are mainly concerned with evaluation. However, the intentional fallacy is soon applied quite naturally to the realm of interpretation, since evaluation is logically linked to interpretation (Peckham 1976: 141). And in his revision of the earlier doctrine, Wimsatt extended the application of the intentional fallacy to the realm of interpretation: «The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging either the meaning or the value of a work of literary art» (Wimsatt 1976: 136).

Wimsatt and Beardsley are, furthermore, concerned with the criticism of poetry, or more widely, with aesthetic criticism. In their account, poetry simply

> *is*, in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring what part is intended or meant. Poetry is a feat of style by which a complex of meaning is handled all at once. . . . In this respect poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention. They are more abstract than poetry.[12]

Moreover, whatever personal thoughts or attitudes are inferred from the poem itself are to be attributed «to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference» (1967: 5). The poem does not belong to the critic, but neither does it belong to the author. It rests on the publicly specifiable conventions of meaning.

By means of an unconscious sleight of hand, Wimsatt and Beardsley's discussion reduces the function of criticism to an inquiry about the value of a work of art, disregarding the interpretive moment.[13] They reject as uninteresting one form of evaluation, the inquiry as to whether an artist realized his (original) intentions. In their view, criticism must evaluate the final result, the poem and not the (original, extrinsic) intention. «The evaluation of the work of art remains public; the work is measured against something outside the author» (1967: 10).

This valuation of public meaning is illegitimately identified with intrinsic criticism: in an even more amazing sleight of hand, «internal» is identified with «public»; «external» with «private» (1967: 10). Hirsch has noted that (in its main claim) Wimsatt and Beardsley's argument is not directed against verbal intentional meaning, but against irrelevant meanings. They contend «not that the inferred meanings are private, but that they are probably not the author's meanings» (Hirsch 1967: 16). Wimsatt and Beardsley, however, would reject the notion of «the author's» meanings, and would insist on the public nature of language. This public nature is what makes the notion of intrinsic criticism possible at all. The language of the poem has to be accepted as internal evidence; semi-private meanings of words are an intermediary case although ultimately they must be accepted as public (since we know them) and intrinsic: «The meaning of words is the history of words, and the biography of an author, his use of a word, and the associations which the word had for *him* , are part of the word's history and meaning» (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967: 10). The historical meaning of the work defined in this way is not «internal» to the text for Wimsatt and Beardsley's point of view. It is an intermediary type of evidence, not wholly external, but then not wholly internal either, because Wimsatt and Beardsley are considering the word as such, as a piece of *langue*, instead of seeing it as an instance of use in a text, a contextually defined *parole*.[14] The historical meaning, that is, is only «a part» of the meaning of the word *even from the purely interpretive point of view* . Ahistoricism rears its head in this conception.

But what really gives the whole theory away is a note appended to the text just quoted: «And the history of words *after* a poem is written may contribute meanings which if relevant to the original pattern should not be ruled out by a scruple about intention» (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967: 281). Notes are always telling about the deep intention of an author. It is clear now that Wimsatt and

Beardsley's concept of criticism sets aesthetic value foremost. The interpretation of the authorial meaning is secondary, even negligible if necessary. The critical act may evaluate the poem according to an accidental meaning or significance which it has acquired by virtue of the evolution of language. It is noticeable that in the note «intention» refers no longer to the sense they had started with, «whatever is or had been in the author's mind apart from the intentional acts publicly specified in the work itself.» The note contradicts the apparent meaning of the text, if not its real thrust. The text gives a (qualified) historicist definition of meaning, a concern for the meaning of the word in the author's context.[15] It comes close to a dangerous point where Wimsatt and Beardsley would be hard pressed not to accept evidence external to the text: those cases where a biographical or other «extrinsic» remark throws light on the original context of composition and therefore on the meaning of the word.[16] The note wipes away this concern for the authorial / historical meaning of the word. All «patterned» meanings, whether historically justified or not, are legitimate.[17] Anti-intentionalism therefore results in anti-historicism.

This doctrine rests on a very specific conception of language, which has sometimes been called «semantic autonomism.» According to this conception, once it is detached from its enunciator, language becomes autonomous; the author has no further rights over his utterance. This conception is shared by some structuralists critics. Roland Barthes speaks in this respect of «the death of the author.» Barthes sees the author's enunciation, writing, as an empty process which needs no interlocutors. Conversely, the reader is free to make of the text whatever he wants. In this view, literature is not communication, and interpretation is a senseless activity: «Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile» (Barthes 1977a: 147). The critic's meaning is as good as the author's. The best meaning, in these critics' view, overrides the authorial meaning, especially if the authorial meaning has to be determined by means of information not readily accessible to the reader.[18]

This might imply, as I have said, a disparagement of historicist considerations, but in fact it does not, or at least Wimsatt and Beardsley do not intend this result. They do not rule out the knowledge of the author's original culture as an essential asset for the interpreter —they presuppose it, they presuppose a competent reader. A great deal of historical and general contextual knowledge is to be taken for granted if this view must make any sense. Even conceding the dictionary meaning of the words to be «intrinsic» to the poem (a major concession which is taken for granted by the New Critics) we still need far more than dictionary meaning would allow in order to make sense of a literary work. An hypothetical dictionary-reader would fall short of Wimsatt and

Beardsley' expectations. They need an encyclopedic reader, one who knows, for instance, that the «trepidation of the spheares» in the Donne poem they comment on in their article refers at all to astronomy. The poem does not say so, but it is nevertheless an internal element of meaning to Wimsatt and Beardsley because they assume that the reader knows.[19] Wimsatt and Beardsley, therefore, do not erase the difference between authorial meaning and other kinds of meaning as far as interpretation is concerned. Neither do they, for that matter, stress it as a meaningful issue. They are not really concerned with interpretation.[20] And criticism, in its evaluative side, should in their view ignore this difference.

The critical act would therefore consist of:

1) Interpreting the text of the poem to determine the range of possible interpretations, whether of authorial meaning, meaning or significance.

2) An evaluation of these interpretations, without privileging the authorial meaning of the poem.

But, given the intrinsically intentional nature of language, the creation of a kind of virtual author is presupposed in (2). The result is that the best meaning is regarded *as if* it were the authorial meaning of the poem. It is clear that with such assumptions about the aims of interpretation the difference between authorial meaning and other kinds of meaning need not be a basic critical concept. At best, as in Wimsatt and Beardsley, it is anecdotic; at worst, as in some of their followers, it is ignored, *not understood*. Interpretive anarchy is kept within bounds by presupposing a competent reader, who will generally give a historically plausible interpretation —even if his aesthetic aims allow him to occasionally improve the poem with the complicity of history. This kind of interpretation is not very different from the adoption of an intentional stance towards mechanical artifacts whose structure we ignore (cf. Dennett 1987: 15ff.). The intentional stance allows us to make sense of the artifact's behaviour, but at the cost of endowing it with a greater degree of consciousness than we would want. Paradoxically, the New Critical «intentional fallacy» has as its concomintant phenomenon an overestimation of the authorial intention and deliberation such as may be found for instance in Stanley Fish's book on Milton (Fish 1967). Theodore Redpath notes that an author cannot be said to have intended everything a reader may find in his work, even if the author claimed so himself. The object of Redpath's criticism is John Dewey's aesthetic theory[21] —no author is known to have claimed this. Perhaps the closest example was T.S. Eliot, who had a critical axe to grind and none the less saw fit to provide *The Waste Land* with notes. The concept of intention is in one sense inevitably linked to at least a potential consciousness and deliberation. For the sense in which it is not, I will speak of *deep intention*.[22] The two must not be confused; otherwise we will end up constructing a fictional author-figure tailored according to the critic's needs.

It should be clear by now that the «intentional fallacy» is no such fallacy. It is a particular choice of what is to count as validity in interpretation. The New Critical anti-intentionalism is another choice, with a different kind of assumptions and aims, and which is not primarily concerned with hermeneutic validity —a perfectly legitimate enterprise if it is done in a self-conscious way and with a clear methodology and aims.[23] Wimsatt and Beardsley's doctrine in «The Intentional Fallacy,» however, is itself a fallacy to the extent that the authors present their «seminal ukase»[24] as an objective critical principle and the universal rule for literary interpretation. Hermeden has noted that «the fundamental issues involved in a stand on intention are nonempirical: they concern normative questions.»[25] No new data will solve the problem; the status of intention in interpretation has to be decided by the interpreter, in view of the aims he sets to his activity. In Hirsch's terms, the reader need not try to realize the author's intended meaning. The question of whether he should or not is an ethical question, which is answered affirmatively by Hirsch: «*Unless there is a powerful overriding value in disregarding an author's intention (i.e. original meaning), we who interpret as a vocation should not disregard it*.»[26] Nevertheless, I would somewhat qualify this position. There are advances made on conceptual issues, too. Analyzing them is not a fruitless task. The issues are now much clearer than when Wimsatt and Beardsley denounced the intentional fallacy: a greater degree of shared assumptions has been discovered, and some extreme positions have been abandoned. And even if there are several correct modes of constructing or using intention, experience tells us that they are not all equally correct in all interpretive contexts.

It is an axiom of classical hermeneutics that interpretation logically precedes evaluation. But it has been noted by Newton-De Molina that «this logical condition of priority may tend to elide the full human importance of an awkward truth: that the relevant information upon which we base particular interpretations is not always prior *in time* to particular evaluations.»[27] The consequence is that «unless evaluations are to be eternally postponed they must always be accepted, in some senses, as generically provisional» (1976: xi). However, it must be recognized that things work in a slightly different way:

a) Evaluation cannot (or should not!) precede that first step of interpretation that we call understanding. It is clear that otherwise we call it prejudice.

b) Some evaluations are more provisional than others. The evaluation of a passage during the reading process may be highly provisional, and the psychological attitudes of any person towards a work may change a great deal at different moments of his life. But the considered evaluation given by a critic in a scholarly article after several careful readings and taking into account a previous evaluative tradition is, I think, in a much more definite relationship to the critic's interpretation of the text. Ideally, it has gone through a process of suspension of judgement until an interpretation is established. But the decisive fact is that this evaluation is public and fixed, and is based on an interpretation of the work which is accessible to other critics. By definition (because of the logical priority of interpretation) Critic no. 2 assumes that Critic no. 1's evaluation is grounded on that particular concretization of the work —not on Critic no. 2's own concretization of the work. And evaluations may be more generally shared than interpretations, and rest on the more general interpretive level of understanding, because precisely one of the functions of great literature in our culture is to generate diverse interpretations, which therefore can affect the basic evaluation of the work only peripherally.

Interpreting with evaluation in mind leads to a confusion of aesthetic and interpretive criteria. This is evident in Wimsatt and Beardsley, and also in some of their critics. In spite of his misgivings about the rejection of biographical evidence, Emilio Roma shares with Wimsatt and Beardsley the assumption that

> there is at least *one* reason which counts for and against interpretations, namely, the reading fails because it does not account for certain significant passages of the poem, and hence does not bring out the *richness* of the poem. This reason is essentially evaluative, and at the same time it does not go «outside» of the poem.[28]

But we might well ask for whom are those passages significant. The answer seems to be: for a critic with Roma's criteria of validity —which may or may not be «in» the poem, but which surely need not be in the author's creative intention. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the last analysis Roma endorses Wimsatt and Beardsley's concept of interpretation and their definition of meaning as something which is decided by the critic on the basis of criteria which are ultimately aesthetic: «the way a poet and his contemporaries understood a word or passage is relevant evidence for making *a decision about the meaning of* a poetic utterance. I do not say that this is always relevant evidence» (1976: 85-86). Translated into our own terms, this would read: «The present-day significance of a work resulting from the conventions of academic interpretation sometimes has more aesthetic relevance than its historical meaning.» This is true if our notion of aesthetic value allows itself, as it does for Roma or Wimsatt and Beardsley, a measure of independence from historical and cognitive considerations. My own view is that the two notions of aesthetic relevance have to be kept apart. We may very well rewrite a poem in our imagination and then evaluate it, but a historicist aesthetics can hardly afford to do this. Its object is not so simple; it involves a

determination of the conditions of artistic production and the assumptions about art in the original context of the work, an evaluation of the work in those terms, and then a study of the «life» of the work and its transformations in the uses to which it is put by different readers and critical projects.[29] The anti-intentionalist, aestheticist project is just one more of these historical attitudes to art, and it does not fare very well from an objectivist perspective. Aesthetic value is usually grounded on the coherence of the text, a coherence which usually is the product of the collaboration between writer and critic. Coherent interpretations are usually reached in this way, but, as Hirsch has noted, coherence is not a sufficiently objective criterion of validity —an interpretation may be both coherent and wrong.[30]

An interpretation, we may conclude, must strive towards coherence and completeness, but in doing so it must not build a perfect structure with the data internal to the work while it conflicts with historical, psychological or cultural assumptions that we might wish to hold.[31] Its hypotheses must remain translatable into other areas of knowledge, with the aim of increasing communication in culture at large.

3. OBJECTIVIST HERMENEUTICS AND CRITICISM: E. D. HIRSCH

The best discipline to keep our own aesthetic or ideological concerns from giving an obvious bias to the interpretive activity, as far as this is possible, is to consider the phases of the critical activity as logically and chronologically sequential activities. In Hirsch's words, «Understanding (and therefore interpretation, in the strict sense of the word) is both logically and psychologically prior to what is generally called criticism» (1967: 209). It has been rightly said that there can be no pure interpretation, that description will always contain a measure of evaluation.[32] This is true. It is none the less the case that description as such is not evaluation as such. Refusing to concede the possibility of this conceptual distinction is the first step towards the collapse of the distinction between understanding and inventing —throw the thrust towards objective description away and communication is likely to follow suit (cf. Hirsch 1967: 26).

Hirsch is the main theorizer of objective interpretation in the English-speaking academy.[33] Hirsch's basic interpretive rule is the distinction between «meaning» and significance. In the first version of his theory (1967), «meaning» is «meaning in the author's context»; significance is «meaning for us, today.» «Meaning» is the result of interpretation, which is logically prior to the inquiry for significance:

> *Meaning* is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. *Significance*, on the other hand, names a relationship between that meaning, and a person, or a conception, or a situation, or indeed anything imaginable. (1967, 8)

Hirsch relates this distinction to similar differences established by other theorists: Boeckh's «interpretation» and «criticism,» Frege's «sense» and «reference,» and Husserl's «inner» and «outer horizons of meaning.» It is one of Hirsch's main tenets that significance is variable while «meaning» is fixed. Significance changes as each critic relates the work to his own interests or to his own knowledge of the subject-matter the original writer was dealing with (cf. Hirsch 1967: 58f., 63); this accounts for concepts such as the life of a work of art, which is relative to the changing significance of the work. «Meaning», on the other hand, is a fixed historical fact: «an author's original meaning cannot change» (1967: 9. Cf. Fowler 1976: 252). It does not change through the life of the text: for Hirsch, history is already written and cannot be unwritten.[34] Later, Hirsch enlarges the sense of the word «meaning» to include other meanings besides the authorial one. This comes nearer to the sense in which I use the terms. Meaning is now «that which a text is taken to represent» (1976: 79). However, the determinateness of the author's meaning still plays the same fundamental role in his theory. And Hirsch's 1976-meaning is still a principle of fixity as opposed to a principle of change, significance, or «meaning-related-to-something-else» (1976: 80).

Hirsch takes great care to distinguish this relation between authorial meaning and the author from any psychologistic conception of intention or meaning: it is the difference defined by Husserl between an Intentional act and a psychical act (Hirsch 1967: 217-218). The authorial verbal meaning is, in Husserlian terms, an Intentional object; it is «that aspect of a speaker's 'intention' which, under linguistic conventions may be shared by others» (Hirsch 1967: 218). This meaning is Intentional in the sense Husserl gives to the word. It may not have been wholly conscious for the author himself at any given moment, but it must belong to his «horizon of expectations»: «The interpreter's aim, then, is to posit the author's horizon and carefully exclude his own accidental associations» (1967: 222). The author's Intentionality does not necessarily warrant «consciousness of meaning»: «there are usually components of an author's intended meaning that he is not conscious of» (1967: 21). Hirsch explains this apparent contradiction by means of the notion of *typification* . The author's Intentional acts (in the Husserlian sense) by which he wills a particular meaning into being are not directed towards each aspect of his intended [Intentional] meaning, but to a typical whole: «the acceptability of a submeaning depends

upon the *author's* notion of the subsuming type whenever this notion is sharable in the particular linguistic circumstances» (1967: 49). Verbal meaning as such is nothing other than «a *willed type* which an author expresses by linguistic symbols and which can be understood by another through these symbols.»[35] The author's use of this type must be learned, and this is possible because types are eminently sharable (1967: 66ff.). The consequence for the definition of «conscious intention» is that very often we cannot be sure whether a meaning was conscious or unconscious. In these cases, according to Hirsch, the distinction is irrelevant (1967: 51).

Moreover, the authorial meaning does not consist solely of representational elements: «Defined in Husserl's terms, 'meaning' embraces not only intentional objects but also the species of intentional acts which sponsor those intentional objects. . . . Subjective feeling, tone, mood, and value, are constitutive of meaning in its fullest sense» (Hirsch 1976: 8). This we might relate to Searle's analysis of intentional acts into a proposition and a modal element (Searle 1983a: 5ff.).

There is a difference between Hirsch's concern for the public specifiability of meaning and a similar concern as it was voiced by Wimsatt and Beardsley. For Hirsch, meaning is public, but never completely so. The text cannot be regarded as a piece of language, a system of possibilities or a verbal icon; it is tied to the author's original meaning (1967: 24). Wimsatt explicitly upholds the interpretation of a work as a piece of *langue*. Apparently, if we interpreted a work as an instance of *parole*, the words «would never. . . make sense to anybody but the author himself» (Wimsatt 1976: 138). The absurdity of this statement hardly needs to be pointed out after the development of discourse analysis during the past twenty years. For Hirsch, the text is not a segment of Saussurean *langue*, but an instance of *parole* (1967: 232), a historically limited phenomenon which must be understood in its context. The (present-day) communal context as such is not a sufficient criterion:

> It is therefore not only sound but necessary for the interpreter to inquire, «What in all probability did the author mean? Is the pattern of emphases I construe the author's pattern?» But it is both incorrect and futile to inquire, «What does the language of the text say?» That question can have no determinate answer. (1967, 235)

Hirsch's conception of a *historicized* meaning also makes irrelevant Raval's contention that «Hirsch's authorial intention does not entail a biographical person but rather a 'speaking subject'» which is «not really distinguishable form the New Critical persona» (1981: 64). The New Critical persona is more or less freely constructed by the reader; Hirsch's persona is the result of the author

adopting discursive conventions which must be understood in the terms of the culture and context where they originated. The ethics of interpretation starts with the respect towards the author's meaning and our efforts to grasp it objectively (cf. Scholes 1990: 50).

Unless we regard things in this way, Hirsch argues, there would be no criterion to determine a correct interpretation. This claim is the polar opposite of Barthes's doctrine that «a text's unity lies not in its origin, but in its destination» (1977a: 148). Focusing on the reader's activity without a reference to the author's meaning does not unify the text; rather, it disintegrates it completely. In a vein similar to Barthes', Horton (1979: x) argues that although meaning is ultimately context-bound, the boundlessness of the context prevents its determination in practice. Hirsch would accept this claim for meaning in general, but not for the concrete authorial meaning. Its historical typicality is what makes interpretation possible. For Hirsch, the text is fixed only at one point, the author's meaning. That is why this is an indispensable criterion for the validation of interpretations. We have seen,though, that there might be other criteria —an aesthetic criterion can determine that the «best interpretation» is the correct one. Hirsch simply has different assumptions as to the aims of criticism. The validity of a reading is not to be equated with its aesthetic excellence (1967: 5). Criticism must resist the temptation to mix evaluative and interpretive criteria. It must speak with the voice of reason, and distinguish the text as it is before the critical activity from the text as it is after the critical activity. Meaning cannot exist in a void. If a critic rejects the author's meaning, he will inevitably substitute his own (1967: 4). But doing this is indulging in a kind of vicarious authorship.[36] This would not be «interpretation» in Hirsch's sense, and so we can concede his point that there is a specific cognitive activity which consists in the identification of the authorial intention. Creative writing and criticism are two different enterprises, even if they share some common elements. In the last analysis, the interpretive theories of Wimsatt and Beardsley and those of Stanley Fish (1980) rest on a shared assumption: that there is no essential difference between interpretation and creation. Hirsch's is radically opposed: interpretation and creation are essentially different activities and they must be carefully distinguished from each other: «Interpretation is the construction of *another's* meaning» (1967: 244). This meaning cannot be constructed partially. It is either ours or the author's: for Hirsch, Gadamer's theory of *Horizontverschmelzung* is a logical contradiction, since it presupposes a contact with something —the author's perspective— which is at the same time declared to be inaccessible. In Hirsch's view, we do not understand the meaning of others in our own terms, though we do value it in our own terms.[37]

Some phenomenological critics have strongly stressed the related notion that reading involves a contact with another mind. For Georges Poulet, reading is an activity with a peculiar ontology of its own —it is an immersion in a conscience different from our own, and it requires total submission to the author's consciousness as it emerges from the work. «I myself, although conscious of whatever [the consciousness inherent in the work] may be conscious of, play a much more humble role content to record passively all that is going on in me» (Poulet 1980: 47). A similar definition of interpretation is found in Maurice Blanchot.[38] These conceptions sound sometimes nearly mystical. But not all theories of interpersonal communication are drawn along these lines. Few people would agree that the reading process itself involves such passivity on the part of the reader as held by Poulet. Dennett's version of the way the gap to the other's meaning is bridged is more satisfactory: it is relativistic to a degree, and stresses the activity of the intepreter: «when we interpret others we do so not so much by *theorizing* about them as by *using ourselves as analog computers* that produce a result. Wanting to know more about your frame of mind, I put myself in it, or as close to being in it as I can muster, and see what I thereupon think (want, do...)» (1987: 100). The hermeneutical tradition since Schleiermacher already stressed that even the simple retrieval of meaning is an active process resting on the play of hypotheses and data, not an act of «reception» (Schleiermacher 1986: 113-17).

If the interpretation of the other in his own terms already requires a degree of activity, criticising him is an eminently active and assertive activity. In Hirsch's model, the critical phase succeeds the interpretive one. Hirsch, I think, would not contest the claim that «conceding authorial privilege means giving the author the first word, not the last» (Fowler 1976: 250). The study of meaning is only a necessary preliminary to that part of the critic's activity which has direct public value, the application of meaning, *significance* (1976: 19). This is an essential, not merely legitimate, function of the critic. Only, the study of significance is an activity different from the interpretation of meaning, and must be carefully distinguished from it.[39]

A last, important characteristic of Hirsch's theory is his probabilism. Authorial meaning is fixed and determinate, but we never know whether we have construed it in a correct way. On this matter there are only various degrees of probability.[40] Nevertheless, knowledge is possible: «It is a logical mistake to confuse the possibility of certainty in understanding with the impossibility of understanding.»[41]

Beardsley's attempt to refute Hirsch's theory of interpretation is in my view unsuccessful. He is not addressing the issues Hirsch is concerned with. His

three arguments against Hirsch's thesis only prove that the reader of a text may construct verbal meanings which were not intended by the author —something which I think is self-evident to Hirsch. The real difference lies in the fact that Beardsley counts these constructions as valid interpretations, whereas Hirsch does not. Just like in «The Intentional Fallacy,» Beardsley is concerned with the aesthetic value of a reading, not with its successful retrieval of the authorial meaning. Again we find the same ahistorical aestheticism at work: in pushing the authorial will out of his consideration, Beardsley is in fact pushing out the historical context of the utterance. Let me show this through a re-cycling of one of Beardsley's examples:

> An ambiguous text does not become any less ambiguous because its author *wills* one of the possible meanings. Will as he will, he cannot will away ambiguity. There is something odd about the notion of «willing» a meaning. It is as though we ordered someone, «Say 'cat' and mean dog.» Can one do that? How does one do it? True I can say, «Vote for Senator Kennedy!» and think of Edward Kennedy. Do I thereby make the word «Kennedy» in that utterance mean *Edward Kennedy*? That is quite impossible. (1970: 29)

The perspective is all wrong. An ambiguous text *does* become less ambiguous *if we find out* that the author had willed one of the possible meanings. We do not usually need to will away ambiguity because our utterances are calculated to be unambiguous in the context in which they are used. Suppose a dog is barking, and someone observes, «The cat is barking.» This is a puzzling behaviour, and a number of intepretations could be offered. No doubt some of them would afford a great deal of aesthetic satisfaction. But if a moment before we had heard Beardsley order our man «Say 'cat' and mean dog,» there would be nothing much left to interpret. In the example of the Kennedys, Beardsley is thinking of the ambiguous reference of the sentence at the time he wrote his essay (the early months of 1968) —it could have meant Edward or Robert Kennedy. But by virtue of changing contexts, the phrase no longer has an ambiguous reference in a 1986 campaign. «Kennedy» does not indeed have the same dictionary meaning as «Edward Kennedy,» but if we can discover the reference by identifying the context where the sentence was uttered, we will have interpreted its authorial meaning beyond the «textual meaning» defined in Beardsley's terms. Again, the phrase is ambiguous only if it is taken as an instance of *langue*.

Indeed, Beardsley admits that the discovery of the «textual meaning» and the discovery of the authorial meaning are two distinct inquiries. Only, «the proper task of the literary interpreter is to interpret textual meaning» (1977: 32). He opposes the aesthetic to the historical approach (1970: 34), instead of

integrating them in a historicist aesthetics. And his conclusion is inevitably contradictory: on one hand, a *carte blanche* for the critic to draw the limits of a poem in an act which is aesthetically motivated[42]; on the other, a claim for the complete autonomy of the poem and the passivity of the critic.[43] That literary discourse is highly conventionalized does not mean that it ceases to be a historical *parole* . Its contexts are standardized to a degree, but not to just *any* degree, as the New Critical aesthetics would have it.

A historically conscious aesthetics is richer than one which ignores historical considerations. Indeed, it includes the latter as a particular historical attitude to art. It is significant that Beardsley cannot help assuming the historically and genetically conscious viewpoint when he tries to refute Hirsch's theory. His three theses against the identity of meaning and authorial meaning are, of course, correct, but they do not prove what they set out to prove, that any construction of meaning justified by «the text itself» is a valid interpretation. Argument number one runs thus: «Some texts that have been formed without the agency of an author, and hence without authorial meaning, nevertheless have a meaning and can be interpreted» (1970: 18). Misprints and poems composed by computers are examples of this. What Beardsley does not conclude is that if we learn that a verbal phenomenon is the result of a misprint or has been generated by a computer, we have gained an insight into the nature of that phenomenon and the kind of «language game» of which it is an instance. «When Hart Crane wrote 'Thy Nazarene and tender eyes,' a printer's error transformed it into 'Thy Nazarene and tinder eyes,' but Crane let the accidental version stand» (Beardsley 1970: 18). The difference between a willed meaning and a printer's error is not irrelevant, as Beardsley seems to suggest. Printer's errors are suppressed in revised editions, and what Hart Crane did in this case was to transform a printer's error into an authorial meaning by means of an act of will which is known and recognized.

The second of Beardsley's objections is that the meanings of words change historically, and therefore the authorial meaning becomes distinct from the textual meaning. In his example, Mark Akenside writes in 1744 of how God «rais'd his plastic arm.» Beardsley comments that the line has acquired a new meaning in our century, but apparently he does not rule out the interpretations which ignore this fact because they are concerned with today's textual meaning. It is not clear to me in which context a critic can deliberately ignore this difference and still lay a claim to be interpreting Akenside's poem. Hirsch would call this activity «rewriting,» and I agree with him.

The third objection is that a text can have meanings that its author is not aware of (Beardsley 1970: 20). So much the better for the interpreter. But this

claim presupposes that we can tell apart what an author is aware of and what he is not aware of —that we can isolate the interpretation of the authorial meaning as a distinct phase of the critical activity. Hirsch, I think, does not ask for more. After this, it is only to be wished that an evaluation of the text does not ignore this conceptual difference we have all started with. I am afraid Beardsley is all too ready to do this.

Since my interpretive assumptions are dangerously close to Hirsch's, maybe it is the moment to make the differences between them more explicit. Some are terminological and some are conceptual.

- Terminologically, I have tried to maintain the normal usage of the terms while carefully distinguishing the conceptual differences. My use of «meaning» and «significance» are closer to Hirsch's use in *The Aims of Interpretation*; whenever I wish to be more specific I will use «authorial meaning.» Hirsch's «criticism» is concerned only with valuation and significance (1967: 9), and as such is opposed to «interpretation,» which is concerned only with establishing (authorial?) meaning. Sometimes he draws a difference between «understanding» as the construction of meaning and «interpretation» as its explanation (1967: 136). I think it is more convenient to think of «criticism» as the sum of interpretation and valuation, and to be concerned with both meaning and significance. Interpretation is not restricted to the fixation of authorial meaning. I think that in the current usage of the word it is also concerned with meaning at large or with the significance of texts. Therefore we should speak of «interpretation of authorial meaning,» «interpretation of meaning» or «interpretation of significance» whenever we wish to be more specific.
- Conceptually: 1) We can borrow Ingarden's term «concretization» (1973: 322) to refer to the whole construction of meaning to which the interpretation may ultimately be assumed to refer to, as opposed to those aspects of the construction it actually refers to. This distinction draws a necessary wedge into the first term in the opposition drawn by Hirsch between «the construction of meaning to which the interpretation refers» and «the meaning of an interpretation» (1967: 129). Sometimes Hirsch does speak of *«the whole* meaning to which [different compatible interpretations] refer.»[44]

2) Hirsch's notion of the historical fixity of a text is linked to his theory in a deficient way. There is one sense in which the author's meaning is not a desideratum —every critic reaches it, or measures his distance to it. To this extent, Hirsch's rejection of the concept of *Horizontverschmelzung* used in Gadamer's historicist hermeneutics (Gadamer 1977) is justified.[45] Through this concept, Gadamer rejects the idea of a fixed sense in texts, and stresses the fact that our construction of an author's meaning is already guided by our position

and aims as interpreters. But this concept cannot have more than a purely metatheorical value Its role is justified in Gadamer's philosophical study. In actual interpretation, however, we cannot have an access to the author's pole to verify the extent of the difference between our horizon and his; and in one way or another we will have to posit our own conception of authorial meaning. This cannot be done with respect to an unknown pole, a noumenon outside our reach. There is then no ultimate contradiction between Gadamer and Hirsch, since Gadamer's «relativism» cannot have any possible bearing on actual interpretation.

Hirsch is right in saying that ultimately the possibility of academic discussion rests on the conceptual difference between (authorial) meaning and significance. But every critic articulates in a different way the proportion alloted in his interpretation to (authorial) meaning and to significance. «If a Marxist critic construes a text differently from a formalist critic,» Hirsch argues, «that is an irrelevant accident. No perspectival necessity requires him to do so. Marxist critics and formalist critics may be equally able to understand what a text means» (1976: 44). This is of course too optimistic. The most significant differences in interpretation do not derive from the critics drawing different significances from the same work, but from the fact that they can barely claim to be evaluating and interpreting the significance of «the same» work —their assumptions about the authorial meaning are widely divergent. Hirsch's argument seems to place the main critical contention in the determination of significance, which is variable, while authorial meaning, being historically fixed, could be approached objectively. This account ignores the fact that history is continually being revised and rewritten, and that this rewriting is itself a matter of ideological contention— hardly a basis on which to ground a critical consensus. Preserving the conceptual difference between authorial meaning, meaning and significance is fundamental, but only as a methodological principle. This conceptual difference will never be, as such, a basis for critical unanimity. The author's meaning did exist as a historical fact, but this does not have the slightest theoretical importance unless it is recognized to be a relevant interpretive element in the theoretical assumptions of the readers and critics. (Authorial) meaning and significance are critical constructs, and the subject of critical debate. Interpretations do have elements in common —but usually, different interpretation share just some assumptions about the work's total sum of (authorial) meaning and significance, not the whole of it. And here once again Gadamer's (1977) reflections on the pre-understanding which directs the direction of interpretation are relevant. This does not mean that Hirsch's probabilistic notion of the historical existence of authorial meaning is not necessary. On the contrary, it is indispensable as a regulative concept.[46] But it does not work exactly the way he puts it, nor does it work the way radical

historicism would put it. In the last analysis historical meaning is always determined with respect to the critic's own historical position; his object is partly built for him by his own age and culture. The result of the scholar's investigation of the author's meaning is not authorial meaning *in se* , which is a historical or cultural noumenon, but rather the way in which we must conceive of that meaning in our own interpretive situation, taking into account the ways in which we conceive of other aspects of the author's cultural context. That is, the scholar's function is to make our assumptions about the past (or areas of knowledge in general) fit with each other, to ensure that the past remains accessible as an object of knowledge. The critic's interpretation of authorial meaning is not a textual time machine, because we never relinquish a holistic conception about the past which is inevitably grounded in the present. What the critic's work seeks ultimately is not to uncover a noumenon, but to ensure the translatability between the concepts in his own area of knowledge and those of the larger cultural context of his own age. Our understanding of the relevant features of the past is constantly changing, and an author's activity must be reinterpreted in the light of this new understanding of the past and of other cultures.

However, Hirsch is right in observing that there is nothing intrinsically different about «the past» as an object of scholarly inquiry —another culture, another present-day conception require just the same kind of interpretive work. These objections against Hirsch's notion of objectivity, then, are not the radical historicist objections he seeks to refute.[47] The meaning of the other must be understood in the other's own terms. But we are unlikely to agree with all of our fellow critics on the precise nature of those terms. My contention against Hirsch's notion of objectivism is that different critics may share Hirsch's interpretive assumptions, be perfectly right in doing so, and yet fail to reach agreement: the heterogeneity of present-day perspectives adduced by Hirsch as a support to his argument against radical historicism (1976: 41) can draw a line right across the middle of English departments. Two scholars may validate quite different interpretations of authorial meaning. This is possible because the objectively sharable interpretive assumptions are not an algorythm for interpretation. Hirsch knows this: «The notion that a reliable methodology of intrerpretation can be built upon a set of canons is... a mirage» (1967: 203). Or: «There can be no canons of *construction,* but only canons which help us to choose between alternative [authorial] meanings that have already been construed from the text» (1967: 204). And yet he fails to draw the implications, drawn by a misguided notion of what objectivity and knowledge are. Knowledge is not ideologically neutral —it is, willy-nilly, at the service of ideological positions

which make it possible and relevant in the first place. An age's conception of the past is not a monolithic, neutral construct. There is no agreement about the past—it is used as a metaphor for the present. A *necessary* metaphor, not one which is deliberate or wilfully distorting. The past is one of the languages of the present, and very often the interpretation carries the marks of its origin, of the project that made it possible For Horton, «interpretation will always be colored, or even determined, by present needs, and will always be as much re-creation as it is retrieval» (1979: 3). The post-structuralist enthusiasm of this affirmation needs to be toned down with another post-structuralist claim: the interpretation will only carry those signs if a further interpreter identifies them there. This is not always the case, but it is always a conceptual possibility. Interpretation takes place in the space between. Hirsch claims that «ideology is far more likely to determine the results of inquiry when the inquirer assumes that it must do so» (1976: 149). It is useful to keep this in mind. Not merely as a good piece of advice (which it is, in a way) but also as a cautionary instance of the opposite danger: believing in the possibility of neutrality is already an ideological claim; it is, moreover, a naive one, one that may make us assume that only «the others» have an ideological axe to grind. Instead, objectivity must be used as a purely regulative concept. Hirsch's objectivity is not purely regulative, since he believes in it as the final, practical result of the interpreter's activity.

Interpreting a text is an ethical question, but not in the way Hirsch would have it (cf. 1976: 90). There are ethical choices relevant to the interpretive activity which are previous to it and wider than a local compromise to be a faithful interpreter. Interpretation is of a a piece with the interpreter's overall ethical, political and generally cultural situation, the one which gives him his view of the text, which makes him capable of having an attitude towards it in the first place. The utmost respect for the text is necessary to all kinds of intepreters, if the interpretation aims at the strongest possible engagement with culture at large, including the interpreter's own project. But this will never result in a final agreement about the (authorial) meaning of the text. The past, as well as other cultures and attitudes, is the object of ideological contention just like the present and our own culture. That is why the idea of an objective value or validation is suspect. But there *is* something like objective knowledge. It is the basis of agreement which is indispensable for either further agreement or disagreement. We can always agree on what it is that we disagree about, and this already provides a significant degree of conceptual sharability.

Hirsch believes in the difference between validation and interpretation of meaning. Validation is always provisional and relative to the current state of knowledge, but it nevertheless aspires to a cognitive rank superior to that of interpretation: «A validation has to show not merely that an interpretation is

plausible, but that it is the most plausible one available» (1967: 172). But a validation will also have to rely on a construction of the text as a measure for the different interpretations. At one point or another, the scholar's own construction of the text must determine whether a phenomenon is relevant or not, whether it counts as evidence of authorial intention or not. And at this point, validation becomes interpretation again. Its epistemological privilege over interpretation is one of degree and circumstance. Just as there are no privileged criteria for the evaluation of literary works (Hirsch 1976: 122) there is no absolute criterion to judge the validity of an interpretation. The work must be read in order to privilege one criterion of validation against the others, and it cannot be read from a neutral stance. Hirsch himself recognizes that new evidence or an analysis of the critic's reasoning may lead to a revision of the validation. But Sparshott is far more direct when he says that «there are no critical courts of last appeal» (1976: 14). This conception of interpretation also makes allowance for a more flexible approach, one which does not completely exclude the hypothetical, the provisional and the tentative form the heuristic activity. As Dennett puts it, fiction and role-playing are a necessary element in interpretation: when I interpret, «the state I put myself in is not belief but make-believe belief» (1987: 100).

The ideal of a universally valid interpretation is then most seriously compromised by the partial relativity of the concept of authorial meaning and its dependence on ideological strife. Hirsch seems to sense this, and that is why he distinguishes between a theoretical aim of criticism (to achieve truth) and a practical aim, which is «agreement that truth has probably been reached» (1967: ix, 17f.). He believes that his noumenal criterion of truth does not impair its function in the system: «we can have the truth without being certain that we have it» (1967: 173). This is not very satisfactory, because it does not leave any room for a clear difference between truth and falsity. In fact, an objective interpretation as understood by Hirsch is a *contradictio in adjecto*. But an objectivist definition of truth need not posit a Tomistic correspondence between the intellect and the thing-in-itself. That is, the theoretical aim of criticism need not (and of course must not) be different from its practical aim: we need a criterion of objective truth which is different from Hirsch's, since his cannot be met. Humanistic disciplines do provide knowledge (it is Hirsch's main aim to maintain the idea that they do), but it is knowledge which does not need to be universally accepted.[48] Interpretations do not need to be «objective» either in the sense of being universally acceptable, or in the sense of being grounded in the nature of things, although they do need to have a thrust towards objectivity —to be objective in the only workable sense of the word. They need this in order to be convincing in the right context, since sadly enough what passes for universal truth is in fact the result of widespread

agreement in an interpretive community. And widespread agreement in an interpretive community can only be reached by meeting that community's truth requirements: Aristotle noted that truth is a quite convincing rhetorical strategy. The academy needs, and has, criteria of validity and objectivity. They are not arbitrary, since they ensure that the functions of the institution be met —in fact, they rest on the very notion of agreement and communication.[49] I propose that the most widespread and effective criterion of objective truth is *the (increased) translatability of knowledge from one cognitive medium, discipline or context to another*. Accordingly, interpretation is the breaking down of complex semiotic objects into others which are more at hand; showing how a new or complex code can be translated into other codes which are more fixed, accessible, or better known. This is in essence nothing new: Aristotle already defined the process by which we acquire knowledge as the translation of the unknown into the known. In the Aristotelian view, interpretation consists the subsuming of particulars under universals (cf. Raval 1981: 43); that is, it is a form of translation. Of course, Aristotle's concept of interpretation is too abstractive and essentialist for us; the view we have been expounding is more flexible. And it is further complicated by the fact that there is no universal proof that translatability between two areas of knowledge has been increased. The interpreters must agree not only on the data, but also on the rules for the validity of translation. These may be analyzed into data, but only according to further rules. Hermeneutic demonstration is always only partial, and has to rely ultimately on shared assumptions. Translatability is not increased in the void, but only in a particular institutional context.

Academic criticism is such a context, or group of contexts. The bulk of academic interpretation of literary texts in the American tradition from the forties on follows these steps:

• A paraphrasis of the most important elements of the action. When this phase is missing, it is taken for granted that the critic and his reader share the current assumptions about which is the relevant action-scheme. Although it is rarely acknowledged in an explicit way, this summary is already a part of the interpretation.

• The establishment of semantic isotopies in the action, the narrative and the discourse levels.[50] Usually, an interpretation will call attention to details which the critic thinks may have been overlooked by the reader, and will show how they exhibit the same logic which organizes the main articulations of the action which have been foregrounded in its paraphrasis. We can see thus the history of the interpretations of a work as a gradual colonization of areas of resistance, and also a gradual uncovering of new problems. The work of all the critics is not wholly

compatible, but later critics benefit from the insight of the previous ones, and often borrow the ideas of a rival interpretation for their own purposes. Practical interpretation, like savage thought (and like theory itself) is essentially *bricolage*.

• The author's narrative is filtered through the critic's text; or, to use another metaphor, the critic's narrative is superimposed on the author's. A clear pattern thus emerges. The initial ambiguity of the story has become tractable for the purposes of the critic, and the new coherence given the story by the isotopies traced across its structure gives authority to the interpretation. A price is paid, however (Horton 1979): the interpretation systematically excludes or leaves untouched those elements which do not fit into the critic's grid. But this becomes simply a stimulus to devise a still more comprehensive interpretation, one that includes those elements which were left aside by previous interpreters.[51] The critic's narrative is finally assumed to be the essence of the author's, to have uncovered or reinforced its central meaning. A scheme of the whole work has emerged which invariably looks more accurate and meaningful than the paraphrase of the action furnished by the critic at the beginning of his essay. The next heuristic maneuver is the substitution of this paraphrase for the author's work as the object of interpretation.

• Usually, an iconic or analogical relationship is established between the isotopical version of the work produced by the critic and a *literary statement* or series of statements which summarize an outlook, message or world-view present in the work. Depending on the interpretive school the critic adheres to, the producer of this literary statement is the author, the author's unconscious, the collective unconscious, the author's culture, social class, epoch, gender, etc., the language of the work, or even the critic himself (assuming that there is any difference between these two possibilities). The extent to which this statement is taken to be conscious or deliberate on the part of the author will vary accordingly. For instance, the critics of Stephen Crane's story «The Monster» almost invariably point to «Crane» as the author of the literary statements they interpret in the story.[52] This is not to assume that Crane is always supposed to have thought of the literary statement in as many words. The literary statement is precisely stated by playing on the conventions of literature; it is the function of the critic to translate this statement from the language of literature to its implications on morality, social life, or politics; to make explicit in the language of criticism the analogical or iconic significance of the story. The statements formulated by these critics can therefore be said to reflect the authorial intention of the work, even if that intention was not formulated linguistically. The semantic isotopies isolated by the critic constitute a provisional semiotic code of their own. Together with the more general conventions of literature, this code is

the original language of the literary statement. Sometimes, a detailed equivalence is drawn between the action and some of the cultural myths shared by the interpreter and the author (in the case of «The Monster,» mainly the Bible and American history). Although many critics hesitate to use the word «allegory,» this kind of interpretation is far more common than we might suppose.

Coherence is desirable, and it will always be the aim of the intepreter. But the scope in which coherence is achieved may be more or less wide. The doctrine of the «Intentional Fallacy,» aiming at defining a specifically literary kind of interpretation, conventionally restricts the scope of interpretation in a way which is no longer acceptable today. When concentrating on the fascinating task of producing coherence inside the text, we should be careful not to disrupt another kind of coherence which is just as essential: that which exists between the text and its author, or between the textual image of the author and our conception of the personality of the author, of his age and his culture. All may be considered to be textual representations if we wish —of the all-encompassing text of History. A theory of interpretation should aim at making sense of literature within this enlarged context, and construct a representation which conciliates our sense of the internal voice of the text with the voices which join in the chorus, coming from other strands of the literary tradition, from the social context in which our interpretation takes place, from history at large, which is the largest of the interpretive contexts we share. It is in the arena of history where collective intentions are shaped and internalized, thereby framing our interpretations from very premisses. It is also the locus where interpretive theories can be considered as texts and objects of interpretation subject to a generalized hermeneutics. A maximum of attention to this larger context is our best way to strive for an interpretation which rests on a minimum of dogma.

NOTES

1. I follow Dennett (1978) and Searle (1983a) in capitalizing the wider, specifically phenomenological sense of «Intentionality» (and «Intentional»).

2. According to Searle, «Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in the same sense of 'represent' that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs» (Searle 1983a: 4). As it stands, this statement is false, due to Searle's (deliberate?) bracketing of his own theory. But I will assume throughout this type of statements to mean something like «the same metalinguistic apparatus can be used for the representation of speech acts and Intentional states.» With this proviso, see Searle 1983a: 4-13 for a comparison of speech acts and Intentional acts, in terms of propositional content, direction of fit, conditions of satisfaction, etc.

3. Both secondary and original, not *derived* (in the above mentioned sense).

4. In Virginia Woolf, *Roger Fry* , qtd. in Redpath 1976, 14. Cf. also Watson 1976, 163.

5. There are other important statements of this position by Valéry (see Scholes 1990: 54), by Frye (1957: 86), Sontag (1966: 9), Barthes (1977a) and Derrida (1988).

6. Newton-De Molina 1976: xvi. See also the varying interpretations of the scope of the «intentional fallacy» by the other contributors to this volume.

7. It is also this kind of anti-intentionalism which is found in the aestheticians (such as Eliseo Vivas) who conceive of creation as an exploration or discovery which is not the result of a pre-existing intention.

8. Fowler 1976: 242. Cf. Horton's view that intention is a complex concept that works differently in each level of the work's structure (1976: 104).

9. In Wimsatt and Beardsley's article there is no suggestion of a relation between intention and the use of public conventions. Nor, for instance, in relatively recent work such as Horton's (1979: 106).

10. Cf. Bateson 1953: 14; R. S. Crane 1953: 166, 169; Sparshott 1976: 108; Peckham 1976: 148; Watson 1976: 164f.; Close 1976: 182; Skinner 1976: 213; Hirsch, 1976: 87, Raval 1981: 46, de Man 1983: 25. While repeating some of the earlier injunctions, Wimsatt's revision of his position a quarter of a century later is somewhat more careful and, above all, it recognizes the legitimacy of interpretations based on an intention found «in the work itself» (1976: 128). Still, there is only moderate interest in the author's meaning —the doctrine is still essentially the same.

11. Redpath 1976: 15 f. Cf. Hirsch 1967: 233; Skinner 1976: 213.

12. Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967: 5. That this is not the case is convincingly argued in Peckham 1976.

13. Wimsatt and Beardsley 1967: 6. Beardsley's *Aesthetics* reintroduced, nevertheless, the difference between interpretation and evaluation; and later Wimsatt recognizes the convenience of recognizing such a conceptual distinction (1976: 126).

14. On *langue* and *parole* , see Saussure 1949; but also Segre 1985: 190ff.

15. This explains why Hirsch believes that «the intentional fallacy has no proper application whatever to verbal meaning» and that Wimsatt and Beardsley ultimately respect the author's meaning (Hirsch 1967: 12).

16. Cf. Fiedler 1952: 259, 273; Cioffi 1976: 60; Roma 1976: 77f. In Hirsch's view, «it is unsound to insist on deriving all inferences from the text itself» (1967: 241); for her part, Horton notes that «knowledge of the conditions of composition alters interpretation» (1979: 95).

17. This is also Peckham's (1976: 141), Fowler's (1976: 249) and Raval's (1981: 59) interpretation of Wimsatt and Beardsley's doctrine.

18. This is still Wimsatt's view in his revision of his early doctrine. See his comments on Hirsch's analysis of Blake's «London» (Wimsatt 1976: 130ff.).

19. Cioffi notes that Wimsatt and Beardsley's notion of what is «in» the text is deceitful, because «externals» of several kinds, often biographical, are always introduced to reach an acceptable intepretation (1976: 68). Cf. also Roma 1976: 81; Harris 1988: 30.

20. Some critics have taken the «intentional fallacy» to refer to interpretation, in spite of Wimsatt and Beardsley's stated definition (e.g. Cioffi 1976: 57). Of course, its «indirect» connections with interpretation finally compromise its the authors' claims to an objective standard of valuation. Sparshott (1976: 108) notes that this version of antiintentionalism, in its exclusive aesthetic concern, forgets that the work of art is a human work, and not merely an aesthetic object.

21. Dewey 1934; Redpath 1976: 19.

22. Cf. Wimsatt 1976: 128; Watson 1976: 69.

23. Cf. Crane 1953. This kind of criticism which deliberately ignores the author's meaning need not be just aesthetic play on the part of the critic; cf. Spivak 1988: 244-45.

24. Newton-De Molina 1976, x. Cf. Peckham 1976, 140.

25. Hermeden 1975: 81. Qtd. in Raval 1981: 265.

26. Hirsch 1976: 90. According to Hirsch, it is the lack of a higher institutional authority in literary criticism which explains the relevance of authorial meaning. In religious or legal texts, special interpretive conventions ensure the control of authority over the meaning of the texts. But it is wrong to extend the principle of unlimited meaning to texts which do not have these institutional constraints (1967: 123). However, what is relevant in the institutional constraints of interpretation is not the structure of authority (which is after all a check) but the uses to which multiplicity of meaning is put. The institutional function of the academic study of literature as it stood in the New Critical conception was in this sense perfectly in keeping with their interpretive practices: a controlled proliferation of meaning and the hypostatization of literature are related and mutually sympathetic conceptions.

27. Newton-De Molina 1976: xi. Newton-De Molina draws this notion from Robson (1966). Cf. Hirsch 1967: 133, 140; Wimsatt 1976: 126; Fowler 1976: 252.

28. Roma 1976: 82. For Beardsley or for Robert Graves, the richest meaning is the best (Fowler 1976: 252). Sparshott (1976: 111) also believes that the «best» and most comprehensive interpretation is the right one, while at the same time he defends the criterion of the authorial intention.

29. On the «life» of a literary work, see Ingarden (1973: ch. 13).

30. Hirsch 1967: 237. Hirsch believes, however, that is very probable that the right intepretation is «the one which makes the most elements functional» (1967: 190). Horton has criticised the assumption that an interpretation ought to take every element of the poem to be the result of a unified logic of composition, or that the best interpretation is the one that makes most elements active (1979: 4ff. Cf. also Fowler 1976: 252).

31. Cf. Crane 1953: 179.

32. Hirsch (1976: 103) quotes Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, sec. XXI of the «Analytic.»

33. Hirsch's interpretive theory is not his own in an exclusive way. It is based on the practical assumptions of many critics, as well as on the theories of Schleiermacher, Boeckh, Dilthey, Frege, Husserl, Popper and Betti. Many other theorists, such as F. W. Bateson or M.H. Abrams, have defended positions similar to Hirsch's in the English-speaking academy.

34. The first version of Hirsch's terminology concerning the concepts of *meaning*, *significance*, *interpretation* and *criticism* is preserved by Harris (1988).

35. Hirsch 1967: 49. Hirsch goes on to say that the actual words in a sentence are types. Peirce's notion of *token* (particular instance or manifestation of a type) would be more accurate.

36. Hirsch 1976: 49. This is also Peckham's argument (1976: 143). Peckham points out some fascinating analogies between the New Critical conception of semantic autonomy and the dogma of transubstantiation.

37. Hirsch 1967: 254 ff.; 1976: 49, 81 ff. Cf. Sparshott 1976: 113.

38. Blanchot 1955: 202; see de Man 1983: 63ff.

39. Cf. also Skinner 1976: 219.

40. Hirsch 1967: 236. Cf. Sparshott 1976: 112; Fowler 1976: 255.

41. Hirsch 1967: 17. Cf. Searle's argument against Derrida's deconstruction of speech act theories (1983b: 78).

42. «Therefore whatever interest comes from without, but yet can be taken as an interesting extension of what is surely in, may be admissible. It merely makes a larger whole» (Beardsley 1970: 36).

43. «The literary text, in the final analysis, is the determiner of its meaning. It has a will, or at least a way, of its own. The sense it makes . . . is what it offers for our aesthetic contemplation» (Beardsley 1970: 37).

44. Hirsch 1967: 132; my italics. The distinction between the construction of meaning to which an interpretation refers and the concretization of a work can also be compared with Beardsley's opposition between «local» and «regional» meanings; the latter belong to «the work as a whole or some large part of it» (1970: 44).

45. The concept of *Horizontverschmelzung* is endorsed by many theorists, e.g. Palmer 1969: 120; Horton 1979: 123; Wellek 1979: 577; qtd. in Raval 1981: 265. An even more extreme relativist formulation is put forward in Michaels (1980).

46. See Horton 1979: 5, and Derrida himself (1967: 227).

47. See Hirsch 1967: 40ff., 245ff.; 1976: 38ff.

48. In this it is not essentially different from scientific knowledge—only in the kind of use to which it is put. Knowledge of any kind does not need universal acceptance. It works in specific contexts and is irrelevant elsewhere.

49. Cf. Hirsch's principle of the sharability of verbal meaning (1967: 31ff.).

50. On the notion of isotopy, see Greimas 1966: 88ff. On the levels of narrative and discourse, cf. Bal's "story" and "text" (Bal 1985).

51. It is clear that beyond a certain point this activity is made possible only by a very specific set of assumptions about the nature of literature and the proper function of criticism. The extreme version I describe is historically localized in the Anglo-American New Critical tradition. The «intentional fallacy» doctrine should perhaps be considered as a *carte blanche* to push this practice to its limits without any qualms about the limitations of the author or the historical status of the meanings thus «retrieved.»

52. Cf. my article on the interpreters of Stephen Crane (1989).

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KUBRICK'S *DOCTOR STRANGELOVE:* THE LOGIC OF SPECTACLE

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For Barthes the language of narratives is the product of two processes: one called «articulation» or segmentation that produces semantic units and another called «integration» which gathers those units into clusters of a higher order providing them with meaning in the process (Barthes 1983: 288). In the process of articulation, narratives are characterized by their ability to distend their signs by inserting new significative material in between those semantic units. So the narrative creates a kind of artificial time that does not correspond with the time of reality, a «logical» time that arises from the mere expectancy that the semantic units will be united. A logical process whose only concern is the regrouping of units at a merely formal level, not at the level of their content or meaning. The aim of this process is to close formal sequences, to ensure that no sequence remains open at the end of the text. Suspense is therefore an exacerbated form of distortion, a game with structure. Through the process of integration the units of the different semantic levels of the narrative (characters, actions,...) are united and acquire a meaning. Integration involves a vertical reading that is superimposed on the horizontal reading that the distortions determine.

So, in a narrative the principal function that is carried out is not the mimetic function but the dynamic of following the inner logic the narrative has created both horizontally and vertically in a quest for meaning that keeps the reader's «passion» for reading on alive: «What takes place in a narrative is from

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For Barthes the language of narratives is the product of two processes: one called «articulation» or segmentation that produces semantic units and another called «integration» which gathers those units into clusters of a higher order providing them with meaning in the process (Barthes 1983: 288). In the process of articulation, narratives are characterized by their ability to distend their signs by inserting new significative material in between those semantic units. So the narrative creates a kind of artificial time that does not correspond with the time of reality, a «logical» time that arises from the mere expectancy that the semantic units will be united. A logical process whose only concern is the regrouping of units at a merely formal level, not at the level of their content or meaning. The aim of this process is to close formal sequences, to ensure that no sequence remains open at the end of the text. Suspense is therefore an exacerbated form of distortion, a game with structure. Through the process of integration the units of the different semantic levels of the narrative (characters, actions,...) are united and acquire a meaning. Integration involves a vertical reading that is superimposed on the horizontal reading that the distortions determine.

So, in a narrative the principal function that is carried out is not the mimetic function but the dynamic of following the inner logic the narrative has created both horizontally and vertically in a quest for meaning that keeps the reader's «passion» for reading on alive: «What takes place in a narrative is from

the referential (reality) point of view literally nothing; what happens is language alone, the adventure of language, the unceasing celebration of its coming» (Barthes 1983: 295).

Barthes says that the passion that leads us on in a narrative is not «that of a 'vision'. Rather, it is that of meaning, that of a higher order of relation» (Barthes 1983: 295). By this he means that the quest for meaning in a text constitutes its essence and not the mimetic portrayal of reality. This position of Barthes's misses some implications that appear when considering other art forms which do not use written language, cinema for instance.

The symbolic nature of written language, the fact that its signifiers are different from the things they designate (the signifieds) allows the reader a distance from which he/she can easily reflect and perceive all the relationships between semantic units. Written language demands an effort on the part of the reader to fill in, to complete with his/her fantasy and imagination what the symbolic language cannot offer: the signified itself, as material entity. This distance the reader has to bridge also provides him/her with a certain independence from that language, as the reader is free to picture things as he/she likes to a certain extent.

While it is obvious that in a filmic text the quest for meaning through the integration of its semantic units is essential for the understanding of the narrative, it is also evident that the basically mimetic nature of cinematic language adds new nuances. Cinematic language is highly iconic: the signifier and the signified are very much alike, and that makes it impossible to eliminate the physical portrayal of reality that it contains while offering the significance of a sequence with respect to the meaning of the narrative. We can say that an image qualifies itself independently of its importance for the narrative line of action (Chatman 1981: 135,136) or of the qualification given to it by the text. For Barthes, the adventure of narrative is not mimetic but structural; a logic that the text sets up and fulfills. It is, then, the adventure of language. But filmic language is different from written language in that the text cannot eliminate the mimetic quality of its signs.

In *Meet Me in St. Louis* (1944), as in many other musicals, Judy Garland stops for a moment in the middle of a scene and starts singing. While walking across a wood in *Road to Utopia* (1945) Bing Crosby and Bob Hope see the Paramount logo in the distance, but nobody in the audience stirs in his/her seat; rather, these ruptures of the conventional narrative rules by flaunting their artificial nature, which in theory should shatter the viewer's suspension of disbelief, work in the opposite direction. The songs interspersed in Minnelli's film and the continuous references to the narrating activity in *Road to Utopia* engage the viewer's attention by their quality as spectacle (romantic or comic).

In this paper I will try to prove that *Dr. Strangelove* exemplifies how that mimetic logic of spectacle takes over and relegates the audience's search for meaning in the text to a secondary place. I will show how the text's defamiliarizing devices and marks of a self-conscious narration are taken as essential components of the satiric, comic genre to which the film belongs; and how they, together with an organization of the story elements typical of a classical narration, work to produce spectacle.

Doctor Strangelove's fabula[1] deals with a nuclear attack on Russia launched by a paranoid American General, Jack D. Ripper, who is convinced of the existence of a Communist plot to conquer the world. He is the only one who knows the secret code of the B-52s' communication systems and cuts off all communications with his base. When informed of this fact, President Merkin Muffley summons the Generals and the Russian ambassador De Sadessky to the Pentagon War Room. General Turgidson proposes that, as there is nothing they can do to prevent the attack, they should take measures to make the attack a successful one and destroy Russia with the minimum American casualties, which he estimates in about twenty million people. While the President contacts the Russian premier, Dimitri Kissoff, and suggests that the Russian airplanes shoot the B-52s down, Group Captain Mandrake, an RAF officer, manages to get the code and recall all the airplanes, except for one (piloted by «King» Kong) whose radio has been damaged. De Sadessky has informed the President that his country has built a «Doomsday Machine» which will cause total nuclear destruction if his country is attacked. Dr. Strangelove, an ex-Nazi scientist, estimates that mankind could survive if a few individuals remain in an underground shelter for a hundred years. Kong drops the bomb and the world explodes as Vera Lynn's «We'll Meet Again» sounds in the background.

Such an incongruous story reveals both a comic treatment of the theme and a temporal organization which provides the narrative with a quick rhythm that builds up suspense as the text alternatively shows three settings where the action takes place: Burpleson air base, the War Room and inside the B-52.

Comedy is only one of the strategies that the text uses to present a shocking, unusual view of reality. These strategies are used to throw a new light on the questions that it raises: the view of a world in which men's distrust of one another has led them to give away the controlling power to machines that rebel against their masters when threatening to carry out their «inhuman» logic. The text strives to satirize the paranoia and incongruity of the military system prevalent at the time the film was made, the Cold War and the sixties. The process to satirize it consists in the distortion and exaggeration of that reality. One of the basic principles of the Russian Formalists was the idea that «the essence of art

lay in renewing perceptions about reality which daily life tended to automatize, to make mechanical, perfunctory, and therefore, imperceptible» (in Eagle 1981: 4). Shklovsky's concept of defamiliarization, and the analysis of the ways in which art tries to transform reality into an independent system capable of offering new points of view on it, are relevant to the study of a film like *Dr. Strangelove* which systematically offers a distorted view of things to the audience.

Single-source lighting is one of the elements of mise-en-scene which can be regarded as belonging to the stock of defamiliarizing textual strategies used in *Dr. Strangelove*. Classical Hollywood films showed a method of lighting a scene that, after many years, came to be associated with realism. Three-point lighting (key light, fill light, backlight), proper of studio filming, responded to a narrative mode which made of the clear depiction of a story-action its principal task; the character was the most important element in that conception of narration because it was him/her who made the action advance and, therefore, it was essential that the character and its relation to the surrounding space were clearly and quickly established (Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson 1988: 20).

Single-source lighting generally falls outside the realm of lighting possibilities considered to be realistic because it does not help the activity of the narrative. It responds to an effort on the part of the text to shock the audience by offering an unusual, consciously artistic view. Most of the shots in Ripper's office and in the War Room show that sort of lighting, which works to emphasize the increasing dementia of the characters who inhabit those spaces and to suggest a nightmarish atmosphere in which men are seen to be so detached from their reality that they can play with life and death without questioning the coherence of their statements. A similar use of lighting appears in noir films to depict a mysterious, threatening milieu in which the hero tries to survive, and where moral ambiguity reigns.

Characterization, another component of mise-en-scene, also works in order to defamiliarize reality. Characters are reduced to caricatures. They are ridiculed by their names (Turgidson, Kissoff, De Sadessky, Merkin Muffley, «King» Kong, Mandrake, Ripper) a fact which at the same time points at their flat nature. Each of them is characterized by a single trait: Turgidson's childishness, Kissoff's sentimentality, De Sadessky's inability to realize the seriousness of the situation, Muffley's incompetence, Kong's faith in the American system, Mandrake's British politeness, Ripper's paranoia. Acting contributes to exaggerate characters and situations. Turgidson freezes in what look like childish postures, he falls to the floor and gets up in the way a clown would. Ripper's excessive self-confidence is manifested by the prepotent way in which he smokes his cigar. Dr. Strangelove's uncontrolled desire to destroy arises in the form of an orthopaedic hand that tries to kill even its owner. Physical appearance and posture are key visual elements in the film to depict the characters' mental state.

Another aspect related to the defamiliarizing activity of many of the previously mentioned elements is the overtly self-conscious narration the text practises. This activity is evident in the use of extradiegetic music: music not produced by any element of mise-en-scene, but rather external to the realm of the story, which is highly self-conscious in general because it only exists for the audience. *Dr. Strangelove* contains three instances of extradiegetic music: «Try a Little Tenderness» in the opening scene, «When Johnny Comes Marching Home» that accompanies the scenes of the B-52 heading towards its target, and Vera Lynn's «We'll Meet Again» (Don't Know Where, Don't Know When) in the final scene of the explosion of the bomb. At least two of these examples have a clearly ironic purpose: the notes of «When Johnny Comes Marching Home» mix the nostalgic, cowboy reminiscences with the irony of its title (if the B-52 reaches its target, nobody will come home); Vera Lynn's sentimental song is also ironic in its lyrics (we shall not meet anywhere because we shall be dead). Both these instances point to an extradiegetic comment on the action of the film and to a narrating activity external to the story which consistently uses irony to make its points clear.

Mise-en-scene also reveals how the narrative clearly shows its inner mechanisms. In the first scene of the film, Mandrake gets a phone call from Ripper. The text shows both interlocutors as they are framed by elements of setting (titles) that read; «Peace is our profession»; in the case of Ripper he is also framed by his own name on the table: «Jack D. Ripper». According to Tynjanov, «every shot creates a special semantic relationship which would not be present if we were viewing the scene in real life» (in Eagle 1981: 8). This is true of every filmic text, but *Dr. Strangelove* takes it beyond the limits of what might be recognized as unobtrusive from a narrative point of view. The shots of a character plus a title tend to qualify the action or the characters, usually with a comic or ironic purpose which indicates the existence of an underlying ideology that the text wants to convey. The frequent appearance of this unusual arrangement of elements in the shot (Turgidson and the title «World Targets in Megadeaths»; Burpleson's air base men and «Peace is our profession»; Kong and the bombs with «Hi there» and «Dear John» painted on them) shows a narrative which lays bare its inner mechanisms in too obvious a way, a narrative aware of being addressing an audience —a self-conscious text.

Nevertheless, the textual strategy that most clearly breaks the laws of classical or «invisible» narration, a narrative mode that only uses those strategies

that help to develop a story without showing its conventionality, is focalization. By focalization we understand the capacity of the text to portray an action from a point of vision belonging to a character in the story (internal focalization) or not belonging to any character (external focalization).[2]

When Mandrake appears in Ripper's office, puzzled because he can hear normal civilian broadcasting on the radio, which means that no Russian attack can be in progress as Ripper has said, he is still ignorant of Ripper's madness. This scene shows Ripper from the back, and a view of his office and the door through which Mandrake enters the room at the far end. The scene is composed of a semi-subjective shot from behind Ripper's back that is held until Mandrake's suspicions about Ripper's mental state are confirmed when he threatens him with a gun. The semi-subjective shot consists in a shot which includes both Ripper looking in the foreground and what he sees in the background: his office, the door and Mandrake who begins to look puzzled. From this moment on, a sequence of shot / reverse shots starts, but not a conventional one; the shots of Ripper are very low angle close-ups that, after the long, static, semi-subjective shot with which the scene had begun, take the audience by surprise. These low-angle shots show Ripper as if enclosed in a claustrophobic space and, together with single-source lighting, contribute to produce a visually exaggerated, expressionistic view of Ripper lost in his madness.

This strategy of delaying the start of the shot/reverse shot sequence to conceal information, followed by shots from unusual angles, with an overtly stated aesthetic purpose, appears again in the War Room scene. Turgidson is framed from a low angle and the words «World Targets in Megadeaths» appear below him on a briefcase he has left on the table. On this occasion the shot / reverse shot sequence that is taking place between Turgidson and President Merkin Muffley is constantly interrupted by this low-angle shot that once more gives away the text's efforts to characterize Turgidson through his megalomania and incapacity to understand the real meaning of what he is going to propose. Finally, this strategy will reappear when Ripper realizes that he has been defeated, seconds before he shoots himself as logical conclusion of his behaviour.

So, a textual strategy whose main aim is to depict a character's reaction or attitude towards what is happening in the scene, or simply to attribute the vision to him/her (both subservient to a general purpose of conveying a story clearly and unambiguously) works to manipulate information and create surprise, to create a distorted visual composition or to offer a commmentary on the image through the arrangement of mise-en-scene elements and cinematography. This distortion of a relatively stable cinematic formula is another example of a self-conscious narrative, a narrative which knows that it is addressing an audience

and uses spectacular effects that go beyond the rules of an unobtrusive narrative activity.

The sound, mise-en-scene and editing elements that we have discussed so far are also defamiliarizing devices. They, together with the comic strategies, lighting and characterization present a new insight into the way we perceive reality with one effect: because of their comic, distorting or self-conscious nature, they distance the viewer from the contents of the narrative. The result is a comic, grotesque narrative that tells the viewer how the world is ruled by maniacs and is about to cease to exist while the audience laughs at the characters and ridiculous situations enjoying every minute of it. The question is: are those deviations from the classical method of presenting a story regarded as such by the audience or not? Do these devices really lead the viewer to understand the narrative as an artificial construction?

Cinema is a fairly recent artistic manifestation, but its popularity and universal language has allowed it to develop very quickly, providing us with a huge number of examples of its fertility. From the Classical Hollywood films in the United States to Art-cinema in Europe, films produce in their audiences the capacity to distinguish what kind of a text they are watching and what they can expect from it. Because of its massive production of moving pictures, Classical Hollywood filmmaking has for a long period of time been considered the paradigm of filmmaking, the style that sets the rules of what can and cannot be done in a film. This Classical Hollywood style accepts a certain degree of self-conscious narration that is put down to and understood as a brief moment of what Bordwell calls «artistic motivation». When an element cannot be said to be motivated by its compositional relevance (it is necessary for the story to proceed), by realistic motivation (its presence justified on the grounds of verisimilitude), or by intertextual motivation (the element is justified on the grounds of the conventions of certain classes of art works), then it can only be said that it may be justified by «its power to call attention to the system within which it operates» (Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson 1988: 21), that is, by artistic motivation.

This artistic motivation systematically tends to play an important role in certain kinds of films, so that certain genres could not be understood without those irruptions of components that «lay bare the device.» This is the case of musicals, in which the story-line stops for a moment to let a character sing a song, or comedies, in which references to the conventionality of the medium such as the appearance of the Paramount logo in *Road to Utopia* are frequent. Because of its systematic appearance in specific genres these deviations are not considered to be such by the viewer: they are regarded as essential components of the genre.

We can say that they are codified generically as being common constituents. They stop being justified for their artistic motivation and become generically, intertextually codified elements as a result of their recurrent appearance in a specific kind of films.

Dr. Strangelove is a satiric comedy and it consequently includes elements common to both comedy and satire: a mixture of realism and fantasy; depiction of characters as caricatures; grotesque, exaggerated acting; self-conscious textual narrative strategies in order to create visually spectacular effects or drive their points home. All these elements are codified as belonging to a satiric and comic text. Generic motivation makes all of them acceptable because one of the characteristics of satiric comedy / comic satire is the overtly achieved «defamiliarization» of reality. They offer a distorted, more spectacular view of reality but do not break the illusion of the telling activity, although they distance the viewer from a completely serious understanding of the film because they identify the text as satire, based on reality but not totally faithful to it. They become an essential part of the text.

The quick pace of the text is the product of the peculiar arrangement of its fabulaic contents. *Dr. Strangelove'* s story resembles what Bordwell calls canonic narration (Bordwell 1985: 157-162).[3] Its characteristics are easily recognizable in *Dr. Strangelove* although the nature of the text offers altered versions of some of them: characters are clearly defined in their insanity or their incapacity to handle the situation; their struggle is to avoid the certain death that is threatening all of them, except for Kong whose task is to drop the bomb (both are clearcut problems and goals). The principal causal agent is the character; although Ripper sets the machine of death loose, it is not the machine that governs the narrative, it is the characters' struggle to avoid that death in the case of the War Room and Mandrake, and Kong's task that move the narrative forwards. Each character is given a motif that keeps appearing and that both identifies and describes the character for us: so Kong's cowboy hat, Turgidson's chewing gum, Ripper's cigar or Strangelove's mechanical hand among others. The locales in which the various lines of action take place are distinct and remain so for the whole of the narrative, so becoming easily identifiable. The temporal arrangement of the narrative relies on two classical devices: deadlines and crosscutting. The action is punctuated by the deadline that the flight of the planes towards their targets implies and both Mandrake's line of action and the characters' in the War Room are based on how they can recall the wing before the B-52s reach their targets. As was pointed out before, the text alternates successively between three locales: Burpleson air base (where Ripper and Mandrake are), the War Room (Turgidson, President) and the B-52 («King»

Kong). This crosscutting structure creates suspense by witholding information for a certain time until the narrative gets back to the same locale again and retakes the line of action left open.

Dr. Strangelove's text contains enough elements to define it as a classical, canonic narration. The purpose of this kind of narration is to facilitate the viewer's quick and easy understanding of the narrative, which will engage his/her attention and will make him/her view the film with interest. We could say that the only purpose of this narrational mode is to excite the audience's curiosity while, at the same time, withholding and retarding the final outcome or meaning of the text until its conclusion.

We have also said that crosscutting builds up curiosity by retarding the completion of a line of action. In *Dr. Strangelove* the fact that the crosscutting of the narrative takes place between three locales strengthens the mechanisms to produce curiosity as the number of lines of action provides more possibilities to do so. This game with information relies on the assumption that the viewer proceeds through the text in the hope of finding out what the relationships of all the elements in the narrative are and reaching an ending that will give a meaning to the whole text. This classical assumption resembles Roland Barthes' statement that the reason why a reader reads a novel is because he/she hopes to find a meaning in it out of the relations between the high order elements of the text (Barthes 1983: 295).

This is exactly the process that Classical Hollywood enhances by rewarding the audience's search for coherent information in the text. *Dr. Strangelove*'s crosscutting-based structure and what we could call classical treatment of its scenes stimulates both a horizontal and a vertical reading, the suspense produced by sequences left open is progressively rewarded and the semantic units are integrated in the whole of the narrative line of action. It is the wish to know, curiosity, that leads the audience through the film towards what Brooks calls «the revelation of meaning that occurs when the narrative sentence reaches full predication» (Brooks 1984: 18). Brooks puts more emphasis on the temporal nature of this process and the retrospective quality of narratives that makes the reader/viewer proceed with the hope that what is to come will provide what has already gone with a new meaning. Both Barthes and Brooks make of the acquisition of meaning the principal advancing force of the text.

So far we have seen how *Dr. Strangelove* regards the defamiliarizing strategies as its essential constituents and how their main aim is to produce spectacle. By their continuous appearance, those strategies cue the audience to expect them all along the narrative. They create an inner logic of expectation comparable to the «logical» time Barthes perceives in narratives. The typically

classical narration the film uses also clearly favours both a horizontal reading and a vertical integrating quest for meaning through all its semantic elements (characters, actions, dialogue,...).

The detachment proper of a satiric text makes part of the vertical quest for knowledge irrelevant and replaces it with a visual, horizontal inner logic (the logic of spectacle, with the final stroke of the appearance of Dr. Strangelove at the end; horizontal, because it only concerns elements at a formal level) of the film that has to be fulfilled, leading to the only outcome that the visual inner logic can provide: the explosion of the bomb. The iconic nature of cinematic signs favours the creation of a textual inner logic of a different kind; it is visual, mimetic as much as temporal. The mimetic side of language that can more easily be disregarded in written narratives is used by the text to build up a logic of its own, it is an intrinsic quality of the medium, one so strong and effective that it works independently of the «logical» time. In the same way that broken sequences are completed and integrated in the textual process, the inner logic of spectacle needs a development and a completion in the ending.

As an example of the former points, we can now focus our attention on some key scenes from the film. Halfway through the film the President tries to contact premier Kissoff to inform him of the attack in progress. This scene takes place in the War Room, in front of the generals, General Turgidson included. President Muffley manages to get Kissoff on the phone and tells him the news and how they are going to help them destroy their B-52s as they cannot recall them. The scene provides, then, new information and leaves a cause dangling at the end which will sustain suspense (the Russian ambassador says they have a «Doomsday Machine» and he looks worried but we are not told why).

The text now changes locale and moves to Ripper's office. It is a scene in which Ripper reveals his theory of fluoridation, the reason why he launched the attack on Russia (he believes the Russians have been «fluoridating» the water in a clearly anti-American tactic). We gain knowledge about the characters, about their actions and their motivations; the vertical quest for meaning is rewarded here as well as in the preceding scene.

Now the narrative goes back to the War Room. We are told what this Doomsday Machine is: a sequence is thereby closed in the horizontal reading of the text and in the vertical one, as it emphasizes the deadline and makes the struggle to recall the airplanes more dramatic: time is running out and they need to recall the wing before they reach their targets.

In these three examples we can note: the first scene's photographic quality of the shots in the War Room, with the comic performance of the President, who treats the Russian premier like a child in one of the funniest scenes

of the film; in the second scene, the incongruous reasons given by Ripper, Mandrake's out of place exquisite politeness that results wonderfully comic, and the use of lighting; and the third scene's caricatures of the Russian Ambassador and Turgidson, and Dr. Strangelove's over the top performance as an ex-Nazi scientist whose mechanical hand rebels against its owner. All these elements contribute to create that mimetic logic of spectacle that contends with the horizontal and vertical readings for the narrative advancing role.

As the film progresses, the weight of this mimetic logic of spectacle increases, especially in the last two scenes that precede the explosion. The first one takes place in the B-52. It starts by showing the characters carrying out their task (getting ready to drop the bomb) in a usual way. But at a certain point in the scene Kong goes down to the bomb cellar to check what is wrong with the bomb doors that refuse to open. From that moment on the scene gets carried away by Kong's monkey-like behaviour (the film uses here a shot in fast motion in which he looks like a mad monkey) that culminates when he rides the bomb to the ground as if it were a bronco, in a completely unrealistic outcome of the scene that gives away its purpose to please the viewer, and make him/her laugh rather than reflect about the consequence of what Kong is doing. The bomb explodes and, in the next scene, Strangelove goes on with his incongruous show. He proposes to hide people in mines for a hundred years until the radioactivity caused by the bomb has disappeared. Here the scene also gives away its desire to please by making the president (one of the few characters who had been fairly reasonable and sensible all along the film) take them into consideration. Strangelove's characterization is so exaggerated and comic that it makes us forget what is happening and fosters its pure enjoyment. Besides, the scene adds no meaning to the development of the narrative because we have just seen the explosion of the bomb and know that everything is finished now.

The text's efforts to produce a certain visual style, and the audience's recognition of it as an essential component of a genre helps to expect this ending, to expect a consistent visual style all along the text. Texts belonging to different genres are recognized as having their own visual elements that keep appearing in the films that belong to that genre: long shots of landscapes or deserts in Westerns, Chaplin and Keaton's difficulties to handle objects of the mise-en-scene, Wim Wenders's shots of desolate urban or country milieu; they all, voluntarily or involuntarily, cue the audience's expectations and constitute a distinctive feature of a genre or an author's work.

Barthes's conviction that the essence of a literary narrative lies in its capacity to build up an artificial structure, independent of the mimetic side of the text, whose fulfilment becomes its main purpose, has to be altered when applied

to films, where the inherent mimetic nature of the cinematic medium has to be acknowledged. In the case of films, their contents can create a visual inherent logic parallel to the structural logic that arises from their arrangement, and sometimes this mimetic logic can even relegate the structural quest for meaning to a secondary place as in *Dr. Strangelove* . After all, the film's complete title is *Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* .

NOTES

1. I am here adopting Mieke Bal's terminology which distinguishes between fabula (series of events), story (ordered events qualified by various points of view) and text (story converted into linguistic signs by a relating agent, a narrator) (Mieke Bal 1985: 6-9). In cinema, the existence of narration does not necessarily involve the presence of a narrator. Most films do not provide a narrator and the viewer will not identify one unless the text provides explicit cues for its construction.

2. External focalization is characteristic of the filmic medium. Internal focalization can be achieved through various textual devices such as a shot containing both a character looking and the object of his/her gaze. Jean Mitry calls this shot «semi-subjective» (in Branigan 1984: 215). Another focalization device is the use of shot / reverse shot sequences which alternatively show two characters (or two objects, or a character and an object) from a point in space that does not wholly correspond to the position of any of the two participants in the sequence. Each shot must represent «from a more or less oblique angle, one endpoint of an imaginary 180-degree line running through the scenographic space» (Bordwell 1985: 110). In a way these sequences also constitute another focalizing method as they usually show the attitude of the characters to what has just been shown to the viewer at the other end of the space of the scene.

3. This kind of narration is typical of Classical Hollywood filmmaking. It presents psychologically defined individuals who try to solve a clear-cut problem or achieve a specific goal. This narrative is heavily based upon the existence of a story-line which follows a cause-effect pattern; the configuration of space and the arrangement of temporal units is designed to depict effectively how causes lead to effects: unity of time (continuous or consistently intermittent) and of space (a quickly identifiable locale) which develop a distinct cause-effect chain. Temporal organization relies on the setting of deadlines that arise expectations in the viewer and motivate the showing of whether the deadline is met or not. Within the scenes, this narrative mode practises temporal and spatial continuity, this is achieved by an editing method that makes a point of showing the events in chronological order, of respecting their frequency of appearance in the story and of only omitting actions that are not relevant for the audience's construction of the story. The construction of the space of the narrative also has as its principal aim to create an «unambiguous» space that leaves the viewer the only task of following the action prompted by the character.

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THE POETRY OF ROBERT GRAVES FROM THE WAR TO *THE WHITE GODDESS*

Lucia GRAVES

All saints revile her, and all sober men
Ruled by the God Apollo's golden mean—
In scorn of which we sailed to find her
Whom we desired above all things to know,
Sister of the mirage and echo.

It was a virtue not to stay,
To go our headstrong and heroic way
Seeking her out at the volcano's head,
Among pack ice, or where the track has faded
Beyond the cavern of the seven sleepers:
Whose broad high brow was white as any leper's
Whose eyes were blue, with rowan-berry lips,
With hair curled honey-coloured to white hips

Green sap of spring in the young wood a-stir
Will celebrate the Mountain Mother,
And every song-bird shout awhile for her;
But we are gifted, even in November
Rawest of seasons, with so huge a sense
Of her nakedly worn magnificence
We forget cruelty and past betrayal,
Heedless of where the next brigh bolt may fall.

(«The White Goddess»[1])

This supremely feminine being is Robert Graves' White Goddess, the product of both rigorous historical research and an extraordinary show of poetic intuition. She became the central figure around which his poetic forces rallied in mid-life, when he was at the peak of his intellectual and creative evolution, and filled the void left by his dissatisfaction with the society in which he lived. She stood shining at the end of a long and tortuous path, and made sense not only of his own past, but of human behaviour as a whole. And she set the course he was to follow during the next three or four decades, until his literary production came to an end.

It is therefore very helpful, if we are to assess the development of Graves' poetry from his earliest days as a war poet, to his establishment as one of the finest love poets in the English language of our century, to take a look at the main elements of this historical-cum-literary thesis that exerted such an influence on him.

During the historical research for his novel *The Golden Fleece*—the story of Jason and the Argonauts— Graves, forever concerned with the nature of poetry and its origins, became fascinated by the development of religious thought in the ancient world, well aware that «it is a commonplace of history that what happens on earth gets reflected in theological dogma.» But his research suddenly took a swing in another direction when he casually came across an ancient Welsh minstrel poem called *The Song of Taliesin*. This poem, hitherto considered a nonsense rhyme, gave Graves the clue of the survival among Celtic bards of the same pre-historic Goddess cult he was beginning to detect in his exploration of the ancient Greek legends. The result of that first intuitive discovery was a whole chain of interconnected discoveries, related to ancient calendars, alphabets, rituals, myths and iconology, which became the body of his book *The White Goddess*.

In this book, which Graves subtitles «A historical grammar of poetic myth,» Graves expounds, through a comparative study of Western mythologies, his conviction that the Western world, from Mesopotamia to the British isles, and across all the Mediterranean countries, was once ruled by a feminine deity, the Lunar Muse-Goddess, or White Goddess, mother of all beings, whose triple condition of maiden, mother and crone, was symbolized by the three phases of the moon. Being in close touch with the magical aspect of life and the mysterious forces of nature, she was the source of all learning and the inspirer of all the arts. But matriarchy gave way to patriarchy, and with the introduction of the Olympic religious system she was eventually dispossessed by Apollo, the Greek God of Logic and Reason, who still governs the world today.

However, as Graves has proved with his conclusive interpretation of «The Song of Taliesin» and of other Mediaeval Celtic verses, the goddess cult

persisted, despite its suppression on an official level, well into the Middle Ages, and has left its mark in many aspects of our own culture: in folklore (take, for instance, folk tales such as Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs), agricultural feasts and customs, and, of course, in the cult of the Virgin Mary. Even more important for the poet Graves, English poetry abounds with traces of her influence throughout the centuries —he mentions Shakespeare, Donne, John Clare, Keats and Coleridge as examples of poets who undoubtedly felt her presence— and she still prevails today among all «true» poets, that is, among all poets inspired by a personal muse, who embodies the spirit of the ancient goddess. Only true poets, says Graves, through their experience of the Goddess, in both her cruel and loving aspects, are still in touch with the ancient forces of inspiration, magic and intuition. This is expressed in the poet's imagery and choice of words, each word being a live component of the poem.

This general view led Graves to distinguish between devotees of Apollo and those of the Muse, between Apollonian poetry and Muse poetry. The first, whose poems are composed in the forepart of the mind, with the help of wit, reason, a close knowledge of rhetoric, Classical example and contemporary fashion, can write on just about any subject: politics, philosophy, anything. But muse poets have «a single, infinitely variable theme,» and that is love. Consciously or unconsciously, according to Graves, all true poets interpret their emotions as part of this cyclic theme, which is the emotional counterpart of the fixed cycles of nature and agriculture. This theme, which Graves has found repeated again and again in the different mythologies that form the basis of Western culture, is a dramatized account of the Goddess's power over nature and over man, and of how man repeatedly clashes with his rival in love for her, his other self.

«The theme, briefly,» says Graves, «is the antique story, which falls into thirteen chapters and an epilogue, of the birth, life, death and resurrection of the God of the Waxing Year; the central chapters concern the God's losing battle with the God of the Waning Year for love of the capricious and all-powerful Threefold Goddess, their mother, bride and layer-out. The poet identifies himself with the God of the Waxing Year and his Muse with the Goddess; the rival is his blood-brother, his other self, his weird. All true poetry celebrates some incident or scene in this very ancient story, and the three main characters are so much a part of our racial inheritance that they not only assert themselves in poetry but recur on occasions of emotional stress in the form of dreams, paranoiac visions and delusions.»[2]

In the figure of the White Goddess Graves found an explanation for his life-long fascination for the irrational elements of life, for the mysterious, the grotesque and even the cruel; an explanation, also, for his stubborn alienation

from established attitudes to life and poetry, and from the patriarchal society in which he was educated.

But how did his life lead up to this, and in what way did his poetry reflect his continual, though not always direct, approach to the White Goddess?

Born in Wimbledon, London, in 1895, Robert was the son of Alfred Perceval Graves, of Anglo-Irish origin, himself a minor poet, and of Amy Von Ranke, of German origin. He had a typically Edwardian education, supported by strict moral and religious views, but with enough love and comfort to make him a happy child, at least while he could observe the world from behind the curtains of the nursery window. For his mother, who exercised a dominant influence over her children, gave Robert a picture of the world as it should be, according to her Victorian ideals, not as it really was. His first painful experience with the harsh reality of the outside world occurred when he was sent to Charterhouse, a boys' public school, for working too hard and for having a German middle name. He braced himself, learned to box and took up mountain climbing, but behind that show of courage, his sensitive nature also forced him to become aware of his individuality and strong poetic vocation. Already in «The Mountain Side at Evening,» written when he was fifteen and published in the school magazine, we see him using poetry to voice his natural fears.

The Mountain Side at Evening

Now even falls
And fresh, cold breezes blow
Adown the grey-green mountain side
Strewn with rough boulders. Soft and low
Night speaks, her tongue untied
Darkness to Darkness calls.

'Tis now men say
From rugged piles of stones
Steal Shapes and Things that should be still
Green terror ripples though our bones,
Our inmost heart-strings thrill
And yearn for careless day

But a much worse experience with reality, one that no mother could have prepared him for, was of course the First World War, into which he entered as a volunteer with his inherited set of values, with his patriotism and righteousness, and even, perhaps, with a childish desire to come close to danger and fear. When

the war broke out in August 1914, Graves had just left school. He was nineteen and his main concern in life was to write poetry. A few months later, he had been sent out to fight in the front and was soon to rise to the rank of captain. He took part in the Somme offensive and on July 20th 1916 was seriously wounded and reported dead. But to everybody's surprise he survived and was sent back to England, where he recovered. It was in fact as a war poet that Robert Graves first made a name for himself. He was part of the war-poetry boom that had been detonated by Rupert Brooke's death in 1915. These war poems, which he later rejected, partly in an effort to forget the horror of the war, but principally because he did not think they had been written for what he considered to be truly poetic reasons, can be seen moving from the initial patriotic youthful verses, to desperate cries of indignation when he began to grasp the reality of the holocaust. His poetry became once again a refuge, this time against despair, the falling apart of a world, the loss of religious faith, and above all, the loss of friends in battle. We come across images either of the lost peace and security of childhood or of a future which he imagines equally comforting.

Over the Brazier (fragment)

What life to lead and where to go
After the War, after the War?
We'd often talked this way before,
But I still see the brazier glow
That April night, still feel the smoke
And stifling pungency of burning coke.

I'd thought: 'A cottage in the hills,
North Wales, a cottage full of books,
Pictures and brass and cosy nooks
And comfortable broad window-sills,
Flowers in the garden, walls all white.
I'd live there peacefully and dream and write'.

But when the war was over and the survivor came home, that spiritual peace was hard to find.

The Survivor Comes Home

Despair and doubt in the blood:
Autumn, a smell rotten-sweet:
What stirs in the drenching wood?

What drags at my heart, my feet?
What stirs in the wood?

Nothing stirs, nothing cries.
Run weasel, cry bird for me,
Comfort my ears, soothe my eyes!
Horror on ground, over tree!
Nothing calls, nothing flies.

Once in a blasted wood,
A shrieking fevered noise
We jeered at Death where he stood:
I jeered, I too had a taste
Of death in the wood.

Am I alive and the rest
Dead, all dead? Sweet friends
With the sun they have journeyed west;
For me now night never ends,
A night without rest.

Death, your revenge is ripe.
Spare me! but can death spare?
Must I leap, howl to your pipe
Because I denied you there?
Your vengeance is ripe.

Death, ay, terror of Death
If I laughed at you, scorned you now
You flash in my eyes, choke my breath
'Safe home'. Safe? Twig and bough
Drip, drip, drip with Death!

What had survived was the body, but the soul was still in great danger. Graves, like many other returning soldiers, was to suffer terribly from shell shock. Shell shock became his personal war, a state of anguish which dominated his thoughts, and turned his life into a never ending nightmare. He could only pose questions, not answer them. What has happened to my world, to the things I once believed in? And, above all, who am I? But from these very questions a ghostly figure emerges. He is the forerunner of the mythical king's rival: his other self. We first encounter him in the «Letter from Wales,» a letter in verse Graves wrote to his fellow poet and soldier Siegfried Sassoon, a long poem which begins «This is a

question of identity which I can't answer» and in which he wonders whether perhaps he did die in battle, and whether his friend Siegfried did not also die in France, both being subsequently supplanted by others. How is he to know he and Siegfried are the same men who were out in the muddy trenches? And again, we find him in «The Pier-Glass,» a poem about a man who looks at himself in a mirror in a large abandoned manor house, abandoned even by rats and insects. It is a poem which depicts his state of mind, the terrible emptiness in his heart. The house is no doubt a symbol of his past, of the lofty values and traditions of his childhood that are now destroyed and abandoned. He is here both the man looking at the mirror, and the man's reflection.

Is there no life, nothing but the thin shadow
And blank foreboding, never a wainscot rat
Rasping a crust? Or at the window pane
No fly, no bluebottle, no starveling spider?
The windows frame a prospect of cold skies
Half-merged with sea, as at the first creation,
Abstract, confusing welter. Face about,
Peer rather in the glass once more, take note
Of self, the grey lips and long hair dishevelled,
Sleep-staring eyes. Ah, mirror for Christ's love
Give me one token that there still abides
Remote, beyond this island mystery
So be it only this side Hope, somewhere,
In streams, on sun-warm mountain pasturage,
True life, natural breath: not this phantasma.

(«The Pier-Glass,» fragment)

In the White Goddess myth, the King has a rival, his other self. But the goddess is also of a double nature. On the one hand she is benevolent, loving, maternal. On the other side she is the executioner, the cruel hag at whose hands the king must die. She is both terrifying and enchanting, and the poet is required to accept both aspects and reconcile the two opposites. As early as 1920, we find Graves exploring this baffling duality of life as a poetic question. I am referring to a poem called «The God Called Poetry» in which poetry is symbolized by a double-headed god:

Then speaking from his double head
The glorious monster said
'I am YES and I am NO,

Black as pitch and white as snow,
Love me, hate me, reconcile
Hate with love, perfect with vile,
So equal justice shall be done
And life shared between moon and sun.
Nature for you shall curse or smile:
A poet you shall be, my son'.

(«The God Called Poetry,» fragment)

Shell shock was followed closely by disenchantment with the society for which he had fought, and he struggled through those post-war years, desperately trying to accomodate himself to life again by means of an early marriage —to Nancy Nicholson, an artist and ardent feminist. They had four children in quick succession, and much of his poetry of that period reflects his involvement in their lives: poems written for children, or using children as their main theme, encased in traditional folk metre and rhyme. But his confrontation with the crude reality of his disenchantment made him all the more determined to reject half-measures and half-truths and search only for what whole truths his poetic mind could unearth in that scene of desolation. As a result, his poems continued to reflect his dark mood and state of anguish without really giving him any answers. Emotional exhaustion did not even allow him the relief of irony. And yet, his obsession for writing good poetry was such, that he decided against psychiatric help for fear that he might lose his poetic powers during the process of psychiatric analysis.

What is interesting about Robert Graves' post war crisis is that although he was implicitly acknowledging that the religion, morals and ideals bequeathed by his forefathers had lost their meaning, and that this irrelevancy had affected whole areas of his culture, he did not, like so many other contemporary poets, reject the traditional forms of poetry, and turn to the freer modernist forms. On the contrary, he seemed obsessed with the idea of preserving traditional structures and perfecting them, for he recognized their value —and always would— as one of the few that had survived the transformation of his world. In the process he became an absolute master of his trade, a highly skilled craftsman in his use of words, rhyme and metre. He strove for originality only in his attitude toward his subject matter, not in linguistic experiments, and kept away from new poetic trends and avant-guard literary circles, even though he was thereby rapidly losing what had been a considerable initial success as a poet. The following poem, written at this time, sounds almost like a folk song in its metre, in its sad but simple resignation of the acceptance of lost love. But the images of the moon —the «tyrannous queen»— the «marble statues,» the «bergs of glinting ice,» and

indeed, all the imagery of the last two verses, are already pointing towards the White Goddess:

Full Moon

As I walked out that sultry night,
I heard the stroke of One.
The moon, attained to her full height,
Stood beaming like the sun:
She exorcised the ghostly wheat
To mute assent in love's defeat,
Whose tryst had now begun.

The fields lay sick beneath my tread,
A tedious owlet cried,
A nightingale above my head
With this or that replied —
Like man and wife who nightly keep
Inconsequent debate in sleep
As they dream side by side.

Your phantom wore the moon's cold mask,
My phantom wore the same;
Forgetful of the feverish task
In hope of which they came,
Each image held the other's eyes
And watched a grey distraction rise
To cloud the eager flame —

To cloud the eager flame of love,
To fog the shining gate;
They held the tyrannous queen above
Sole mover of their fate,
They glared as marble statues glare
Across the tessellated stair
Or down the halls of state.

And now warm earth was Arctic sea,
Each breath came dagger keen;
Two bergs of glinting ice were we,
The broad moon sailed between;
There swam the mermaids, tailed and finned,
And love went by upon the wind
As though it had not been.

It was at this point, when Graves was voicing his confusion in poems full of surrealistic images of nightmares, or looking back at his nursery days in the more traditionally cut poems, that he met the American poet Laura Riding. Their ensuing literary and personal association provoked a definite break with a world to which he knew he no longer belonged. Not only did his marriage break up, but Graves wrote his autobiography *Goodbye to All That*, a passionate but dry account of his experiences in the war, through which he hoped at last to rid himself of his neurosis. Riding was a strong and dominant woman, and with enough intellectual capacity to excite Graves' intellect into new action. Here was the fresh voice of the American continent, a continent which had not suffered the direct wound of the war the way Europe had. Riding was detached enough from those events to be able to concern herself with the more eternal philosophical questions on the meaning of life. For her History had ended, and Time did not exist. This coincided with Graves' own search for the eternal values of life, and helped him reinforce his desire to escape from the nightmarish trap he was caught in at the time. And so. in 1929, after the publication of his autobiography, Graves left England with Laura Riding and together they settled on the island of Mallorca, where they spent the next seven years. During those years, his poetry reflects a growing fascination with the nature of woman, and with the relationship between the sexes. It also reveals a growing awareness that there is something wrong with this relationship in our present world, anticipating his later belief that «the political and social confusion of these last 3,000 years has been entirely due to man's revolt against woman as a priestess of natural magic, and his defeat of her wisdom by the use of intellect.»

Biographers and critics have remarked on the fact that Riding herself was the foreshadow of the White Goddess, and that Graves found an explanation, if not an acceptance, of her often harsh behaviour towards him, in the merciless aspect of the White Goddess —the crone, the witch, the layer-out. Here are two contrasting poems, written about this time, in which we are able to perceive, through the poet's eyes, these two opposing aspects of woman. And it is interesting to note how both poems confer on the woman described the powers and attributes of divinity.

On Portents

If strange things happen where she is,
So that men say that graves open
And the dead walk, or that futurity
Becomes a womb and the unborn are shed,
Such portents are not to be wondered at,

Being tourbillions in Time made
By the strong pulling of her bladed mind
Through that ever-reluctant element.

Like Snow

She, then, like snow in a dark night,
Fell secretly. And the world waked
With dazzling of the drowsy eye,
So that some muttered 'Too much light',
And drew the curtains close.
Like snow, warmer than the fingers feared,
And to soil friendly;
Holding the histories of the night
In yet unmelted tracks.

Between the hasty departure from Mallorca at the onset of the Spanish Civil war, and the publication of *The White Goddess* in 1948, two events of prime importance occurred in the life of Robert Graves. The first was the final and painful break with Laura Riding when she left him for another man and repudiated all her poetry. As Graves put it in a letter to Gertrude Stein, «the spirit left her and she became common clay, an average American divorcée-remarried housewife.» The other event was the rediscovery of love through my mother, Beryl, which brought with it a revival of his poetic powers. It was then, and only then, that he knew he had regained his lost vision of peace:

Mid-winter Waking

Stirring suddenly from long hibernation,
I knew myself once more a poet
Guarded by timeless principalities
Against the worm of death, this hillside haunting;
And presently dared open both my eyes.

O gracious, lofty, shone against from under,
Back-of-the-mind-far clouds like towers;
And you, sudden warm airs that blow
Before the expected season of new blossom,
While sheep still gnaw at roots and lambless go—

Be witness that on waking, this mid-winter,
I found her hand in mine laid closely
Who shall watch out the Spring with me.
We stared in silence all around us
But found no winter anywhere to see.

From this time on Robert Graves channelled all his energies into the exploration of the White Goddess myth through his personal experiences. The only poetry not directly concerned with it are the humorous or satirical verses, to which he had always dedicated part of his energies, finding in them a useful relief from the seriousness of his task. But otherwise he continued writing chiefly love poetry to the end of his active life.

The creative process of a poem was an experience that Graves found almost painful. «The art of poetry,» he said, «consists in taking a poem through draft after draft, without losing its inspirational magic.» To end this paper I think it would be interesting to take a glimpse of the poet at work. For that I have chosen one of his last poems, «Advent of Summer,» written in July 1974, at the age of seventy-nine.[3] I have chosen it partly because it strikes one as unusual within the general line of his poems from this period, which are mostly straightforward love poems celebrating joy or unhappiness in his role of poet-lover. «Advent of Summer» is addressed not to the loved one, but to himself, to the familiar other self. As we look through the drafts we will notice that this is not made clear from the start and it is only in the fifth draft that the «fellow poet» makes his appearance in the very first line. Again it is interesting how the figure of the other poet, his *alter ego*, becomes more and more precisely described.

In the first draft we read «You are my fellow poet»; in the second a state of mind is added: «You are lonely, my poet.» In the third we see «You are lonely, dear (crossed out), old (crossed out), shy poet.» In the fourth draft he is «poor poet,» in the fifth «honest poet,» then «You have always been lonely my fellow poet,» moving on to «You have always been lonely my grey fellow poet» —the adjective «grey» leaving us with no doubt as to who the fellow poet is. The final version reads «You have lived long but over lonely, / My grey-haired fellow poet.» The other idea one sees changing through the drafts is the description of the «cold showery summer,» which seems to be what originated the poem. In some drafts it is a showery summer, in others a rainless June. The important point, we see as the poem moves on, is that this is not the sort of summer one is used to, not a true summer, in fact. To start with, he is telling himself not to be saddened by this cold summer, «Let us flout the unkindness of a cold rainless June»; «Forget all the cruelties of this unlovely summer.» Then «Forget the absurdities of so untrue a summer.» But at this point, in the seventh draft, he

changes to «Let us deny the absurdities of every summer,» and finally, «Let us deny the absurdities of every true summer.» So in the last drafts he has moved from a particular summer, a cold and unusual one, to all summers. All summers, he is saying on reflection, are equally true, and so equally absurd: either from too much life or from too little. The white-haired poet has seen plenty of them, and prefers to listen to the song of the simple thrushes.

The title changes from «Summer '74,» to «One Last Poem,» to «Summer» to «A New Poem» and then to the final «Advent of Summer.»

Other changes are more for sound and rhythm than for concept: like the «apples» that change to «apricots» and back to «apples.»

Here is the final version:

Advent of Summer

You have lived long but over-lonely,
My grey-haired fellow-poet
Sighing for new melodies
In face of sullen grief,
With wanings of old friendship,
With sullen repetition —
For who can thrive in loneliness,
Accepting its cold needs?

Let love dawn with the advent
Of a cool, showery summer
With no firm, fallen apricots
Nor pods on any beanstalk,
Nor strawberries in blossom,
Nor cherries on the boughs.

Let us deny the absurdities
Of every true summer:
Let us never live ill-used
Or derided by new strangers;
Let us praise the vagrant thrushes
And listen to their songs.

* * *

In Robert Graves the poet and the man were inextricably united. For him poetry was «not a department of literature but a way of being and thinking.» And this was obvious to all who knew him. Whatever activity he undertook when he was

not actually writing poetry, whether as a scholar, novelist, or simply as a family man, he remained obsessively loyal to his poetic principles. I can therefore find no better way to conclude this paper than by quoting these words of his:

> A continuous sense of gratitude at being alive, and in love, and having no grudge against practical circumstances —if only because of having obstinately avoided being enslaved by them— may imply that the dedicated poet has been constantly wounded and bruised by attempting the impossible. Will his poems then figure as durable records of blessedness, or will they do no more than convey, truthfully, the darkness of his self-deception? This seems to me a philosophical, and therefore irrelevant question. A poet's destiny is to love.

NOTES

1. The copyright of all texts of Robert Graves quoted in the paper belongs to the Trustees of the Robert Graves Copyright Trust.
2. Robert Graves, *The White Goddess* (London: Faber and Faber), 24.
3. Mss reproduced by kind permission of the Eton School Library. (Mss included as an appendix to this article — Ed.).











You have always been lonely,
My grey fellow poet,
You demand a new form
In place of sudden distance,
Black weaving of friendship
And sad repetition —
But who could provide it
And measure the need?
That must come with the advent
Of a show showery summer —
No apricots on trees,
No pods on the beanstalks,
No strawberries in blossom
No plums on the boughs.

//

Forget the absurdities
Of so untrue a summer:
Let us never be ill-used
Or derided by strangers
But listen to the rapacious thunder
And listen to their songs.

Advent of Summer

You have always been lonely,
My grey fellow poet
Demanding a new form
In place of sudden distance,
All black weaving of friendship
And sad repetition —
But who can provide it
Or accept the need?

//

That must come with the advent
Of a showery summer —
No apricots on trees,
No pods on beanstalks,
No strawberries in blossom,
No cherries on the boughs.

//

Let us forget
The absurdities
Of so untrue a summer:
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But listen to the rapacious thunder
And listen to their songs.



ADVENT OF SUMMER

You have long lived but over-lonely,
My grey-haired fellow-poet,
Sighing for new melodies
In face of sullen grief,
With wanings of old friendship,
With sullen repetition —
Who can thrive in loneliness
Accepting its cold needs?

Let love dawn with the advent
Of a cool, showery summer
With no firm, fallen apricots
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No cherries on the boughs.

Let us deny the absurdities
Of every true summer;
Let us never live ill-used
Or derided by new strangers;
Let us praise the vagrant thrushes
And listen to their songs.

Deyá
July
1924

ALGUNAS CLAVES LINGÜÍSTICAS Y PRAGMÁTICAS EN LA EVOLUCIÓN DE LOS PRONOMBRES DE SEGUNDA PERSONA EN INGLÉS: SU USO EN *HENRY IV (PART I)* Y *SONS AND LOVERS*

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Las lenguas son, en esencia, unos constructos sociales sujetos a las normas y vaivenes impuestos por las sociedades que las hablan. Este axioma explica cómo la evolución de los usos lingüísticos depende de las inevitables alteraciones que se originan en el tejido social a través de los tiempos. Una de las constataciones más evidentes de lo que afirmamos la hallamos, en el caso de la lengua inglesa, en la evolución del pronombre personal de segunda persona desde comienzos del segundo milenio hasta nuestros días.

Esta relación biunívoca entre la lengua y la comunidad hablante ha hecho ver a las escuelas de lingüística más recientes[1] la necesidad de superar el objeto restrictivo de la lingüística tradicional, la oración. Para ello, ha sido preciso entender la lengua como discurso, compuesto por un complejo haz de elementos lingüísticos (monemas, palabras, oraciones, proposiciones, etc.) extralingüísticos (presuposiciones, implicaturas, contextos, temas discursivos, etc.) y, finalmente, por otros de naturaleza social, psicológica, antropológica y cultural.

Los enunciados que emitimos no se reducen a una sucesión de oraciones, enlazadas gracias a la observancia de un conjunto de reglas gramaticales prescriptivistas. Nuestra habla está viva y en acción constante, organizándose

en los llamados *actos de habla,*[2] compuestos por tres niveles superpuestos de significación. El primero o nivel *locucionario* nos remite al plano gramatical, al de las palabras y oraciones que emitimos, siendo su estudio el objetivo tradicional de los paradigmas lingüísticos precedentes. El segundo nivel, llamado *ilocucionario,* nos sitúa en el umbral de las intenciones y propósitos que llevan al emisor a construir su enunciado. Por último, el tercer nivel, *perlocucionario,* se centra en el receptor de ese enunciado y en los efectos que éste le produce.

El caso de la evolución del pronombre inglés de segunda persona constituye un ejemplo revelador de cómo es necesario un estudio a la par lingüístico y discursivo si se quiere comprender el complejo proceso lingüístico, pero también pragmático y cultural, que llevó a la suma simplificación un elaborado y rico sistema pronominal. El pronombre *you* actual es, sin duda, el resultado de una larga evolución sintética impuesta por una serie de convencionalismos sociales, usos pragmáticos y lingüísticos, más diversas circunstancias históricas, que han confluido en su predominio como forma única y exclusiva de todos los ámbitos de la comunicación verbal entre los anglohablantes. Con *you* apela el más humilde de los ciudadanos a su reina o presidente, con *you,* el padre se dirige al hijo, el amante a su amada o el señor al criado. Se ha establecido en la lengua inglesa un interesante mecanismo discursivo y lingüístico igualitario entre las diversas clases sociales. Un proceso semejante, intuiríamos, al que se está produciendo en la lengua castellana con un «tú» que va ganando progresivamente terreno al «usted» e introduciéndose en contextos comunicativos donde su utilización hubiera resultado impensable u ofensiva hace tan sólo una década.

El «tuteo» va avanzando en el intercambio conversacional cotidiano de una manera que se nos antoja similar a la que caracterizó al *you* a lo largo de los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII. Hay, empero, una diferencia de orden sociológico entre ambas evoluciones que merece comentarse: mientras en castellano se produce una rebaja en el grado de estimación social, al preferirse el coloquial «tú» al cortés «usted», en inglés el proceso seguido fue justamente el inverso. El cambio giró del coloquial *thou* al cortés *you,* generalizándose el uso de éste último con el resultado de relegar el primero a empleos dialectales y a los propios del ámbito familiar, como veremos en las páginas siguientes. Pero vayamos al principio de este proceso. La evolución de los pronombres ingleses a lo largo de los siglos se ha caracterizado por la progresiva simplificación gramatical de un sistema pronominal sin duda complejo.

Veamos cómo era el pronombre personal de segunda persona, que es el objeto del presente trabajo, entre los siglos XI y XII.

Pronombre personal de segunda persona[3]

	Singular	Dual	Plural
Nominativo	u, tu	git, it , .'	ge, e
Acusativo	e, te	inc	eow, ou, ou
Genitivo	in	incer	(o)ure, eow
Determinante	e	inc	eow

El pronombre de 2ª persona se declinaba con formas diversas según los casos, incluso con variantes dentro de cada caso, incorporando el número dual igualmente declinado. En épocas posteriores, esta riqueza morfológica, que reflejaba una compleja casuística de interacción social entre los hablantes, fue atenuándose hasta alcanzar los siglos XVI y XVII con cambios profundos en las formas y en los usos:

	S. XVI		S. XVII	
	Singular	Plural	Singular	Plural
Nominativo	thou	ye	thou	ye, you
Acusativo	thee	you	thee	ye, you
Genitivo	thine	yours	thine	yours
Determinante	thy /thine	your	thy / thine	your

(Barber 1967: 204-8)

Con la desaparición del número dual, observamos una tendencia hacia la regularidad en las formas, correspondiendo una distinta para cada posibilidad morfológica. A partir de finales del siglo XVII, el pronombre de segunda persona adquirió la fisionomía moderna del inglés estándar actual por unas razones en gran medida sociológicas y pragmáticas o de uso, que analizaremos a continuación.

Pronombre personal de segunda persona estándar

	Singular	Plural
Nominativo	you	you
Acusativo	you	you
Genitivo	yours	yours
Determinante	your	your

La simplificacion final actual no ha podido ser más impresionante y completa. No hay formas distintas para el singular y el plural, ni para las diversas realizaciones sintagmáticas a excepción del genitivo *yours*. Para llegar a la situación lingüística presente, el pronombre personal de segunda persona se ha visto sometido al vaivén de las costumbres y usos sociales de las diversas épocas que lo han modificado, reutilizado, elevado o hecho desaparecer según los casos.

Volvamos, sin embargo, al pronombre tal y como era a comienzos del siglo XVI. La diferencia entre *thou* y *ye* era de número, mientras que *ye* se utilizaba funcionalmente como sujeto y *you* como objeto. Esta última diferencia fue perdiéndose paulatinamente, al utilizarse ambos de manera indistinta durante el siglo XVII. En la centuria siguiente, *you* se había impuesto en todos los casos, quedando la forma *ye* relegada a un uso literario elevado o restringida al dialecto. La variante de singular *thou* sufrió pronto el acoso sociológico de *you*. Quizá debido a la influencia francesa, empezó a utilizarse el plural *you* como un singular de cortesía o deferencia. Este uso ya se había apuntado, tímidamente, con la forma *ye* durante los dos siglos anteriores, pero fue en el XVII cuando *you* se utilizó extensamente como pronombre sin marca o de uso neutro en situaciones sociales imprecisas o en actos de habla fuera del ámbito familiar.

A lo largo del siglo XVII tenemos dos formas pronominales de segunda persona: *thou*, equivalente a nuestro «tú», que se utilizaba en el círculo familiar, siendo preferida por las clases bajas en aquellas situaciones de interacción comunicativa en las que un superior se dirigía a un subordinado (señor a criado, padre a hijo, etc.). Igualmente, era el vehículo idóneo con el que expresar los sentimientos, las emociones, o las relaciones de amistad y camaradería, incluso entre usuarios del *you*. En resumen, reflejaba, al igual que en nuestro idioma, «el pronombre del alma, del corazón», amén de marcar diferencias de estatus y clase social. El insulto y el afecto usaban *thou:*

> If thou «thou'st» him some thrice it shall not be amiss. (*Twelfth Night* 3.2)
>
> Before I loved thee as a brother, John, but now I do respect thee as my soul. (*1 Henry IV* 5.4)[4]

La segunda variante *you* adoptó el papel equivalente de nuestro «usted». Era la fórmula discursiva utilizada por los miembros inferiores de la sociedad para dirigirse de manera respetuosa a sus superiores, entre los componentes de las clases sociales elevadas y, progresivamente, entre la incipiente burguesía. El uso más deferente y cortés de *you* se impuso y generalizó durante el siglo XVII, al ser más útil en todo tipo de situaciones conversacionales, sobre todo las más ambiguas, y por obedecer a un deseo igualitario por parte de las clases sociales

más desfavorecidas. *Thou* vio restringido su empleo a círculos cada vez más íntimos y familiares, circunscribiéndose fundamentalmente a las variedades dialectales y regionales. En el siglo XVIII, *you* era ya el único pronombre de segunda persona en el inglés estándar. El uso de *thou* se reducía a ciertos enunciados propios de la liturgia religiosa,[5] o de formas literarias elevadas y arcaizantes. Curiosamente seguía dándose en el habla de determinadas sectas religiosas como los cuáqueros en su afán de mantener una especie de integrismo religioso por medio de la fosilización lingüística que, además, conseguía mantenerlos al margen de la evolución social circundante. Finalmente, perduraba, aunque ya en franca regresión, en las mencionadas variedades dialectales.

El uso indistinto de *you* para el singular y el plural generó, anecdóticamente, las formas *you is* para el singular y *you are* para el plural, fórmulas que desaparecieron ante los dictados de los puristas del idioma de la Ilustración británica del XVIII (Strang 1970: 140). Muchos tratadistas coinciden en lamentar la desaparición del inglés estándar de la forma *thou* como un síntoma de empobrecimiento lingüístico y discursivo, sobre todo por lo que significó de eliminación del idioma de una de las formas de tratamiento más íntimas y más ligadas a las emociones y sentimientos humanos profundos. A comienzos de nuestro siglo, *thou* y sus variantes todavía seguían utilizándose regularmente en ámbitos dialectales; así, Joseph y Elizabeth Wright escribían al respecto:

> *Thou* in its various dialect forms is still in general use in most of the modern dialects of England, but not in Scotland, to express familiarity or contempt, but it cannot be used to a superior without conveying the idea of impertinence. (1923: 159).

Hoy día, *thou* pervive en el norte, centro-occidente y zonas del centro de Inglaterra mientras que su variante oblicua *thee* está presente en el sudoeste y parte más occidental del centro del país (Fernández 1982: 624). *Thou*, por la propia idiosincrasia fonológica del inglés, ha dado lugar a innumerables variables dialectales, tanto fonéticas como grafémicas, como muestra la edición de 1971 del *Oxford English Dictionary*, de la que extraemos algunas:

> *Thaw, thau, thah, tha, theau, theow, thoo, thu.*
> *Tau, taw, ta, tay, teau, teaw, teu, too, tou, tow.*
> *Doo, dou, du,* etc.

USOS DE *THOU* Y *YOU* EN LA LITERATURA DE LOS SIGLOS XVII Y XX

La literatura es una fuente de información útil para el estudioso en su indagación de los usos lingüístico-discursivos de una sociedad a través de los siglos, aunque con las limitaciones derivadas de la naturaleza del texto literario como un objeto de creación artística y no un instrumento puro de investigación científica. La literatura y por extensión el lenguaje escrito pretende, al igual que el intercambio oral normal, establecer un vínculo comunicativo entre un emisor (el autor) y un receptor (la audiencia). La propia especificidad del discurso literario hace que el proceso para alcanzar dicho objetivo sea diferente. La interacción verbal cotidiana se basa en la copresencia física del emisor y del receptor, en el carácter efímero del mensaje y en su compleja contextualidad. El texto escrito y el literario no gozan de tales características. El escritor desarrolla su tarea en soledad y hace llegar su mensaje al lector «in absentia». No es precisa la copresencia física de ambos debido al carácter permanente de la escritura.

Por otro lado, ¿qué podemos decir del contexto, como elemento clave en toda interpretación discursiva? La interacción verbal se apoya en el conocimiento que los interlocutores poseen del contexto de habla que hace posible la aparente paradoja de que una proposición falsa sea aceptable y verdadera o que un enunciado insultante sea, en realidad, lisonjero y con este sentido lo emita el hablante y lo interprete el oyente. Esta clase de contexto no es posible en el discurso literario ya que el autor no está presente cuando se culmina el proceso comunicativo con la lectura de su obra. En la interacción literaria se produce lo que Nystram (1986) denomina *contexto de uso futuro* según el cual el texto literario, una vez que ha visto la luz de la pluma de su autor, aguarda el momento propicio de su lectura. Dentro de este carácter potencial que caracteriza al contexto literario, es irrelevante la posición física del autor, puesto que el texto permanecerá contextualizado en estado latente (gracias a todas las claves en este sentido: lingüísticas, prosódicas, culturales, pragmáticas, etc., que el autor haya incorporado en su momento) hasta su lectura. Será la actuación del lector la que defina el contexto y será en ese preciso momento cuando, finalmente, hable el autor a través de su texto.

Gracias a esa característica atemporal del contexto literario, podemos enfrentarnos a cualquier obra escrita no sólo desde la óptica del placer estético de su lectura, sino también con un propósito indagador y de estudio. Este es el ánimo que nos guía en nuestro análisis de la alternancia discursiva de los pronombres de segunda persona *you* y *thou*, cuyo funcionamiento gramatical y uso comunicativo en el pasado sólo es posible conocer mediante el examen de

textos escritos, en nuestro caso de carácter literario. Dentro de los diversos géneros literarios quizás sean el teatro y, en menor medida, la novela, los más adecuados para este empeño por su «pretendido» eco de la polifonía de voces procedentes de los diversos estamentos sociales representados que, de alguna manera, reflejan los hábitos lingüísticos y comunicativos de la sociedad de la época en que la obra fue escrita.

La necesidad de recurrir a textos literarios, en vez de a los diversos manuales y gramáticas, para intentar comprender el devenir de los usos de las mencionadas formas pronominales se apoya en una razón de cierto peso. Parece ser que, históricamente, la lengua viva ha evolucionado más deprisa que la mayoría de las gramáticas que intentaban describirla. Estas eran, en su momento, más residuos de usos y variedades caducas y desfasadas que descripciones del momento sincrónico de la lengua en cuestión. Muchas se revelan como copias desganadas de clásicos anteriores y ya superadas por el dinamismo vital del idioma. El mismo John Wallis, eminente gramático inglés del XVII cuya obra está siendo objeto de atención por parte de los estudiosos actuales por lo que de innovadora resultó para su tiempo, cae, sin embargo, en las mismas actitudes cuando en su tratado *Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae* [6] publicado en 1653, en pleno uso de *you* y *thou* con todas las implicaciones sociales ya apuntadas, da la siguiente clasificación pronominal:

	Formas básicas		**Formas posesivas**	
	Sujeto	Objeto	Con nombre	Sin nombre
Singular	thou	thee	thy	thine
Plural	ye	you	your	yours

Básicamente, esas eran las formas, pero ya no era ese su uso: *thou* y *you* se utilizaban en singular, *you* suplantaba a *ye* en plural que languidecía, etc. Wallis, en su descargo, escribió su gramática en un tiempo que resultaba aún próximo a sus postulados. Sin embargo, los dos tratados que comentamos a continuación fueron escritos en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX cuando el sistema pronominal inglés estándar estaba claramente definido. En el primero de ellos, publicado en Barcelona por A. Bergues de las Casas en 1864 y titulado *Novísima gramática inglesa*, tras afirmar su autor que «ha tenido presente todas las gramáticas inglesas publicadas hasta el día, inclusa la de G. H. OLLENDORFF» (1864: 1) ofrece en la página 16 el siguiente cuadro referido a los pronombres de segunda persona:

	Singular	Plural y tratamiento
Nominativo	Thou	You
Genitivo	Of thee	Of you
Dativo	To thee	To you
Acusativo	Thee	You
Vocativo	Oh thee!	Oh you!
Ablativo	From thee	From you

En la segunda gramática reseñada, publicada en Inglaterra en 1887, su autor, D. Evans, incluye de nuevo *thou, thy, thee* y *ye* en su relación de pronombres, aunque al referirse a *thou* matiza: «This pronoun is now rarely used except in poetical and elevated language» (1887: 47). Sin embargo, en relación a *thee* establece un uso más común: «Thee is used both as a Direct and an Indirect Object, e.g.: I love thee, I gave thee my word» (1887: 47). Este uso común que el autor le atribuye queda patente cuando atreviéndose en escarceos fonológicos afirma: «It is worth noting that in spoken English, the Personal Pronouns, when unemphatic, are sounded as though they were mere enclitics of the verb. Thus, we pronounce: 'Give me thy hand' as though it were written 'Giveme thy hand'» (1887: 185).

A más de un siglo del fin de su empleo en el inglés estándar, estos gramáticos continuaban incluyendo en sus tratados formas periclitadas o limitadas a determinados ámbitos familiares y dialectales. Nos inclinamos, pues, por la literatura como el medio más fiable para llevar a cabo un breve estudio pragmático-discursivo del uso de los pronombres *you* y *thou* en dos épocas diferentes y haciendo hincapié en el complejo mecanismo social que representaban. Por un lado, hemos elegido a W. Shakespeare como representante literario paradigmático de los siglos XVI y XVII, tiempos del mayor esplendor lingüístico y sociológico de ambas formas pronominales, y en concreto su presencia en *Henry IV, Part I*. Por otro lado, hemos seleccionado a D. H. Lawrence y su novela *Sons and Lovers* como ejemplo de la pervivencia y decadencia de *thou* en nuestro siglo en ciertas variedades dialectales como la de Nottinghamshire.

A) HENRY IV, PART I

La lengua, tal y como hemos apuntado con anterioridad, tiene como objetivo último la comunicación entre dos o más interlocutores. Por esta razón fundamental, además del conocimiento de los factores propiamente lingüísticos y discursivos (reglas, usos, estrategias discursivas, procesos de cohesión y coherencia interna,

etc.), es preciso entender la naturaleza de los elementos externos, las relaciones de poder, raza, estrato social, sexo, etc., que condicionan y fijan el rumbo de la interacción por medio del lenguaje. En definitivas cuentas, es lo que solemos hacer cuando ajustamos nuestros discursos y actos de habla a los diversos parámetros contextuales que organizan cada intercambio conversacional individual. Nuestros enunciados, en esas circunstancias, tendrán en cuenta, como punto previo y de obligada referencia, las diversas estructuras del poder, económicas y de clase, si pretendemos una «feliz» interacción verbal con nuestro interlocutor. La lengua es, sin duda, un óptimo instrumento a disposición del poder para la manipulación de la voluntad y permite la selección de un amplio abanico de estructuras sintácticas y discursivas que definen en sí mismas las desigualdades de rango social entre los miembros de una comunidad. La lengua, según R. Fowler (1985) es un factor causante de la desigualdad social más que un reflejo inocente de la misma. Por medio de la lengua, tal y como muestra la novela de Lawrence, los diversos grupos sociales desarrollan germanías, en su doble sentido de jerga y de solidaridad grupal, que les sirven no sólo como señas de identidad sino también como defensa frente a otros grupos. Las clases educadas hacen de su dominio de la lengua su estandarte contra otras clases menos alfabetizadas. Estas, a su vez, se identifican entre sí mediante el uso de otras características lingüísticas como, por ejemplo, el acento regional. Creemos que la relación entre la lengua y la ideología constituye un parámetro de tal magnitud que impregna todas las actividades interactivas humanas y nos influye decisivamente.

El drama histórico shakespeariano que presentamos recoge, al ser un fresco de las diversas estructuras de poder imperantes en la sociedad inglesa del siglo XVI, las hablas de los representantes de las diferentes escalas sociales, tanto cuando se relacionan entre sí como cuando se comunican con miembros de escalas distintas. A este respecto nos centraremos en el análisis de las formas pronominales objeto de nuestro estudio. *Henry IV, Part I* constituye una muestra soberbia de las enormes posibilidades que en los planos lingüístico, literario, comunicativo y sociológico mostraba la dualidad pronominal *you* y *thou* a fines del siglo XVI. El compañerismo, el amor, la intriga, el odio, el respeto y tantos otros aspectos de las relaciones humanas desarrollaban sus formulaciones retóricas y expresivas alternando el empleo de ambos pronombres de una manera bastante sutil y compleja que, pensamos, enriquecía notablemente la naturaleza fáctica del idioma inglés. Shakespeare no era sólo un maestro en la descripción de tipos y comportamientos humanos, sino que también dominaba las claves del potencial social y jerarquizador del lenguaje y, por supuesto, de su manifestación en el discurso de los personajes por medio de *you* y *thou*. El estudio que pre-

sentamos a continuación trata de resumir las diversas posibilidades discursivas de ambos pronombres en *Henry IV, Part I* desde una aproximación lingüístico-social.

Entre los principales usuarios de la forma *thou* tenemos a:

1. El rey dirigiéndose a sus nobles, como muestra de su prepotencia, incluso sobre su propio hijo, el cual le responde con el *you* de respeto y sumisión:

> *King Henry:* . . .
> He hath more worthy interest to the state,
> Than thou the shadow of succession.
> . . .
> *Prince Hal:* Do not think so; you shall not find it so . . .
> . . .
> And in the closing of some glorious day,
> Be bold to tell you that I am your son . . .
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 3.2)

> *King Henry:* Thou dost belie him, Percy, thou dost belie him . . .
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 1.3)

2. Personajes de la nobleza o burguesía unidos por lazos de amistad o camaradería. Curiosamente, en la mayoría de actos de habla de este grupo, la camaradería parece primar sobre otros conceptos más elevados como el respeto a la dignidad real. Así, Falstaff nunca se dirige a Hal, príncipe heredero, con el protocolario *you* de respeto, sino con el *thou* del amigo y camarada de francachelas que, a veces, reviste de tintes irónicos e incluso irrespetuosos:

> *Prince Hal:* Thou art so fat-witted with drinking of old sack . . . that thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know. . . .
> *Falstaff:* . . . And, I prithee, sweet wag, when thou art king, —as, God save thy grace, (majesty, I should say, for grace thou wilt have none,)—
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 1.2)

3. Entre nobles de la misma facción política, como reafirmación de camaradería:

> *Hotspur* [hijo del Earl of Northumberland]:
> O Douglas! Hadst thou fought at Holmedon thus,
> I never had triumphed upon a Scot.
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 5.3)

4. Entre sirvientes o miembros de la nobleza o clase baja al dirigirse a plebeyos, en este último caso como manifestación de su superior lugar en la estructura jerárquica de la sociedad que les hace detentadores de esa prerrogativa lingüística.

> *Gadshill:* I prithee, lend me thy lantern, to see my gelding in the stable.
> . . .
> *Second carrier:* . . . Lend me the lantern, quoth he! —marry, I'll see thee hanged first.
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 2.1)

> *Prince Hal:* How now, my lady the hostess! what sayest thou to me!
> *Hostess:* Marry, my lord, there is a nobleman of the court at door would speak with you: he says he comes from your father.
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 2.4)

5. En la expresión de las emociones y de los sentimientos. *Thou* se prefiere en aquellos enunciados y actos de habla portadores de intensa carga emotiva, desplazando en esos momentos al más convencional *you*. Veamos a continuación los usos más característicos de esta forma pronominal:

5.1. Irritación entre nobles:

> *Glendower:* Why, I can teach thee, cousin, to command the devil.
> *Hotspur:* And I can teach thee, coz, to shame the devil . . .
> . . .
> If thou have power to raise him, bring him hither.
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 3.1)

5.2. Insultos entre nobles, rebajando así su nivel de estima social:

> *Prince Hal:* . . . Why, thou clay-brained guts, thou knotty-patted fool, thou whoreson, obscene, greasy tallow-keech,—
> *Falstaff:* What, art thou mad? art thou mad?
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 2.4)

5.3. Odio entre enemigos, aunque uno de ellos sea el propio rey:

> *King Henry:* . . .
> But, seeing thou fall'st on me so luckily,
> I will assay thee: so, defend thyself.
> *Douglas:* . . .

And yet, in faith thou bear'st thee like a king:
But mine I am sure thou art, whoe'er thou be,
And thus I win thee.

(*1 Henry IV* 5.4)

5.4 El afecto halla su expresión más conmovedora con el uso de *thou:*

Prince Hal: By Heaven, thou hast deceiv'd me, Lancaster;
I did not think thee lord of such a spirit:
Before, I lov'd thee as a brother, John;
But now, I do respect thee as my soul.

(*1 Henry IV* 5.4)

5.5. El amor como sentimiento prefiere *thou,* aunque como símbolo de la subordinación conyugal de la esposa se utilice *you.* Hotspur sabe manipular el lenguaje dirigiéndose a su esposa con *thou* cuando quiere halagarla o fingir que la desprecia, pero recurriendo al *you* impositivo y autoritario cuando encuentra cierta oposición a su voluntad. Lady Hotspur suele emplear un sumiso *you* cuando apela a su esposo. *Thou* es el vehículo de la expresión más intensa de su amor hacia el esposo, quien, curiosamente en estos momentos, no le presta atención:

Lady Percy: . . .
Tell me, sweet lord, what is it that takes from thee
Thy stomach, pleasure, and thy golden sleep?
. . .
But hear you, my lord.
Hotspur: What say'st thou, my lady?
Lady Percy: What is it carries you away?

(*1 Henry IV* 2.3)

Hotspur: Away,
Away, thou trifler! —Love? —I love thee not,
I care not for thee, Kate . . .
. . .
What say'st thou, Kate
Lady Percy: Do you not love me? . . .
Well, do not, then; for since you love me not,
I will not love myself. Do you not love me?
Nay, tell me if you speak in jest or no.
Hotspur: Come, wilt thou see me ride?

And when I am on horseback I will swear
I love thee infinitely. But hark you, Kate,
I must not have you henceforth question me
Whither I go, nor reason whereabout;
Whither I must, I must. . .

(*1 Henry IV* 2.3)

You, como vehículo de tratamiento cortés, se utiliza en aquellas situaciones discursivas y momentos dramáticos elevados o altamente retóricos y en las relaciones de subordinación del inferior al superior, aunque Shakespeare, maestro en el dominio del lenguaje y las situaciones humanas, lo utiliza a veces de forma inesperada en ciertos contextos y enunciados en los que normalmente se debería utilizar *thou.* Se intenta llamar la atención del lector o espectador, empleando un pronombre cuando la norma social elegiría el otro. Entre los usos más destacados de *you* entresacamos los siguientes:

1. De inferior a superior: esposa a esposo, criado a señor, noble o príncipe a rey, etc. Sería su uso más característico y el que fijó, desde una perspectiva discursiva y sociológica, la tendencia que desplazó, de forma paulatina e inexorable, a *thou* de la mayoría de los intercambios comunicativos.

2. Monólogos retóricos que por su elevada carga literaria y social requieren el empleo de la forma pronominal más enaltecedora.

3. Entre nobles de bandos opuestos como expresión de distanciamiento, opuesto a la expresión de camaradería que mencionamos con anterioridad:

Blunt: I come with gracious offers from the King,
If you vouchsafe me hearing and respect.
Hotspur: Welcome, Sir Walter Blunt; and would to God
You were of our determination!
Some of us love you well . . .

(*1 Henry IV* 4.3)

4. Entre nobles con ironía o agresividad verbal en contextos en los que *thou* sería más usual:

Falstaff: Hear ye, Yedward; if I tarry at home and go not, I'll hang you for going.
Poins: You will, chops?

(*1 Henry IV* 1.2)

5. Insultos con ese objetivo de alterar la norma social y lingüística mencionada, pues el insulto, como expresión última de una emoción, requeriría el empleo de *thou:*

> *Falstaff:* Away, you starveling, you elf-skin, you dried neat's tongue, bull's pizzle, you stock-fish . . .
>
> (*1 Henry IV* 2.4)

Las enormes posibilidades literarias que representaba la existencia de dos formas pronominales de segunda persona quedan de manifiesto, para cualquier lector que profundice en ello, en la riqueza de matices y sugerencias que su uso conllevaba. Toda suerte de relaciones e implicaciones sociales, de expresión de estados emotivos o de rastros irónicos, burlescos o humorísticos quedaban expresados en esta dicotomía de pronombres que, por desgracia para la lengua inglesa, fue diluyéndose con el discurrir del tiempo hasta llegar a su desaparición actual.

B) *SONS AND LOVERS*

Existen todavía en nuestro siglos autores que han recurrido a la expresividad de estos dos pronombres y han rescatado su uso en sus obras. Uno de ellos es D. H. Lawrence, de cuya obra de creación literaria hemos seleccionado la novela autobiográfica *Sons and Lovers.* Su esfuerzo no ha residido en revivir formas caducas y obsoletas en el inglés estándar sino rescatarlas de aquellas parcelas lingüísticas y sociales donde su uso era todavía vivo y trasladarlas a sus páginas. Lawrence recurre a usos dialectales para representar con mayor realismo el primitivismo y emotividad de algunos de sus personajes. Contrapone en su novela el habla dialectal del minero Morel al discurso estandarizado de su esposa. El dialecto es expresión de la ternura, el sentimiento, el apego a las raíces, mientras que el estándar surge de la norma y la convención social imperante. Norman Page escribe al respecto: «Lawrence uses dialect, that is, not primarily for local colour and social contrast, but to distinguish the language of intimacy from that of more formal or commonplace relationships» (1973: 72). En *Sons and Lovers,* Morel es el único personaje principal que utiliza variedades discursivas dialectales y que es consciente del viejo uso que marcaba la distinción entre *you* y *thou.* Su habla es una continuación de la tradición del siglo XVII y conoce toda la carga irónica y social que su empleo implica:

> Authority was hateful to him, therefore he could only abuse the pit-managers. He would say, in the Palmerston:
> 'Th gaffer comes down to our stall this morning, an' 'e says «you know, Walter, this 'ere'll not do. What about these props?» An' I says to him, «Why, what art* talkin' about? What d'st* mean about th' props?» «It'll never do, this 'ere,» 'e says, «you'll be havin' th' roof in, one o'these days.» An' I says, «Tha'd better stan' on a bit o'clunch, then, an' hold it up wi' thy 'ead.» So'e wor* that mad 'e crossed an' 'e swore, an' t'other chaps they did laugh.
> Morel was a good mimic. He imitated the manager's fat, squeaky voice with its attempt at good English.[8]

La diferente extracción social entre un miembro de la clase baja, Walter Morel, y una representante de la clase media, su futura esposa Gertrude, queda marcada en la dicotomía discursiva dialectal / estándar en el momento en que ambos se conocen durante el transcurso de un baile y él la invita a bailar:

> «Now do come and have one wi' me» he said caressively; «it's easy, you know, I'm pining to see you dance. (*Sons and Lovers* 18)

El cortés *you* cambia a *thou* según van intimando:

> «Tha niver sen such a way they get in. But that mun let me ta'e thee down some time, an' tha can see for thysel.» She had never been «thee'd» and «thou'd» before. (*Sons and Lovers* 19)

Una innovación dialéctica propia del siglo la encontramos en el cariz desafiante que Morel impone a su dialecto, indicativo de clase y utilizado como un arma discursiva, cuando habla con un pastor anglicano:

> He nodded a «How d'yer do» to the clergyman, who rose to shake hands with him. «Nay,» said Morel, showing his hand, «look thee at it! tha niver wants ter shake hands wi' a hand like that, does ter?» The minister flushed with confusion, and sat down again.
> «Are you tired?» asked the clergyman.
> «Tired?» replied Morel. «**You** don't know waht it is to be tired, as I'm tired.» (*Sons and Lovers* 47)

El uso de *you,* en negrita en el original, tiene un valor enfático y desafiador.

La expresión de las emociones encuentra un vehículo idóneo en el empleo de *thou* y de sus variantes dialectales. El enunciado del personaje establece, así,

un equilibrado mecanismo interactivo y transmisor entre el acto locucionario, el ilocucionario y el efecto perlocucionario que se pretende alcanzar en el oyente. La irritación y el afecto encuentran en estos actos de habla un cauce justo:

1. Irritación:

> «What, are thee there!» he said boisterously. «Sluther off an' let me wash mysen» (*Sons and Lovers* 22)

2. Afecto:

> «Ha! I can an' a', tha mucky little 'ussy.» (*Sons and Lovers* 28)
> «I've brought thee a cup o'tea, lass,» he said. «Drink it up; it'll pop thee to sleep again.» (*Sons and Lovers* 39)

Finalmente, en un estado de alta carga emocional, la muerte de Mrs Morel, Walter Morel se aferra al dialecto para hablar con su hijo Paul quien, por el contrario, utiliza el estándar:

> «I thought tha wor niver comin' lad.» «I didn't think you'd sit up,» said Paul. (*Sons and Lovers* 486)

Ambas variedades pronominales y discursivas reflejan de una manera admirable esa calidad expresiva del lenguaje humano mediante la cual somos capaces de mostrar sentimientos y afecto sin necesidad de mencionar expresamente esas palabras.

A modo de resumen y para cerrar este breve análisis de los usos discursivos de *thou* y *you* en dos textos literarios distintos, queremos destacar las posibilidades que ofrece la pragmática en el conocimiento de unos fenómenos concretos del lenguaje. En el caso concreto que nos ocupa, nos ha servido para ofrecer una amplia perspectiva, desde diversas áreas de interés, de la evolución y caracterización de los pronombres ingleses de segunda persona, así como de la riqueza de sus usos y matices discursivos.

NOTAS

1. Nos referimos a todas aquellas que bajo la denominación de análisis del discurso, lingüística textual, teoría de los actos de habla, etc., se agrupan en el paradigma lingüístico más innovador e influyente de las últimas décadas: la pragmática. Este paradigma centra el objeto de sus estudio en el análisis de la lengua como un hecho de comunicación discursiva y de interacción social entre unos interlocutores determinados en un contexto determinado.

2. Esta teoría fue esbozada y desarrollada por los filósofos del lenguaje Austin, Searle y Hymes, constituyendo un jalón de capital importancia para la comprensión de los procesos discursivos y comunicativos que se dan en la interacción verbal humana. Significó, además, un impulso definitivo en el desarrollo de la pragmática al ofrecer un sesgo más empírico a los fundamentos filosóficos y semióticos de Peirce y Morris.

3. Este esquema está basado en los desarrollados por B. Strang (1970: 262), Juan de la Cruz (1983: 229) y F. Fernández (1982: 308).

4. El primer ejemplo lo cita Hussey (1982: 120).

5. Se preserva en las diferentes ediciones de la Biblia, como por ejemplo en *The Authorized Version of the Bible* y en todo tipo de oraciones y plegarias. Veamos el inicio del Padrenuestro: «Our Father who art in Heaven, hallowed be thy name...», etc.

6. Es interesante citar al respecto el trabajo sobre John Wallis publicado por J. A. Kemp (1972).

7. La forma *ye*, aunque no tan empleada como *you*, se presenta, sin embargo, en algunos diálogos de manera dominante. Su número es proporcionalmente escaso en relación con las demás formas y suele aparecer con su función original de nominativo o sujeto en plural: «*Falstaff*: Hang ye, gorbellied knaves, are ye undone? No, ye fat chuffs; I would your store were here! On, bacons, on! Whay, ye knaves! young men must live. You are grandjurors, are ye? We'll jure ye, i'faith!» (*1 Henry IV* 2.2).

8. *Sons and Lovers* 26. Los asteriscos muestran las variantes dialectales: «dost» y «art» se corresponden con la segunda persona del singular del presente según se conjugaba en el siglo XVII, es decir: *thou art / dost*. «Tha» y «wor» son, respectivamente, variantes dialectales de *thou* y *was*.

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COLISIONES TERMINOLÓGICAS

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La moda rige nuestro modo de pensar en mucha mayor medida de lo que nos gusta reconocer y esta puede ser, tal vez, la causa última de que, en ciertas disciplinas humanísticas, no prestemos demasiada atención a los problemas terminológicos; concretamente, en el campo de la Filología Inglesa, son los profesionales que trabajan en ESP (inglés para fines específicos) quienes más fieles han sido al interés por la consistencia terminológica, sin duda por la influencia de las llamadas «ciencias duras».

Un tratamiento exhaustivo de los problemas terminológicos que se presentan en las Humanidades y, en concreto a la Lingüística y a la Crítica Literaria, resulta misión poco menos que imposible, por lo que examinaremos únicamente ciertos aspectos de incidencia pedagógica.

Cuando nos tropezamos con una nueva palabra —tanto si es un término especializado como si no— nuestra primera reacción intuitiva es la de imaginar que existe alguna entidad en el mundo exterior que puede tomarse como referente de tal palabra. Es decir, pensamos en un conjunto de posibles referentes con su propia e independiente existencia.

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Este es ciertamente el caso cuando el vocabulario se relaciona con objetos materiales concretos. Sin embargo, como sabemos por experiencia, los problemas empiezan a surgir al tratarse de significados no materiales o abstractos del

tipo «amor « o «democracia». Raras veces nos damos cuenta del todo de hasta qué punto los *signifiés* son creados al incorporarse en nuestro vocabulario un *signifiant*, tanto en el lenguaje cotidiano como en el lenguaje más especializado o en jergas restringidas.

El encontrar una palabra apropiada para un cierto «estado de cosas» implica con frecuencia descubrir un fenómeno, propiedad, suceso, etc. que hasta entonces había permanecido como algo desconocido u oscuro.

Si buscamos la palabra *term* en el *Concise Oxford Dictionary* (ed. 1969) leemos: «Word used to express a definite conception esp. in particular branch of study etc. as technical, scientific, legal terms.» Al buscar luego *conception*, el diccionario nos remite a «idea» como significado, señalando con ello existencia mental más que existencia en el mundo exterior. Aun las palabras que denotan entidades materiales son difíciles de precisar. Recordemos el ejemplo clásico de «edificios de residencia». Se pueden establecer fronteras claras entre casos extremos como «palacio»y «choza», pero los ejemplos intermedios (mansión, villa...) no son fáciles de distinguir unos de otros. Si esto sucede con ejemplares concretos, resulta evidente la dificultad de establecer claros límites en el caso de conceptos abstractos.

Pese a los obstáculos teóricos, los hablantes ordinarios poseen un considerable ingenio para la interpretación de palabras. Clark y Guerrik (1983) mencionan la instrucción «please do a Napoleon for the camera» interpretada como la acción de posar con una mano introducida en la chaqueta, igual que aparece en la mayoría de los retratos de Napoleón. El reconocimiento de los significados de las palabras se realiza mediante la identificación de prototipos —los ejemplares más centrales de una clase— en un proceso de emparejar los significados evocados con los prototipos hasta que alcanzan un grado apropiado de aproximación.

Esta estrategia interpretativa se extiende igualmente a la *terminología* de una determinada disciplina, consistente en términos acuñados deliberadamente bien a partir de raíces greco-latinas o vernáculas, o bien tomados del lenguaje cotidiano tras sufrir un proceso de restricción semántica, siendo conocidos entonces como «subtécnicos».

Un amplio número de términos en los ámbitos de la Lingüística y la Crítica Literaria se corresponden con palabras del lenguaje ordinario que adquieren así un uso metalingüístico básico. «Metalingüístico» significa «lenguaje para hablar sobre el lenguaje», como indica Rey Debové: «metalinguistique, c'est-à-dire destinés à parler du langage. Par example: adjectif, déclinaison, illisible, dire, gramaticalement» (1981:26). Los términos metalingüísticos tienen una influencia decisiva en la formación de conceptos y en el desarrollo

intelectual en su conjunto. A este respecto, Olson y Astington describen expresivamente el papel de un tipo de tales palabras metalingüísticas (los verbos ilocutivos), comentario que puede hacerse extensivo a cualquier repertorio de este tipo de palabras: «they are verbs which are reflexive and metarepresentational, suitable for talking about talk and thought. They are, therefore, *words for thinking with*» (Olson y Astington 1990: 717; cursiva añadida).

La operación reflexiva de pensar y hablar sobre el lenguaje parece deberse, sobre todo, al resultado de la habilidad lectora y a la educación. Aunque la situación parezca impensable en el llamado Primer Mundo, Luria (1976) menciona casos de hablantes que carecen de la habilidad de reconocer textos en cuanto a textos, mostrando así su incompetencia para el análisis metalingüístico.

En el extremo opuesto, la atmósfera de sofisticación intelectual que rodea la vida académica en los países desarrollados conduce a una situación completamente distinta , comentar textos , que comentan textos, que comentan textos ... operación que conlleva, como consecuencia, el juego de palabras y el verbalismo. Estos riesgos son los que denuncia Regnier como rémoras de cierto tipo de trabajo intelectual: «Une conception du travail intellectuel qui règne dans certains ensegnements conduit ceux qui les suivent à sombrer dans le verbalisme» (Regnier 1974:360). Según el DRAE (ed. 1970), *verbalismo* significa «propensión a fundar el razonamiento más en las palabras que en los conceptos.» El efecto perverso del verbalismo no es que oculte la verdad, sino que confunde al oyente/lector y sus consecuencias son semejantes a las medias verdades. Atchinson menciona un divertido ejemplo de media verdad (o media mentira, según se mire) que produce un efecto de equívoco más que de engaño:

> Schemallovitz is invited to dinner at his boss's house. After a dismal evening enjoyed by no one, Schmallovitz says to his hostess «...thanks, it was a terrific party.» (Atchinson 1987: 57)

¿Es este comentario, apropiado pero inexacto, una mentira en el sentido habitual de la palabra? El verbalismo en cierto modo tiene un efecto perturbador al exigir excesiva atención a la forma en detrimento del contenido. Esta atención intensa hacia la forma es característica de la lectura de poesía, pero es un inconveniente en el estilo (o variedad) científico, al que se presupone transparencia. Consiguientemente, lo que constituye dificultad de percepción del texto, por un lado, y apresamiento en las redes del texto, por otro, forman extremos de una escala, con toda clase de peldaños intermedios y que sustancialmente están ligados al grado de educación formal y, el segundo, a la familiaridad con el uso metalingüístico.

Además, en todos los ámbitos especializados, los términos técnicos ejercen un influjo singular en el lector hasta el punto de que, según señala Ignacio Vázquez, se corre el peligro de descuidar otros rasgos lingüísticos, en particular los que estructuran y organizan el discurso:

> Some students who have developed a special awareness of technical terms will spot them at once in a text and tend to base their interpretation on the degree of frequency of a particular term often disregarding the syntactic and attitudinal markers which provide the key to the author's standpoint towards the concept and its practical implications. . . their oversensivity to technical concepts makes them overlook other clues to the text's full meaning. (Vázquez 1990:25)

Esta atracción hacia los términos técnicos está, sin duda, fundada en la consideración de un determinado saber como ciencia, lo que, desde una perspectiva social llamaríamos alcanzar la plena respetabilidad científica.

La terminología, en la era del tratamiento informático de textos ha llegado a adquirir en sí misma un estatus científico y se ha desarrollado una teoría de la terminología que Sager identifica en tres dimensiones:

> - a cognitive one which relates the linguistic forms to the conceptual content, i.e. the referents in the real world,
> - a linguistic one which examines the existing and potential forms of the representations of terminologies,
> - a communicative one which looks at the use of terminologies and has to justify the human activity of terminology compilation and processing. (Sager 1990:13)

Junto a los complejos y versátiles sistemas de codificación terminológica, comprobamos que el ámbito conceptual permanece borroso por la idiosincrasia de los procesos de formación de conceptos, como nos recuerda David Palermo: «The nature of the rules that establish the structure of a concept is difficult to specify because the rules form a part of the tacit knowledge of the conceptualizer» (1982:337). En el uso ordinario del lenguaje, los hablantes muestran opiniones ampliamente divergentes sobre los rasgos que caracterizan un determinado concepto, no obstante lo cual las actitudes o prejuicios evocados resultan sorprendentemente coincidentes. Livingston hace al respecto un interesante comentario sobre el término (y concepto subyacente) *socialismo:*

> The wonderful thing about the lack of consensus as to the extension of the concept *socialism* and the lack of precision in the expression of a definition for the term is often associated with very definite attitudes and feeling about which many people can say a great deal, in spite of their inability to give a clear definition. (Livingston 1982:434)

En resumen, podríamos decir que los términos, en particular los llamados técnicos o subtécnicos, sea cual fuere su definición de diccionario, están, de un lado, investidos de un alto rango o prestancia léxica hasta oscurecer en algún caso ciertos aspectos igualmente pertinentes en los textos científicos; de otro, el abanico de significados es también más convencional y restringido que el de las palabras en lenguaje ordinario.

Las piezas léxicas del lenguaje ordinario, en líneas generales, están insertas en las comunidades de hablantes, mientras que los términos técnicos son el resultado de un acuerdo entre un número limitado de científicos o incluso han sido acuñados por un solo individuo.

En las llamadas «ciencias duras» los términos son, al menos, a) semánticamente transparentes una vez conocida la etimología, e.g. *anfibio* tiene el significado de animal que vive en dos elementos, tierra y agua, y b) usados consistentemente por todos los miembros de una determinada comunidad científica.

En el campo de las humanidades, sin embargo, las cosas no están tan claras. Si bien existe un amplio consenso sobre un conjunto de términos de significado transparente y uso regular como *preposición* o *catarsis,* también apreciamos una falta de acuerdo sobre términos clave. Tal puede ser el caso de términos absolutamente centrales como *literatura* o *tragedia.*

La vaguedad o indefinición terminológica no son, a mi juicio, los aspectos más peligrosos de este estado de cosas. Lo que me parece más perturbador es la resistencia psicológica a reconocer el origen convencional de los términos y el uso divergente en disciplinas muy próximas, divergencias que son auténtica piedra de escándalo entre los estudiantes que se enfrentan con ciertas disciplinas con algún nivel de profundidad.

Un ejemplo muy típico de la primera situación es la larga y hasta el momento infructuosa búsqueda de rasgos universales definitorios que marquen, inambiguamente, conceptos como *poesía* o *cultura,* ya que ambos son conceptos dependientes del contexto histórico y social, de suerte que las definiciones universales y estables resultan imposibles.

El segundo caso resulta evidente si observamos dos campos vecinos de nuestras disciplinas: la gramática y la crítica literaria, metalenguajes de la lengua y la literatura, respectivamente. En glosarios y enciclopedias de divulgación general (Abrams 1986, Crystal 1987, Fowler 1987 entre otros) hallaremos

abundantes ejemplos de uso divergente en una y otra disciplina e incluso, nada infrecuentemente, dentro de una misma disciplina. Es innegable, sin embargo, el esfuerzo realizado en la búsqueda de un mínimo común denominador terminológico sobre todo desde la revitalización de los estudios comparativos (Lehman 1989: 133 y ss).

Con todo, las discrepancias terminológicas son un obstáculo para la plena virtualidad de la dimensión educativa que, casi sin excepción, se atribuye a las Humanidades. El problema no tiene fácil solución ya que la terminología ejerce una gran fascinación como emblema de identidad de escuelas y, juntamente con ello, la dimensión educativa se refuerza con el paso del tiempo. Precisamente la intersección entre lo literario y lo lingüístico, la retórica, adquiere hoy un nuevo dinamismo en virtud de la ubicuidad de los mensajes, difundidos a una escala jamás conocida hasta nuestros días. Retórica que, a su vez, se complica con la fusión de elementos icónicos en los textos y el efecto multiplicador de los grandes medios de masas (Vázquez y Aldea 1991).

En este sentido, y en un tiempo en que cada vez es más necesario comprender la estructura y función del mensaje lingüístico, la inconsistencia terminológica actúa como elemento disuasorio del interés de los jóvenes en las asignaturas metalingüísticas. Algunos hechos de sentido común pueden, a pesar de todo, ayudar a remontar las desventajas que tal inconsistencia conlleva. Hay que señalar que, de hecho, la terminología tradicional funciona como metalenguaje de los metalenguajes crítico y gramatical y por lo tanto, la familiaridad con dicha terminología proporciona un punto de vista privilegiado. Es también útil recordar que, de momento, es preciso acostumbrarse a convivir con la ambigüedad. De modo que no tiene sentido preguntarse cuál es el *auténtico* significado de X, sino más bien qué significa X en el contexto Y del autor Z. Además es conveniente no perder de vista la radical indeterminación de los términos sin referentes concretos, de modo que aun en las «ciencias duras», los conceptos básicos como vida, materia o inteligencia, son el resultado de acuerdos de la comunidad científica más que de propiedades inherentes e inmutables. Basta recordar el ejemplo de *inteligencia artificial* para apreciar cómo han variado las propiedades vitales asociadas con la inteligencia, que siempre se había predicado de hombres, ángeles o seres divinos.

Sin embargo, las ciencias desarrollan un conjunto de términos operativos que usan regularmente en la descripción de principios, procesos o elementos, sin que importen demasiado las cuestiones etimológicas u ontológicas. Cuanto mayor es la responsabilidad social de una ciencia mayor es su esfuerzo por usar una colección de términos coherente. ¿Podría alguien imaginar el que las enfermedades o los elementos químicos tuvieran distintos nombres en distintas

comunidades científicas? Ya son bastante graves los problemas del vocabulario subtécnico, como se observa, por ejemplo en la Veterinaria.

Si la inconsistencia terminológica, por un lado, y la tendencia al verbalismo, por otro, no se contrarrestan de algún modo, la crítica literaria y la lingüística perderán poco a poco su valor educativo. En las Enseñanzas Medias se nota la falta de sensibilidad hacia los modos de expresión a expensas de un pseudo cientifismo favorecido por una inclusión, fragmentaria y tardía, en los programas de unos modelos de descripción gramatical que nunca tuvieron la menor pretensión pedagógica. Otros alumnos serán incapaces, de por vida, de gozar con la dimensión lúdica de la literatura.

En la medida en que nos sintamos responsables de la educación de la juventud, nuestros términos deberían desvelar, no ocultar, la riqueza del lenguaje en acción.

NOTA

Una primera versión de este trabajo fue presentada como comunicación en el Seminario Susanne Hübner «Terminología de Uso Común en las Ciencias del Lenguaje, Crítica Literaria y Estudios Socio-Culturales», organizado por el Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana de la Universidad de Zaragoza, del 30 de enero al 1 de febrero de 1991.

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CLAUSAL AND COHESIVE TEXT-FORMING DEVICES IN SHAKESPEARE'S *SONNET 20*

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0. INTRODUCTION

This paper basically follows Halliday's studies of linguistic cohesion and discourse where he distinguishes between the functions of Theme and Rheme, and Given and New, on the one hand, and those contributing to cohesion, on the other, in the creation of meaningful discourse, so valuable in the study and criticism of texts.

We shall concentrate upon the linguistic cohesion of the poem as the main contribution to its texture and a vehicle for the conveyance of its immediate meaning, which is closely related to the main pragmatic functions performed by the sonnet's participants. None the less, we believe that an entire previous section must be devoted both to the thematic and to the information structures as they make themselves felt in the underlying linguistic events embodied in the sonnet's clause structures. For both Theme and Information (Focus), structural concepts as they are, speak volumes for the semantic processes and their potentiality to be foregrounded and intentionally or unconsciously actualized during the composition of the poem. Moreover, it is the rhetorical combination of their respective deliberate lay-outs that largely makes the poem communicate to us a quality of clause-internal texture which, together with that provided by

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the various cohesive devices, constitute the nature of its discourse style. Without this kind of texture cohesion would only signal a partial framework in which semantic textual relations would occur without hardly serving any meaningful purpose of poetic coherence. Moreover, this purpose, upon which the poem hinges as such, is not only intimated but also directly created in part by structural patternings. Among these, we have selected especially Theme and Information for their value in enlightening us as to the poem's flow of discourse, since this paper is not an attempt at analysing and interpreting all aspects of the sonnet but rather at rendering some obscure discourse processes observable.

As regards the process of cohesion, techniques such as reference, ellipsis (substitution as a form of ellipsis being absent from the poem altogether), conjunction and lexical cohesion will be examined, and non-structural relations both within and beyond the clause will be referred to.

The appendix shows the complete text under examination.

1. THEME AND INFORMATION AS STRUCTURAL TEXT-FORMING DEVICES

Although both are communicatively prominent, the former is best thought of as a system inherent to the clause, and the latter as a particular dimension of meaning more or less neatly corresponding to the clause.

In order to become aware of how discourse is created as far as these two independent but interrelated systems go, we may wish to be aided by a deconstructed version of the poem[1] (see fig. 1), thus revealing the actual choices of Theme and Rheme made in the poem and the ways in which they come into play with the Given and the New information conveyed by the information focus employed, although this is more clearly seen in fig. 2.

Discourse, or the textual process, is developed clause by clause on the plane of Theme and Rheme since they are functions at clause level realized by the sequence of clause constituents. The deconstructed version of the poem shows us all the unmarked clause-theme patternings, i.e. the veritable ingredients of the poetic discourse we are presented with that take place before they become «marked» in black and white:

> We shall refer to the mapping or Theme on to Subject as the UNMARKED THEME of a declarative clause.... A theme that is something other than the Subject, in a declarative clause, we shall refer to as a MARKED THEME.... The «most marked» type of Theme in a declarative clause is ... a Complement... [which] is a nominal element which ... has the potentiality of being Subject; which has not been selected as Subject; and which nevertheless has been made thematic. Since it could have been Subject, and therefore *unmarked* Theme, there must be very good reason for making it a thematic Complement—it is being explicitly foregrounded as the Theme of the clause. (Halliday 1985: 45)

We make use of these definitions throughout. Given any passage of the poem, we can identify the corresponding *topical themes* embodying some of the semantic participants of the linguistic events under consideration by resorting to the deconstructed text.[2]

In this connection Downing's (1990) critical discussion of the meaning of *topic* in the early Halliday is crucial if we are not to confuse, e.g. *theme*, *topic* and *subject*. In her view *topic*, although a context-bound elusive notion, can be defined as «what the message is about» rather than the «initial constituent of a clause» so that it should not be confused with theme.[3]

> We shall ... refer to a «main participant» who will typically represent the current topic over a certain span, although not necessarily the topic of the larger discourse. And we shall find that this «main participant» is more often than not the Subject. (Downing 1990: 28)

Justifiably, Downing advocates Enkvist's suggestion that we «treat as initial elements (i.e. theme) every constituent from the beginning of a macrosyntagm up to and including the subject of its main clause,» to avoid the awkward identification between such different clause elements as adjuncts and subjects as topical themes, present in Halliday. What elements should correspond to topic then? Adjuncts, in her view, should not qualify for topical theme status; rather they make up a category of spatial, temporal or situational (realized by initial clauses) themes which set up *circumstantial frameworks*, in constrast with topical themes, which set up *individual frameworks* and with discourse themes (Halliday's continuative, conjunctive, vocative, modal, and relational «multiple themes» — see Downing 1990: 30, 31, 34), which set up *subjective frameworks*. Topical themes are then themes or parts of the theme which coincide with the topic, while discourse and circumstantial themes are not. But both individual and circumstantial frameworks are necessarily represented in all discourse, the subjective ones being optional.

Topical themes are seen in this light as (usually Subject) initial individual frameworks in which a participant in the discourse events is referred to, fronted objects and complements in marked cases acting as a «starting point for the ensuing clause,» identifying the main participant or expressing its attributes.

These remarks should be borne in mind as they will prove most relevant to our sonnet. As to circumstantial initiators, they «mark a spatial-temporal discourse span which holds until a new span is introduced» (Downing 1990: 37), unlike non-initiating circumstantial expressions, whose span, if they have one at all, is very restricted. Situational themes also set up circumstantial spans by means of V-ed and V-ing clauses; we will see to what extent this applies to our text. Downing's view, then, is that «unless the point of departure is a participant or a process, it [the initial element] almost certainly is not what the message is about» (1990: 43). Individual frameworks establish the topic, while circumstantial and situational frameworks orientate the reader through the text. Whether we follow Halliday strictly or we fully take into account Downing's alternative approach, it still holds that initial elements are important in that their complex relationship with the topic of the message is essential for the production of a given discourse structure.

In the figures we have used Halliday's notion of topical theme within the context of Downing's corrections.

In Fig. 1 each line encapsulates an event, and it also shows the Rheme, which in turn contains more participants. The procedure is one of isolating events first and then having topical themes mapped onto the Given, and rhemes onto the New elements, since, according to Halliday, *«other things being equal,* a speaker will choose the Theme form within what is Given and locate the focus . . . of the New, somewhere within the Rheme» (1985: 278; our italics). This enables us to observe how the structures parallel or contrast with the actual contextual conditions set up by the poem itself, and to draw conclusions about the stylistic effects achieved.

Thou hast a woman's face.
A woman's face is painted with nature's own hand.
Thou art the master-mistress of my passion.
Thou hast a woman's gentle heart.
A woman's gentle heart is not acquainted with change
Change shifts.
False woman is acquainted with change.
Change shifts.
Thou hast an eye more bright than women.
An eye is less false in rolling.
An eye gilds the object.
Thou art a man in hue.
All hues are in a man's controlling (or: *A man* controls all hues through a man's hues; or: *all hues that are in a man's hues* control [others]).

A man steal's men's eyes.
A man amazeth women's souls.
Thou wert first created for a woman.
Nature fell a-doting.
Nature wrought thee.
Nature defeated me of thee.
Nature made an addition.
Nature added nothing to my purpose.
Nature added one thing to thee.
Nature pricked thee out for women's pleasure.
I want thy love to be my love.
I want thy love's use to be the women's treasure.

Fig. 1. Events in the deconstructed poem (with removed cohesion and typical or natural —unmarked— thematic patterns, irrespective of actual options in the textual system). NB: italicized text: Topical theme; plain text: Rheme.

Informational and thematic patterns overlap in the abstracted form represented by Fig. 1 but do not necessarily do so in the poem. We have opted for a neutral version of the poem first so as to see in which way and why the poem departs form our version. Since, according to the Functional Sentence Perspective, Theme and Rheme imply speaker-oriented prominence, Given and New being listener-oriented, and considering that, typically, Theme is pragmatically initial in the clause and New takes nuclear or focal prominence at the end of information units (usually the clause), the analysis of the poem's thematic and information structures is as follows (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2 Text analysed for Theme and information.



A woman's gentle heart, ((but not acquainted



With shifting change,)) as is false woman's fashion));//



An eye more bright than theirs, less false in rolling,



((Gilding the object // whereupon it gazeth))));



A man in hue ((all hues in his controlling)),





((Which steals men's eyes)) ((and women's souls amazeth)). \



And for a woman wert thou first created, //



Till nature ((as she wrought thee)) fell a-doting,//



And by addition me of thee defeated, //\



By adding one thing // to my purpose nothing. /\



But since she pricked thee out for women's pleasure,//



Mine be thy love,// and thy love's use their treasure. /\



Notations:

//	clause boundary
(( ))	embedded —downranked— clause (in nominal group) or dependent clause
rh	rheme
ß	clause as topical Theme (in clause complex).
dis	discourse theme (structural, conjunctive...)
top	topical theme
cir	circumstantial (i.e. spatial, temporal, manner or situational) theme
/	theme in downranked clause
\	end of sentence

Some points must be made. *By addition* is classed, by analogy, as circumstantial theme marking a manner framework. The noun phrase *a woman's heart* is new information though it contains the given element *a woman* (anaphoric repetition); the whole syntactic unit (o) coincides with a generally new information unit. *False* in 1. 5 is contrastive with *bright,* so it must be considered part of the New, whose focus falls on *rolling* (suggested to mean an inconstant trait of women). *Women's* in *women's souls* can be considered Given by virtue of the lexical foregrounding of *woman's* before. *Wrought* in *wrought thee* is *un*marked focus because it is the last lexical element (i.e. accented) in the information unit. *Thee,* together with other phoric elements (*thou, it, me, thee)* is inherentely Given so that, following Halliday, we only indicate their givenness (if they are part of the New) when they are post-tonic. *Use* in *love's use* is selected by the speaker in the poem as *Given* because its sexual connotations are already conveyed by *one thing.*

We observe that some clauses in the sonnet exhibit marked themes with important instances of fronting or thematisation (see also fig. 3). All objects dependent on the subject *thou* of the first sentence, from 1. 1 down to 1. 8, occupy first position in alternate lines; in them the scope of new information of each event seems to be displaced to important points in the graphic structure of the poem (see fig. 1 & 2). Shakespeare seems particularly interested in foregrounding all lexical items vital to the theme of the poem and having them near the beginning, the caesura or end of lines, at least inthe first part (the first two quatrains). A case in point is the juxtaposition of *men's eyes* and *women's souls* on both sides of the caesura in 1. 8.

Marked themes are observable in clauses no. 1 (the object *face),* 2 (object *heart),* 3 (object *eye),* 4 (Cs *man),* 5 (A *for a woman),* 7 (A *by addition),* 8 (cl. *by adding one thing),* 9 (cl. *since she... pleasure),* as well as within the complex rheme of cl. 6 (cl. *as she wrought thee),* within the complex rheme of cl. 9 (A *mine),* in the first embedded clause within cl. 4 (O *all hues in his)* and in the third embedded clause within cl. 4 (O *women's souls).*

For further clarification of all the frontings and/or displacements in thematic or informational structural prominence, the syntactic orderings on next page should also be consulted together with the previous schemas.

1.1: *Od* (ed-cl (*AP*))
1.2: *P S* Cs[4]
1.3: Od (coor[5]- ed-cl (P
1.4: A) A (sub-*PS*))
1.5: Od[6]
1.6: (P-ing cl.[7] (P Od[8] rel- SP))
1.7: Cs[9] (*ing-cl* (SP) or: (SA)[10] or: (*Od P*))

1.8. (rel- P Od) -coor- (*Od P*) /
1.9. coor[11] *APop S A Plex*
1.10: A (sub - S (*A* (*sub-* (*S P Od*))) P
1.11: coor[12] - *A Od A P*)
1.12. A (*sub- P Od*) *Oi Od* [13]) /
1.13. coor[14] - A (*sub- S P Od A*)
1.14: *Cs P S* -coor- S Cs[15] /

Fig. 3. Meaningful choices in the sonnet affecting the «typical» combinations between Theme and Information[16] of Fig. 1 as reflected by clause structures (NB: ed-cl: *ed-* clause; ing-cl: *ing-* clause; coor: coordinator; sub: subordinator; rel: particle introducing a relative clause).

According to the figure, we find fronted elements at clause level in 1. 1 (fronted object), 1.4 (fronted—obligatory—P in sub. cl.), 1.7 (fronted Od in sub. cl.), 1.8 (fronted Od in the second coordinated element of the postmodification), 1.10 (fronted A realized by the second sub. cl. in the line), 1. 11 (fronted A and Od), and 1. 12 (fronted Oi) and 1. 14 (fronted Cs in the main clause). But we also find instances of fronted clauses —at the level of other clauses as well as at sentence level— in lines 1, 10, 12 (if we think it is a sentence) and 13. These are also underlined in the schema.

Yet another fundamental example of how thematisation affects the overall significance of the poem is the foregrounding of the Cs in 1. 7 into initial position for a surprising effect due to the defeated expectancy it helps to create —a break in the pattern established by the previous objects of *thou*. This is, in fact, new information coinciding with the theme of the object phrase of 1. 7 and 1. 8 as Fig. 2 illustrates. Indeed, it is safe to say that the complexity in syntactic structure of this sonnet (with the first sentence occupying two quatrains, the second sentence another quatrain and the third sentence the couplet[17]) is founded on the upset of the order Theme+Rheme, which is the typical sequence, and on the overlapping of thematic and new elements, since in many units there are no given elements at all. Thus we are constantly forced to focus on interpreting *new* elements which are *also* syntactically foregrounded. There are no marked types of informations structure, viz. a structure with Given material after the New, in which «any *accented matter* that follows the tonic foot is . . . Given» (Halliday 1985: 276, our italics); but a look at Fig. 2 shows that there are only 12 instances of Given and 24 of New information, as perhaps to be expected in a poetic text. This gives an idea of how the poet manipulates his verbal matter to hold our

attention by providing us with a very dense poem in terms of its information structure.

We have seen through the deconstructed poem how the two resources analysed in this section work together to create texture, a reflection of which is manifest in the poem. Deconstruction also helps towards pinpointing textual components of meaning (events), as is seen by the analysis of the semantic roles attached to the participants in each event:

1: SREC V ODAFF
2: SAFF V A
3: SAFF V CSCURR. ATTRIB.
4: V ODAFF
5: SREC V A
6: SAG V
7: SREC V A
8: SAG V
9: SREC V ODAFF
10: SAFF V CSCURR. ATTRIB.
11. SAG V OAFF
12: SAG V OAFF
13: SAFF V CSCURR. ATTRIB
14: SAFF V A (14a: SAG V OAFF; 14b: SAG V OAFF)
15: SAG V OAFF
16: SAG V OAFF
17: SAFF V A
18: SAFF V CS
19: SAG V OAFF
20: SAG V OAFF
21: SAG V OAFF
22: SAG V ODAFF OIREC
23: SAG V ODAFF OIREC
24: SAG V ODAFF OIREC
25: SAG V ODAFF
26: SAG V OAFF

Fig. 4. Semantic roles of participants.

We are now in a position to state that the most widely used pattern is one of transitivity with agentive subject and affected object (8 occurrences over

against a maximum 3 of the other patterns). This accounts for the dynamic description of *thou* (the poet's interlocutor) in relation to the other two main participants: *I* and *Nature*. But the main participants take, or are semantically related to, different forms with which they form cohesive participant chains.

Main participants	*Dependent participants*
Thou	A woman's face, a heart, an eye, all hues, a man, master-mistress, thee, one thing, thy love, thy love's use
I	Me, my purpose, my love (mine) Woman's fashion, souls, pleasure, shifting change, their treasure.
Nature	Addition, nature's hand.

2. COHESIVE DEVICES

2.1. Reference

Fig. 5 gives us a possible notation form (Halliday's) to indicate the way in which cohesion in the poem is established at the level of referential links that could be added to any other system of notation in the syntactic analysis of a text.



R:C = ref: comparative
R:D = ref: demonstrative
R:P = ref: personal
R:A = ref: article

← : anaphoric
→ : cataphoric
↑ : exophoric/homophoric

Fig. 5. Poem analysed for reference.

This system helps us discover the type of reference used, be it anaphoric (pointing backwards in the environment) or cataphoric (pointing forward). An item which is exophoric (pointing outward) sets up a semantic relation with an entity in the physical world outside the linguistic realm, such as *all* (1. 7) *thou* (l. 2) and its derivatives, and *me* (l. 11) and its derivatives (if we take this poem to be a monologue addressed by the author to one person in particular, say Mr W. Hughes[18]). It also indicates the word class to which an item belongs that makes reference to another one (comparative, demonstrative, personal reference items and reference designated by articles, both definite and indefinite). Whether they imply generic or specific reference could also be indicated, but this distinction is left out here, as all the articles in the poem are specific.

Not all reference items display the same degree of cohesiveness. All of them require that we look elsewhere in the text (or outside the text) to locate their referents, but in a coreference relationship two items are most cohesive when there is no previous structural relationship between them within the clause complex. In the sonnet, *my* (1. 2), *a* (l. 7), *she* (l. 13), *thee* (l. 13), *mine* (l. 14), and *me* (l. 11) are very cohesive.

Whereupon (l. 6), a blend of preposition and relative pronoun, functioning as relative pronoun, refers back to *object* (same line) and should be counted (like *which* —l. 8—) as a reference item even if Halliday does not mention relative pronouns in his discussion. *Which,* referring to *a man* (l. 7) as a personal relative pronoun like *who* would,[19] and *whereupon* can both be replaced by personal reference items such as *he* or *it* provided that two sentences were made from one.

Indefinite articles are also included, despite Halliday's omission, and grouped with definite articles even though they show no demonstrative potential, unlike *the*. In fact, they could be seen as indefinite demonstratives that introduce entities, after which a definite article could be used. In Halliday's example: «Algy met a bear. The bear was bulgy.» But we prefer to treat them together with definite articles because both are none the less specific in this and our case, and belong to the same class.

One is an indefinite numeral (also left out in Halliday's list) that does have sometimes a referential function as an emphasizer of *a(n)*. Here it refers back to the one addition made by nature that makes so much difference to the writer's «voice» (though it could also be dealt with as exophoric reference).

The comparative references by *more* and *less* (l. 5) establish a relationship of contrast rather than of co-reference through the terms of comparison they carry with them.

2.2 Ellipsis

A woman's gentle heart, but ( ) *not acquainted* (it is / one which is[20])
( ) *A man in hue, all hues in his controlling* (thou art)
Which steals men's eyes and ( ) *women's souls amazeth* (which)
By adding one thing ( ) *to my purpose* ( ) *nothing* (to thee; has been added)
Mine be thy love, and thy love's use ( ) *their treasure* (be)

E:C = ellipsis: clausal
E:V = ellipsis: verbal
E:N = ellipsis: nominal

Fig. 6. Lines analysed for ellipsis.

Fig. 6 shows those cases of ellipsis occurring in the poem. For the sake of brevity we have limited it to the lines with elliptical structures. On the right-hand side we find the presupposed items implicit in the cases of ellipsis, to be inserted within the empty brackets. It also gives us the type of ellipsis, whether the structure at issue implies presupposition of a whole clause, a verb phrase or a nominal group.

Ellipsis is included in our study since it contributes to the overall semantic structure, although, unlike reference, it does not set up semantic ties but structural ones. Substitution is usually examined here as well but in our poem there is not a single case except for *mine* (l. 14) perhaps, which is a combination of the possessive adjective (personal reference item) and the nominal substitute, yet it could also be treated as an elliptical form with the modifier (*my*) functioning as head and with tonic prominence in the tone group of the elliptical noun phrase (i.e. *thy love be MY love).*

Three types are identified. Clausal ellipsis can be yes/no ellipsis implying omission of the whole clause or of part of it, and also wh-ellipsis with the same two categories. This is tantamount to saying that the structure containing the ellipsis can be rephrased in a question-answer sequence typical of a dialogue:

A: What is thy heart like?
B: (Gentle but) (it is) not acquainted with shifting change

in e. g. l. 3. Under the label «implying the whole clause» we must understand the whole except «the item that is the response to the wh-element» (Halliday 1985: 299), i. e., the information-bearing element. The introduction of such a

sequence is no doubt of great importance for the retrieval of the presupposed item.

Here ellipsis in coordination by *but* of a repeated (or implied) subject in the second clause does not apply because the semantic relationship is not one in which the second conjoin restates affirmatively what has been said negatively in the first (Quirk 1985: 259). To be sure, this instance illustrates only a phenomenon of a very local effect, which does not enter into full cohesion. The clause is an elliptic non-finite participle clause that could be considered to contain ellipsis of the modal element of the verbal group. The subject and the appropriate form of *be* are elided. The subject is coreferential with that of the superordinate clause, which would be a presupposed «your heart is gentle» derived from the object of the verb *hast* (it = the heart), or the elliptical items could be *which is,* with *which* functioning as a pronoun for the head of the Od of the superordinate clause. But the subordinator *but* (rather than coordinator as pointed out: *but = though* here) is present and precludes the latter analysis, unless we postulate ellipsis of the substitute *one* (for *heart*), thus resulting in *but one which.*

Line 7 shows the residue of ellipsis of the modal element (thou hast). Line 8 presents a structural, not very cohesive example of ellipsis in which the subject of the introduced conjoin by *and* is omitted because it is coreferential with that of the first linked clause. In line 12, both parts are dependent on each other for the retrieval of the elliptical presupposed elements. The following correspondence could be made to locate the presupposition in the previous modal group: *one thing has been added to theee but nothing has been (added) to my purpose*. The missing words *to thee* can only be recovered by virtue of the context, more specifically the sense hinted at from l. 9 onwards, namely that although the poet's young friend has a body like a woman's, there is only one thing that distinguishes him from women, the object of the poet's desire. That thing, interpreted as the friend's sex organ, is then evoked by l. 12. The Oi of *adding* must then be the poet's interlocutor. The sequences (see lexical cohesion below) whose elements are interwoven into each other by their denotative meanings and which are established by *woman, created, wrought, nature, a-doting, addition, adding, thing,* make this clear and provide the source for missing information.

To thee is concluded to be this missing information as it constitutes the likeliest systemic opposition eligible for selection by the verb form *adding,* given the context of the poem. And this option is indeed structurally essential if we are to make any sense of the line, and in order that we may see the relation of *one thing* and *nothing* as one of contrast stemming from their respective, separate positions in the line. This is the main reason for its highly elliptical nature. This ellipsis is felt to be all the more cohesive for setting up a structural relation with

the semantic dimension on which the communicative process of the poem takes place, and also for helping properly construe through presupposition the other part of the structural parallelism established in the line: *to my purpose* and the ellipsis it contains (*has been added).* As Halliday puts it, a reference item signals that the meaning is recoverable, but here in the form that best suits the preceding clauses of the poem, which provide *thee* as the head of the missing phrase.

In l. 14 we see a verbal group with a structure that does not fully represent all its systemic features (finiteness, polarity, voice, and tense). It only consists of the bare form: a restricted type of clausal ellipsis. There is an ellipsis of the lexical verb and the operator. The elided verb is a special literary or archaic be-subjunctive with special ordering. The operator *may* (or the quasioperator, the catenative *want to)* is elided, but the real equivalence is X,Y = X be Y = may X be Y, or: X be Y = I want X to be Y. The verbal group can also be taken to be an imperative form (let X be Y), and therefore finite with nonfinite overtones. Finiteness also has to be explicit in verbal ellipsis. The same goes for voice. The elliptical «be» cannot repudiate the selection of voice carried over by the presupposed clause except when in operator ellipsis the agent/affected relationship is reversed, but this does not apply here as we are dealing with an intensive relation. In sum, only the elements that contrast with those in parallel structure are retained.

2.3. Conjunction

Conjunction does not play an important part in the cohesion of the poem. However, it is clear that what little there is belongs to the category of interpersonal or internal conjunction, in which the logical-semantic relations take place between messages (within the clause or beyond it) that are things said or arguments rather than things happening or processes related to experience.

There are only four instances of conjunctive cohesion (*buy* in l. 3, *as* in l. 4, *and* in l. 9, *and* in l. 11). Most join clauses within a clause complex, except for *and* in 1.9 (the most important cohesive conjunction), so the relation established is one of interdependency rather than one of conjunctive cohesion proper. All are various types of paratactic expansion except *as,* which is hypotactic. *But* sets up an adversative additive link: *as* is comparative; the first *and* signals positive addition between two clause complexes or sentence structures, and the final *and,* also additive, joins two paratactic clauses embedded in a superordinate one.

2.4. Lexical Cohesion

A woman's face, with nature's own hand *painted*,
S: Hyp / *created* [21]

Hast thou, the master-mistress of my *passion* -
coll: *master-mistress*
Mer: *love*

A *woman's* gentle heart, but not acquainted
Rep

With shifting change, as is false *woman's* fashion;
Rep

An eye more bright than theirs, less *false* in rolling,
Rep

Gilding the *object* whereupon it *gazeth;*
S: id/ *bright* S: Hyp/ *thing* Coll/ S: id/*eye*

A *man* in hue all *hues* in his controlling,
Ant: *woman* Rep

Which steals *men's eyes* and *women's* souls amazeth.
Rep Rep Rep

And for a *woman* wert *thou* first created,
Rep Rep

Till *nature* as she *wrought thee* fell *a-doting*,
Rep S: hyp/ Rep *created* S: mer: *love*

And by addition me of *thee* defeated,
Rep

By *adding* one *thing* to my purpose *nothing*.
Rep Coll: *use* Ant: *thing*

But since she *pricked thee* out for *women's pleasure*,
id: *thing* Rep Rep Coll: *master-mistress*

Mine be *thy love*, and *thy love's use* their treasure.
Rep Rep Coll: *master-mistress* Rep Rep Rep: *hues*

Coll: collocation
Rep: repetition
S: synonymy
S: id = identity of reference
S: hyp = hyponymy
S: mer = meronymy
S: ant = antonymy

Fig. 7. Poem analysed for lexical cohesion.

To further clarify figure 7, some comments are called for. *Nothing* is considered an antonym of *thing* due to the latter's sexual connotations in this poem.[22] Hence the fact that we shoud also read *nothing* as *no-thing* (i. e. vagina).

Passion is also a meronym of *love* if *passion* is not interpreted as aesthetic / spiritual attraction, a meaning not at all alien to its semantic range at least in the sense it acquires in the poem.

Gilding expresses the same reference as *bright* by virtue of its contextual relations with the culture of the Elizabethan age:

> Este magnetismo se presenta bajo la forma metafórica tradicional del renacimiento («Gilding the object whereupon it gazeth» v. 6) ya que, al igual que la luz del sol dora los objetos al incidir en ellos, se pensaba que los ojos emitían luz y, a la vez, se entendía que esta mirada confería belleza al objeto de su atención y eliminaba de éste toda imperfección. (MacCandless 1986: 262-3)

Use can be considered a repetition of *hues:*

> hay confusión en cuanto a la cuestión de la pronunciación u omisión de la /h/ inicial en *hue* y *hues*. Si se omitiera, podría resultar en equivalencias entre *hues* y *use*, éste último con conotaciones sexuales. (MacCanless 1986: 264)

Pricked evokes the same referent as *thing*, although it belongs to a different class, taking into account the overall context of the poem.

Repeated items are regarded as such even if they do not appear in the same identifiable form, e. g. *thou-thee, addition-adding*.

The superordinate of *gilding* would be, in this context, its synonym *brighten*, since *brighten* expresses a higher order of generality than *gilding*. There is identity of reference, though not to a participant, since both synonyms belong to different word classes.

The superordinate of *prick*, evoked by the verb *pricked*, is *thing*; the latter expresses more generality (here *thing* = that which hangs between a man's legs, whatever it may be; *prick* = male sex organ), although both could be regarded as strict synonyms with the same reference in the context of the poem.

A woman a and *man* (three times the former) are two examples of identification of participants in the discourse of the poem thanks to the reinforcement of lexical cohesion by means of indefinite reference (*a*). Thus two different ties coexist between these items in these instances of cohesion, although one is referential.

Hyponymy and meronymy are defined by Halliday thus: «Given a lexical set consisting of either hyponyms, where x, y and z are all 'kinds of' a, or meronyms, where p, q and r are all 'parts of' b, the occurrence of any pair of items within the set will be cohesive.» These are exemplified by *painted* and *wrought* as cohyponyms of *create*, or *a-doting* (to dote = to show a great deal of love and care, according to the CED) as comeronyms of *love*, though there is no clear line between meronymy and hyponymy with abstract terms; ours is a good example, since *doting* could also be «a part» of *love*.

Items that collocate, or collocates, tend to co-occur or to be found together in a more or less close association depending on the context. For example, *thing* collocates with *use* in typical sentences such as «what's the use of that thing» and the like.

Some items that present both collocation and synonymy are *passion, love* and *pleasure*, all three related to *master-mistress*. In this case there is a systematic semantic relationship, so there is a fairly weak cohesive effect, but in the case of *thing-use* there is a noticeable cohesive result.

Thus we have a series of interacting participant chains, including not only abstractions such as *love* or *pleasure*, or concrete interactants such as *men, women, thou, me*. . . but also processes such as *fall a-doting, gilding, gazing, pricking, adding*. There is no clear chain in which only processes supervene, but rather they mix with linguistic entities of quite a different nature to create heterogeneous chains. This mixing process, as pointed out by Halliday, is extremely cohesive. The interlocking that takes place between members of different chains forces us to slow down our reading and be more mindful of what it is that is going on in the poem, i. e. what the dynamics of the discourse we are unravelling consists in. In the above examples this is principally brought on by lexical verbs like *doting, gilding* in their cohesive overlapping with participants (*love, eye* . . .). Such complexes, together with the presence of two different cohesive phenomena in one item, serve the purpose of creating text.

CONCLUSIONS: TEXTURE AND COHERENCE

We have given an overview of those features that intermingle to create the cohesion of the sonnet, perceptible for a perspicacious reader, or, for that matter, to any reader that cares to read it a number of times. This would mean that all we have been doing to attain our goal in this paper (that is, deconstructing the sonnet and finding out the various linguistic resources deployed by the poet in his process of composition) would ultimately serve the purpose of highlighting the workings of an unconscious process (whereby a reader decodes such resources appropriately when he reads) so as to become fully aware of it. We, its recipients, need have resource to countless readings in search of textured sense. Thus it is, in the last analysis, a question of interpretation, not only of meaning but also of the artistic coherence or significance implicit in the author's personal way of manipulating textual processes, half intuitively, half consciously, to create meaningful discourse.

In this paper we have not taken account of the lexico-grammatical patterns that make for the overall structure of the utterances in the sonnet but rather have centred round its processes—both semantic and pragmatic—as they appear with a thematic-informational and a cohesive basis. We have also dealt in passing with their more strictly grammatical realization such as grammatical ellipsis or expansion within the clause. Likewise, it is obvious from the above analysis that reference and lexical cohesion (especially repetition, 5 instances, and synonymy, 9, over against collocation, 4) prove more instrumental than the other resources in furnishing the end-product with the required cohesive structure, as seems typical of poetic discourse as opposed to other types such as dialogue, or narrative-expository texts. Given the condensed nature of poetic information, and the higher semantic load found in poetic discourse, it is small wonder that ellipsis (itself a more lexico-grammatical phenomenon albeit contributory to the semantic structure of the whole discourse) and conjunction (a device to make explicit semantic relations between clausal components and complexes) should be absent to a larger extent than reference or lexical cohesion should. These two, remarkably, are accumulated at the end, and so are ellipsis and conjunction, as can be seen in the figures above. In that final part the subject matter and the theme of the poem become apparent, in accordance with the conventions of the

Elizabethan sonnet. This concentration of semantic relations, especially in the second quartet and in the final couplet, as a deliberate or at least extremely powerful stylistic effect, also serves to reinforce the explicitation of subject matter and theme (already somewhat anticipated by the juxtaposition of *men's eyes* and *women's souls* in l. 8).

Figure 8 below shows all the items that enter into some form of cohesion or other. In it we are made aware of the underlying semantic texture of the poem. As pointed out, some items (e.g. relative pronouns and some conjunctions) exhibit a considerable inclination towards the lexicogrammatical side of a cohesion line that could be postulated to span both internal (syntactic-structural proper) and external (semantic-cohesive proper) configurations encoded at different levels of description and communication in clauses and clause complexes.

A woman's nature's painted,
thou, the master-mistress my passion
A woman's but
false woman's
An eye more bright theirs less false
Gilding whereupon it gazeth
A man hue all hues his
Which men's eyes women's
And a woman thou created
nature she wrought thee a-doting
And addition me thee
adding one thing my nothing
But she pricked thee women's pleasure
Mine thy love thy love's use their

Fig. 8. Elements that enter into cohesive patterns.

Finally, it would be as well perhaps to end this paper by pointing out that the cohesion of this sonnet would be of little avail were it not to show in what way cohesion is ancillary to coherence. In other words, it would be necessary to supplement this discussion on the cohesive forces of the poem with another one capable of casting any light on the significance, first linguistic then semiotic of the sonnet as a coherent text (therefore syntactically and semantically appropriate to its genre). Such a coherence results from the dialectics of structure and cohesion and their close relationship with a higher order of communicative functions, namely those of literary phenomena as a whole, as they multifariously relate to reality itself. These functions and the no doubt important role played by cohesion (as well as by, though to a lesser extent, syntactic and graphic

structure) in establishing such functions are central to the final elucidation of this poem. Such an aim lies beyond our scope. Yet our study of cohesion has, we feel, laid the groundwork for a more detailed discussion of the meaning of the poem (along the lines, for instance, of the bone of contention for many critics whether the poem is about the poet's persona falling physically or spiritually in love, or both, with his young friend —the *thou).* But it also derives to some extent, as hinted earlier, from some interpretive choices made at the lexico-semantic level. In fact, decisions on such questions as to what extent particular instances of collocation (e.g. does *thing* really collocate with *hues?)* or synonymy apply in this poem involve decisions on the semantics and the overall context of the poem.

Once we know, then, what the poem is (what it consists of) and how it is so, we can proceed in a literary commentary to try and ascertain what it is about and what it entails form the point of view of literary criticism.

NOTES

1. By *deconstructed* we mean the same as Halliday: «destroying its [the text's] textual patterns one by one» (1985: 314); this should not, perhaps, be confused with J. Derrida's primary aim of demonstrating that a text has no fixed or stable meaning by means of deconstruction.
2. Participants in topical themes usually correspond to subject in declarative clauses, operator and subject in a yes/no question, wh-element in a wh-question, main verb or predicator in a command, according to Downing (1990: 30).
3. See Downing (1990: 30 ff.) for Halliday's definition of theme and her criticism.
4. A non-restricted appositive noun phrase
5. At the level of the premodifying adj. *gentle.*
6. With two postmodifying phrases in the line, the next beginning next line.
7. Embedded at O level.
8. With postmodifying relative clause.
9. With a postmodifying P-ing clause in all three interpretations (*a man in hue controlling all hues of his; a man in hue, all hues being in his control (ling); a man in hue, all hues in his hues controlling something else)* plus two coordinating postmodifying relative clauses in the next line.
10. The predicator is elliptical here: *being.*
11. At sentence level.
12. At the level of the last P.
13. With elliptical S and P—*she added*—, if we construe this line as a sentence, or with elliptical conjunction *and* possibly with elliptical Oi *to me* after *one thing,* if we decide it is an A to the clause in the previous line.

14. At sentence level.
15. With elliptical P *be*.
16. By e.g. making Theme and New (or Given and Rheme) coincide.
17. For the —likely— interpretation of 1.12 as sentence see above.
18. See MacCandless (1986: 264).
19. See MacCandless (1986: 185), where he cites other examples of such archaic usage by Shakespeare himself.
20. See discussion below.
21. We have preferred this interpretation —also in agreement with MacCandless (1986: 266)— to the one which would have *painted* as a synonym of *made up*, whereby the line would mean that the addressee's face is «not made up with cosmetics» (see note 1 to Sonnet 20 on p. 875 of *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*. 5th ed., vol. 1, New York. 1986).
22. For an exhaustive account of all possible connotations and meanings of the most important lexical items see the lexico-semantic study by MacCandless (1986: 260 ff.), to which much of this paper is indebted.

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APPENDIX

A woman's face, with nature's own hand painted,
Hast thou, the master-mistress of my passion -
A woman's gentle heart, but not acquainted
With shifting change, as is false woman's fashion;
An eye more bright than theirs, less false in rolling,
Gilding the object whereupon it gazeth;
A man in hue all hues in his controlling,
Which steals men's eyes and women's souls amazeth.
And for a woman wert thou first created,
Till nature as she wrought thee fell a-doting,
And by addition me of thee defeated,
By adding one thing to my purpose nothing.
But since she pricked thee out for women's pleasure,
Mine be thy love, and thy love's use their treasure.

ÍNDICE