Transcendental a priori and conventional a priori. The devious path of apriority from Kant to Putnam

Authors

  • Pablo Melogno Universidad de la República

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201812924

Abstract

In several works produced in the 60's and 70's, Putnam introduced the notion of

contextually a priori, trying to give an account of the principles that fix the limits

of the possible experience within a conceptual scheme. According to Putnam, these

principles are originated by the satisfaction of specific cognitive needs, and not by

conventional stipulations. This paper discusses the putnamian notion of the a priori

in relation to the stances of Poincaré, Reichenbach and Carnap, trying to establish

in each case the points of convergence with the putnamian conception, as well as

the reasons that led Putnam to reject the conventionalist views of the a priori. It

is argued that the putnamian account can be considered as a rehabilitation of the

transcendental component of the Kantian a priori, as for Putnam the a priori principles

are not only constitutive of the objects, but they fix cognitive limits that can only be

overcome in contexts of conceptual change.

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Published

2018-07-12

How to Cite

Melogno, P. (2018). Transcendental a priori and conventional a priori. The devious path of apriority from Kant to Putnam. Analysis. Journal of Philosophical Research, 5(1), 51-71. https://doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201812924