Epistemic Attitudes in Dialetheism: To Assent and Dissent in Contradiction

Abstract

Dialetheism is a philosophical position that asserts that some contradictions are true. Notably, dialetheism opposes the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). This paper inquires into the dialetheist's ability to meaningfully express her disagreement with other positions, especially the one Aristotle holds towards the PNC. To this end, the first step is to analyze the epistemic attitudes of assent and dissent, and how these intervene in the disagreement between incompatible positions. After this, I address two objections by Terence Parsons, as well as the responses of the dialetheist Graham Priest, highlighting the theoretical commitments of each side to explain why Parsons' arguments beg the question. Furthermore, I extend Parsons' arguments to a dialogical framework, in which the dialetheist debates with Aristotle. I argue that, in this context, the dialetheist's commitments, especially her assents to the conclusions of the liar paradoxes, prevent her from significantly expressing rejection to the PNC. To attain this conclusion, I emphasize a pragmatic inconsistency, along with the incoherent use of dialetheist's attitudes of assent and dissent.